Paper short abstract:

This paper explores how the interplay of political settlement dynamics and organisational leadership shapes public sector performance in Uganda, and how Uganda's PoEs have increasingly come to reflect the politics of regime survival rather than any wider state-building project.

Paper long abstract:

Uganda's impressive levels of economic performance over much of the past three decades have often been linked to the performance of certain 'pockets of effectiveness' (PoEs), including the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Uganda and, more unevenly, the Uganda Revenue Authority. The President's extension of political protection to these (and other) PoEs has been central to their success, as has been the appointment of 'technopols' to lead these organisations, and who have proven capable of managing both the political and technical aspects of their briefs. However, the performance of these organisations has varied considerably over time, with all coming under considerable pressure as a result of shifts within Uganda's political settlement, which moved from being broadly 'dominant-developmental' to 'vulnerable-populist' in character from the early 2000s onwards. This shift profoundly altered the 'embedded autonomy' that PoEs had previously enjoyed, in ways that have undermined their capacity to deliver on their mandate. This paper explores how the interplay of political settlement dynamics and organisational leadership shapes public sector performance in Uganda, and how Uganda's PoEs have increasingly come to reflect the politics of regime survival rather than any wider state-building project.