Paper short abstract:

This paper explores unintended consequences of security force assistance to beneficiaries in very weak states. It highlights new global processional networks that develop as a result, linking providers and beneficiaries, and their impacts in the politics of recipient states.

Paper long abstract:

Security force assistance (SFA) to build tactically proficient security forces in very weak states produces important unintended consequences. Elements of national security forces that receive targeted SFA become islands of efficiency, well connected to the professional networks of providers. From SFA providers' perspectives, islands of efficiency are welcome alternatives to expensive and politically infeasible broad stabilization efforts. This paper focuses on the professional connections and tactical proficiency that equip SFA beneficiaries to play new political roles in very weak state politics beyond the stated intentions of SFA. The paper paints a picture of global security networks that connect groups of mutually recognized security professionals and politicians that support SFA programs in SFA provider and recipient countries. While this is an intended SFA outcome, these networks play distinctive domestic political roles when the recipient government as a whole lacks the political will and capacity to effectively fight insurgents. The lack of broader political focus and the development of bureaucratic enclaves in SFA provider governments help extend this network of security professionals. These networks become tactically proficient at the same time that they operate in a strategic vacuum on both the provider and recipient government sides. Tactical proficiency in this political environment is an ideal recipe for unintended consequences. Research for this project conducted on the ground in Mali and Iraq during 2018-2019 under the auspices of the PRIO-based and Norwegian Research Council project, "The impact of Security Force Assistance on State Fragility" shapes the analysis in this paper.