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- Convenors:
-
Øystein H. Rolandsen
(Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO))
Kwesi Aning (KAIPTC)
Karen Büscher (Ghent University)
Maggie Dwyer (University of Edinburgh)
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- Stream:
- Politics and International Relations
- Location:
- Appleton Tower, Lecture Theatre 5
- Sessions:
- Thursday 13 June, -, -
Time zone: Europe/London
Short Abstract:
This panel explores the complex dynamics of international security assistance by focusing on the effects on recipient countries in Africa. It aims to look beyond the official policies of donors to understand how foreign-driven security assistance is interpreted, adapted, or contested within Africa.
Long Abstract:
Security assistance, with the overarching goal of increased 'stability', is a key area of international engagement for many states in Africa. Through advisors, training and equipment donations such programmes often aim to assist African countries to deal with transnational issues (e.g. violent extremism, migration or organized crime). It is a measure for actors outside the continent to address ruptures (civil wars, terror attacks, etc.) and obstruct connections they deem threatening (smuggling routes and religious extremism networks). Concurrently, security assistance is a key element in the bolstering of multi-lateral collaborations between African states (e.g. AMISOM and G5-Sahel). The landscape of security assistance has, however, become increasingly murky with a growing number of donors from both within and outside the continent, which at times advance differing agendas. The grand plans of security assistance are often riddled with competing interests, unintended consequences and contradictory outcomes.
The panel convenors invite contributions which explore the connections, ruptures and complex dynamics of international security assistance and its effects on recipient countries in Africa. Of particular interest would be papers looking beyond the official policies of donors to understand how foreign-driven security assistance is interpreted, adapted or contested within Africa. We will also welcome papers which take a view from below, examining the lived realities of security assistance on local communities, soldiers, police and traditional leaders. Submissions to the panel may also use approaches that take a broader perspective and investigate how international security partnerships affect governance, human rights and civil-military relations.
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Thursday 13 June, 2019, -Paper short abstract:
After independence, Ghana sought to modernise and transform its security forces with through the provision of assistance from multiple providers. Such assistance which came through education, training and basic equipment provision have been major contributors to Ghana's peacekeeping engagements.
Paper long abstract:
After independence in 1957, Ghana sought to modernise and transform its security forces, particularly the armed forces, through the request for and acceptance of assistance from multiple providers. Such assistance, which came through education, training and basic equipment provision, the paper argues have been major contributing factors to Ghana's peacekeeping engagements domestically, regionally and globally. While the paper argues that the objectives of SFA providers could have diverged significantly from the institutional and political interests of the Ghana Armed Forces and government, it is clear that the net impact on the Ghana Armed Forces have overall been positive. There is a lacunae in the literature, however, namely exploring the possible linkages between: (a) the provision of SFA to the GAF; and (b) its effectiveness in application during operations in peacekeeping theatres. A tentative answer to these questions are that Ghana had projections of itself as a continental leader and needed to modernise the armed forces to project power abroad through peacekeeping. The paper seeks therefore to bridge the gap by exploring the extent to which correlations, whether positive or negative, can be made between the provision of SFA and Ghana's peacekeeping engagements. It also explores the wider lessons to be learned from the need to appreciate the finer political and institutional nuances and calculus of recipient institutions and the potential unintended consequences of such assistance after their provision.
Paper short abstract:
This presentation explores the role of security force assistance in the midst of political transition in The Gambia. Despite much focus on reform, there are strong signals of continuity rather than a significant break from the past.
Paper long abstract:
This presentation explores the role of security force assistance in the midst of political transition in The Gambia. After nearly twenty-three years in power, President Jammeh of The Gambia was forced out of office in 2017 through a regional military intervention following his refusal to concede defeat in general elections. The sudden shift from a repressive authoritarian leader to a new government that promised adherence to democratic principles brought a rush of international aid, including offers for security force assistance (SFA). President Barrow has promised a new beginning for The Gambia and security force assistance has fit into the wider narrative of reform. Foreign assistance is seen as a way to help transform the security forces from organisations that were built around loyalty to an autocratic leader into a professional apolitical force that works for the betterment of the country. Yet the research found that the security force assistance aimed at transformation is limited in its scale, while the most rigorous assistance maintains the status quo. Therefore, despite much focus on reform, there are strong signals of continuity rather than a significant break from the past. The research for this presentation involved interviews with key donors and members of the Gambia security forces, a systematic review of Gambian news sources, and analysis of government and donor documents related to plans for security sector reform.
Paper short abstract:
This paper explores in how far the security assistance project of an US-American QUANGO establishes complicities and contentions between state security actors and the vigilante group "Koglweogo" in the light of their local power struggles.
Paper long abstract:
In 2017, the US-American QUANGO "United States Institute of Peace" (USIP) launched a "Justice and Security Dialogue Process" in the capital of Burkina Faso. The main objective of this security assistance project is to establish trust between the police, the military, civil society and the nationwide, vigilante self-defence group "Koglweogo", who recently attracted attention because of their physical punishments of delinquents. A secondary objective of the project is to reinforce a closer collaboration of these actors, in order to address ruptures like growing crime rates and terror attacks.
This civil-military 'assemblage' of actors has three dimensions of governance: On a global scale, the project mirrors the advancing transnationalization of security efforts in West Africa. On the national level, the project is a unique example for state fragmentation, because the USIP actively cooperates with a self-defence group that is not fully acknowledged by the state, though supported by a majority of the population. With regard to the action level, the projects' exceptionally broad spectrum of ethical notions is particularly noticeable, ranging from physical torture to state-legal norms and international human rights guidelines by the USIP.
Against this background, the present paper focuses on the local power struggles between the participants of the project. It highlights how competing interests between the state security actors, civil society and "Koglweogo" are negotiated, mediated and concealed. By doing this, the key research questions are, how the USIP is evaluated by the participants and in how far its involvement establishes complicities and contentions between them.
Paper short abstract:
This paper explores unintended consequences of security force assistance to beneficiaries in very weak states. It highlights new global processional networks that develop as a result, linking providers and beneficiaries, and their impacts in the politics of recipient states.
Paper long abstract:
Security force assistance (SFA) to build tactically proficient security forces in very weak states produces important unintended consequences. Elements of national security forces that receive targeted SFA become islands of efficiency, well connected to the professional networks of providers. From SFA providers' perspectives, islands of efficiency are welcome alternatives to expensive and politically infeasible broad stabilization efforts. This paper focuses on the professional connections and tactical proficiency that equip SFA beneficiaries to play new political roles in very weak state politics beyond the stated intentions of SFA. The paper paints a picture of global security networks that connect groups of mutually recognized security professionals and politicians that support SFA programs in SFA provider and recipient countries. While this is an intended SFA outcome, these networks play distinctive domestic political roles when the recipient government as a whole lacks the political will and capacity to effectively fight insurgents. The lack of broader political focus and the development of bureaucratic enclaves in SFA provider governments help extend this network of security professionals. These networks become tactically proficient at the same time that they operate in a strategic vacuum on both the provider and recipient government sides. Tactical proficiency in this political environment is an ideal recipe for unintended consequences. Research for this project conducted on the ground in Mali and Iraq during 2018-2019 under the auspices of the PRIO-based and Norwegian Research Council project, "The impact of Security Force Assistance on State Fragility" shapes the analysis in this paper.
Paper short abstract:
What kind of security assistance rising powers offer to African countries? And how are competition dynamics for similar opportunities absorbed on the ground? I explore these issues by analyzing Chinese and Indian overtures towards Mozambique as well as Brazilian and Chinese efforts in Namibia.
Paper long abstract:
Studies over the role of rising powers in providing security assistance to African countries have so far avoided comparative exercises. Instead, the focus is often set on sparse ad hoc efforts led by either China, India, or Brazil on an individual basis. But despite the proliferation of new external security actors in the continent and the increase of juxtaposing intersections on the ground, the content of the expertise and capabilities made available, on the one hand, and the reactions they entice from the ground up, on the other hand, still remain insufficiently explored. What different practical solutions are offered in these cases? And how do recipient nations interpret and absorb dynamics of competition that invariably arise between newcomers for similar opportunities? I unpack these predicaments by analyzing Chinese and Indian overtures towards Mozambique as well as Brazilian and Chinese efforts in Namibia. I evidence key similarities and distinctions in tackling broad security needs, particularly when concerning the capacity-building of security sectors and the growing focus on maritime security concerns. I also argue for a measure of evident bargaining from African states despite conflicting outcomes in juggling multiple partners vying for the same ends.
Paper short abstract:
British soldiers undertaking SFA in Mali, Nigeria and Kenya often ask: where is the "demand signal" for their activities? They feel that the UK approach currently lacks sufficient resources and political guidance, or commitment, to provide - or even understand - what partner forces want and need.
Paper long abstract:
In 2018, British Prime Minister Theresa May championed the UK's security force assistance (SFA) efforts in Africa; highlighting, particularly, the work of UK soldiers in Mali and Kenya in "providing support for African governments that are meeting [the terrorist] challenge head-on." However, when speaking to these same soldiers during field research in Mali and Kenya, many expressed doubts about whether UK SFA is meeting the "demand signal" from partner forces - suggesting their activities were often neither asked for nor effective. Most soldiers we spoke to argued that this was caused, in part, by the UK government's failure to provide the strategic direction or resources necessary to have a positive impact in the countries in which the UK is engaged. As a result, activities were often short-term in approach; for instance, most soldiers focused on short training courses which could be delivered on their deployment cycle with the limited resources they had. However, it was hard to find any soldier who believed these activities addressed the key issues affecting insecurity. Similarly, efforts to improve the UK contribution by building relationships with local partners were often wasted as the contact was lost with the end of the deployment cycle. This study will show that SFA is currently being treated as an afterthought by British decision-makers and will conclude that, to ensure Britain is really supporting its partners, SFA must be given the strategic guidance and resources it requires, drawing more effectively on the lessons learned from those on the ground.
Paper short abstract:
How does security-sector assistance play out in the domestic context of African recipient states and how do variations in domestic politics affect the outcome of security assistance? A comparison of Sahel and the Horn.
Paper long abstract:
African responses to security threats such as terrorist activities vary from robust counter-insurgency, as is the case of Ethiopia, to relative absenteeism, as in Mali. What are such variations a function of? In this paper, we highlight the extent to which variations in patronage, in historical legitimacy of the state, in the degree of ethnic ownership of state institutions including the military, and in a country's propensity for extraversion affect the strength of its response to security threats or its "will to live." We then show how such responses condition the nature and effectiveness of international, and particularly US, security-sector assistance to these countries. Our findings highlight the paradox that US capacity-building and security-governance efforts are most welcome by, and most developed in, states where there are significant deficits of the will to live or commitment to security.
Paper short abstract:
This paper explores Security Force Assistance to Mali, which is provided by several different actors and given to a diverse set of recipients among branches of the government security apparatus. This fragmentation results in ineffectiveness and has adverse negative consequences for people in Mali.
Paper long abstract:
This paper explores the complex reality of Security Force Assistance (SFA) to Mali. The provision of SFA is currently presented by many commentators and governments in the global North as a panacea for the various threats and problems in the global South. Training and equipping the police, border guard and military forces in weak states are expected to bring stability, control illegal immigration, and stop terror and crime networks. Based on field research and a comprehensive analysis of documentary evidence the authors find that in Mali, SFA is provided by several different actors and given to a diverse set of recipients among branches of the government security apparatus. Thus, multiple providers and uncoordinated implementation muddle objectives and may serve to fragment an already loosely assembled recipient state and its armed forces. It is likely that increased focus on security assistance from foreign states impacts civil-military relations in Mali as it bolsters the relative strength of the army and its officers vis-à-vis their civilian leaders. Also, the need for foreign donors to achieve quick solutions to immediate security threats might result in by-passing of the civilian leadership. The implication is that SFA to a fragmented weak state such as Mali appears to exacerbate the problems the assistance is meant to solve.