Paper short abstract:

Many civil service positions are associated with required formal qualifications yet there is little evidence that such skills are related to performance, especially in developing country where requirements are often enforced loosely. I find that skill-position adequacy is critical for performance.

Paper long abstract:

Many civil service positions are associated with required formal qualifications yet there is little evidence that such qualifications are related to performance, particularly in developing country contexts where such requirements are often enforced loosely. More interestingly, findings are mixed and controversial. In this paper, I develop a structural model that I estimate using individual-level survey data combined with audit reports stemming from 45 Beninese Local Administrations to explore bureaucratic performance. I find that Skill-Position Matching (i.e. appointing or hiring the required qualification to the position is required) is what matters the most for individual bureaucrat to performance better. Findings are robust to a set of controls and survive a number of specifications. Moreover, I address potential bias from selection on unobservables, and using an exogenous variation in skill-position matching, I perform a placebo to establish the causal relationship between skill-position adequacy and performance. Overall, evidence supports the view that policies that enhance civil service regulation and offset local politicians' power in both hiring and appointment decision are keys to improving bureaucratic performance.