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- Convenor:
-
Sam Hickey
(University of Manchester)
Send message to Convenor
- Formats:
- Papers Synchronous
- Stream:
- Leadership pathways and spaces
- Sessions:
- Thursday 18 June, -, -
Time zone: Europe/London
Short Abstract
The role of bureaucratic 'pockets of effectiveness' in delivering development often relies heavily on the role of 'technopols', leaders of both governments and organisations who not only possess a technical command of their field but also an ability to navigate difficult political terrains.
Long Abstract
It remains a puzzle that certain parts of the state function remarkably effectively in developing countries, despite being located in governance contexts that many characterize as dysfunctional. Often referred to as 'pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness', PoEs, can be defined as public organizations that are reasonably effective in carrying out their functions in otherwise dysfunctional governance contexts. PoEs have played essential roles in establishing the conditions for economic growth, avoiding problems associated with the resource curse, delivering services and performing a range of regulatory functions.
Leadership has been identified as a particularly important variable in enabling PoEs to emerge, flourish and be sustained. More specifically, the literature has identified a particular type of leader as often defining PoEs, namely 'technopols'. Technopols are leaders of both governments and organisations who not only possess a technical command of their field but also an ability to navigate difficult political terrains. We welcome papers that examines the role of technopols and other forms of leadership that are critical to PoEs, and which locate PoEs in their political context, including with reference to wider strategies of state-building and regime survival.
Accepted papers
Session 1 Thursday 18 June, 2020, -Paper short abstract
Technopols in Zambia are most productive if they are aligned with State House, in terms of personal rapport and ideas/ideologies, as was the case between 2001 and 2008 when a technocratic consensus emerged. The impact of technopols lessened when Zambia's political settlement changed in 2011.
Paper long abstract
Strong and independent leadership of Zambia's economic institutions, such as the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Zambia and Zambia Revenue Authority, have proven to be a crucial element in turning these institutions into 'Pockets of Effectiveness.' However, as we set out in our paper, these technopols are most productive if they have any influence on, or are aligned with the executive powers. Closeness to State House, in terms of personal rapport and ideas/ideologies are important, as was the case between 2001 and 2008 when a technocratic consensus emerged. The impact of technopols lessened when Zambia's political settlement changed in 2011, leading to varying outcomes of PoE in Zambia's economic institutions, with only the Bank of Zambia being able to carry out its mandate.
Paper short abstract
Employing an expanded political settlements approach, this paper explores the political economy factors that have explained the emergence and persistence of 'pockets of effectiveness' in Kenya
Paper long abstract
This paper explores the role that 'pockets of effectiveness' (POEs) have played in Kenya's recent developmental trajectory, as well as the political economy factors that explain their emergence and persistence over time. Drawing on in-depth primary research conducted at a number of Kenyan public-sector organisations, the paper finds that the country's competitive-clientelist political settlement creates an environment that is largely unconducive to the emergence of POEs, and certainly to their sustenance. This is because ruling elites are generally preoccupied with their own short-term political survival and are reluctant to invest in the longer-term venture of building and protecting state capacity. Instead of being top-down initiatives, as in many dominant political settlements, POEs in Kenya tend to be the result of multi-stakeholder initiatives, making them especially vulnerable to fluctuations in the interests and/or influence of various actors within the political settlement. That said, the paper identifies several factors that have played a kind of countervailing role on Kenya's competitive political settlement, helping to sustain certain POEs over considerable periods of time. These factors include ideas, which have occasionally motivated political leaders to support and protect organisations that they deem critical to their developmental visions, as well as transnational actors, who have offered significant support in terms of capacity-building and oversight, especially within the macroeconomic technocracy. Also important have been the leaders of POEs themselves, who by juggling both developmental and political goals have been able to maintain sufficient autonomy for their organisations to operate effectively.
Paper short abstract
This paper highlights the centrality of technopols for understanding how and why bureaucratic pockets of effectiveness emerge and persist within Ghana's largely dysfunctional public sector.
Paper long abstract
This paper highlights the centrality of technopols for understanding how and why bureaucratic pockets of effectiveness emerge and persist within Ghana's largely dysfunctional public sector. It focuses on the experiences of the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Ghana, two public sector agencies that have been widely acknowledged to have maintained relatively high levels of performance overtime, although with significant dips in performance both across and within ruling coalitions. Across both case studies, we find that the specific moments of good performance were those characterized by leaders who combined technocratic expertise with significant political influence within the ruling coalition. Unlike pure technocrats, such 'technopols' are often better able to push through relevant but difficult reforms because of the political trust that they wield within ruling coalitions. These findings support recent observations that in contexts of personalised forms of governance as in much of Africa, public sector agencies can enhance their effectiveness, not by isolating themselves from politics, but instead by cultivating 'strong political relations' and engaging in various forms of 'political bargaining' with powerful political and bureaucratic elites.
Paper short abstract
This paper explores how the interplay of political settlement dynamics and organisational leadership shapes public sector performance in Uganda, and how Uganda's PoEs have increasingly come to reflect the politics of regime survival rather than any wider state-building project.
Paper long abstract
Uganda's impressive levels of economic performance over much of the past three decades have often been linked to the performance of certain 'pockets of effectiveness' (PoEs), including the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Uganda and, more unevenly, the Uganda Revenue Authority. The President's extension of political protection to these (and other) PoEs has been central to their success, as has been the appointment of 'technopols' to lead these organisations, and who have proven capable of managing both the political and technical aspects of their briefs. However, the performance of these organisations has varied considerably over time, with all coming under considerable pressure as a result of shifts within Uganda's political settlement, which moved from being broadly 'dominant-developmental' to 'vulnerable-populist' in character from the early 2000s onwards. This shift profoundly altered the 'embedded autonomy' that PoEs had previously enjoyed, in ways that have undermined their capacity to deliver on their mandate. This paper explores how the interplay of political settlement dynamics and organisational leadership shapes public sector performance in Uganda, and how Uganda's PoEs have increasingly come to reflect the politics of regime survival rather than any wider state-building project.
Paper short abstract
Drawing on archival data and the author's participant observation of four Government of Ghana Ministries, this paper explores how funding delays, personal pressures, and the relationships between ministers and senior bureaucrats impact bureaucratic effectiveness.
Paper long abstract
There is a growing body of literature on bureaucratic pockets of effectiveness, much of which is focused on Ministries of Finance. However, less is known about how effectiveness is promoted or challenged in other government ministries. This paper presents insights from the author's participant observation of four Government of Ghana Ministers and their senior bureaucratic staffs: Local Government and Rural Development; Tourism; Youth and Sports; and Roads and Highways. Archival data from the Office of the Head of Civil Service indicates that these ministries are staffed by capable, well-educated bureaucrats, but bureaucratic effectiveness is hindered by competition between ministers and bureaucrats as well as politicians' and bureaucrats' own personal pressures (e.g., political finance, saving for retirement). Numerous political and bureaucratic interviewees also note that budget funds from the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning--which many consider to be a pocket of effectiveness--are frequently delayed, further impacting their own ministries' effectiveness. Engaging with the actual demands faced by politicians and bureaucrats, this paper will explore how leaders can enhance bureaucratic effectiveness and offer recommendations for donors on supporting such leadership.
Paper short abstract
How do networks of effectiveness develop and how are politicized bureaucratic appointments used to influence bureaucratic performance? I argue that politicians and bureaucrats ensure enhanced performance by making legal and extra-legal appointments of bureaucrats to key posts at critical junctures.
Paper long abstract
Bureaucratic performance is a key component of state capacity. However, bureaucratic performance can vary immensely even within a low-capacity state. In fact, politicians and bureaucrats often create pockets or networks of effectiveness that allow some bureaucrats and some departments to perform efficiently, while ignoring others. How do these networks of effectiveness develop and how are politicized bureaucratic appointments used to influence bureaucratic performance? I argue that politicians and bureaucrats ensure enhanced performance by making legal and extra-legal appointments of bureaucrats to key posts at critical junctures. I draw on qualitative fieldwork (including interviews, semi-participant observations, and data collection using newspaper archives) conducted in Punjab, Pakistan to show that the choice of bureaucrat for these posts is made on the basis of carefully curated relationships of patronage between politicians and bureaucrats, and bureaucrats themselves, established through work, training, and old school networks. These ties, and the method by which an appointment is made, are instrumental in determining bureaucratic turnover at times of governance crisis, or when the performance or service delivery of a department or agency needs improvement. As a result, temporary networks of effectiveness are created but are rendered unsustainable by the very patronage relationships that create them. My argument contributes to debates on intra-state capacity and politicization, and emphasises the role of politics in studying bureaucratic performance. More broadly, I show that staffing decisions—namely, appointing the right official to the right post—are a method of governance control that precedes and enables all others.
Paper short abstract
Many civil service positions are associated with required formal qualifications yet there is little evidence that such skills are related to performance, especially in developing country where requirements are often enforced loosely. I find that skill-position adequacy is critical for performance.
Paper long abstract
Many civil service positions are associated with required formal qualifications yet there is little evidence that such qualifications are related to performance, particularly in developing country contexts where such requirements are often enforced loosely. More interestingly, findings are mixed and controversial. In this paper, I develop a structural model that I estimate using individual-level survey data combined with audit reports stemming from 45 Beninese Local Administrations to explore bureaucratic performance. I find that Skill-Position Matching (i.e. appointing or hiring the required qualification to the position is required) is what matters the most for individual bureaucrat to performance better. Findings are robust to a set of controls and survive a number of specifications. Moreover, I address potential bias from selection on unobservables, and using an exogenous variation in skill-position matching, I perform a placebo to establish the causal relationship between skill-position adequacy and performance. Overall, evidence supports the view that policies that enhance civil service regulation and offset local politicians' power in both hiring and appointment decision are keys to improving bureaucratic performance.
Paper short abstract
In search of 'pockets of effectiveness', the paper beams the search light on public service delivery in Nigeria, which is often regarded as being in a poor state. It finds that indeed there are a few pockets of effectiveness in public service delivery in Nigeria.
Paper long abstract
The paper interrogates the existence of 'pockets of
effectiveness' among selected public services in Nigeria. While there is
a general negative perception of the effectiveness of public service
delivery across most African and developing countries, the paper seeks
to interrogate the case of Nigeria, and unravel whether there are areas
of public service delivery operating effectively. This is important as
majority of Nigerian citizens continue to lack quality and effective
public services from the government. The effectiveness of government in
delivery these public services are measured through citizens'
experiences of such services like reliable electricity supply, crime
reduction, water and sanitation services, among others. On this basis,
the paper interrogates the existence or otherwise of pockets of
effectiveness in public service delivery in Nigeria. It relies on
primary data sourced from Afrobarometer database R2016/2018 and analyses
the data using descriptive statistical techniques (frequencies and
percentages) of the Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS); and
content analysis. The paper finds that among the ten public service
delivery tested, only four showed pockets of effectiveness, while the
remaining six held true of the poor and ineffective state of public
services description in Nigeria. It concludes that despite the largely
ineffective state of public service delivery in Nigeria, there is still
a few pockets of effectiveness in this area.