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Japan is the only front-line US ally that both fears China and sees itself as a regional leader. The paper asks how the quiet fear of being left alone with China shapes Japan’s alliance behaviour, public narratives, and policy choices.

Paper long abstract

Debates on Japanese security policy usually focus on “normalisation”, the China threat, and the US-Japan alliance. This paper starts from a simpler point, one that is often taken for granted: Japan is the United States’ front-line ally against China, alone with no NATO-like community around it, but yet has a self-image as a “tier one” state that would not live under Chinese regional hegemony. The quiet fear of being abandoned by the US and left alone with China – a fear that cannot be stated openly in polite alliance and policy circles – nonetheless fundamentally shapes contemporary alliance politics.

The paper examines how this fear shapes Japan’s behaviour as a “reliable” ally and how it is managed in public language. Successive governments have worked hard to demonstrate Japan’s usefulness to Washington, through legal changes, military spending, build-up, and diplomatic activism, while avoiding open discussion of what US retrenchment would actually mean. Subordination to Washington is treated, implicitly, as the lesser of two evils: a way to insure against a future in which Japan must deal with China from a position of isolation and lowered status.

Drawing on speeches, white papers, Diet debates, among other sources, and focused on the post-Cold War era, the paper pays special attention to moments when US commitment seemed to waver – and how Japan responded. It shows how fear of abandonment is handled through reassurance towards the US, rather than through explicit debate about a future in which the US is less present

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This study analyzes how Korean migration to Japan during colonial rule (1910–1945) has indirectly shaped postwar Japanese electoral politics. Using panel data (1958–2015) and a fixed-effects model, it shows birthplace-driven spatial effects on voting and party support.

Paper long abstract

This study examines the long-term and spatial effects of Korean migration to Japan and its indirect impact on postwar Japanese electoral politics, focusing on House of Representatives elections between 1958 and 2015. The analysis is situated within the broader historical context of Japan’s colonial rule over Korea (1910–1945), when large numbers of Koreans—often through forced or semi-forced migration—moved to Japan. Many of their descendants, known as Zainichi Koreans, remained in Japan after World War II under ambiguous legal status and persistent social discrimination. Their settlement patterns and social presence have indirectly shaped the political preferences and voting behavior of surrounding Japanese communities.

The study builds a prefecture-level panel dataset combining House of Representatives election results, demographic indicators, and detailed immigration records from the Japanese National Diet Library. A fixed-effects model is used to estimate the effects of migrants’ regional origins on local electoral outcomes. The analysis distinguishes Korean migrants’ birthplaces by levels of economic development and political orientation, allowing for the identification of the key mechanism through which migration legacies affect Japanese politics.

The results show that the main channel of influence is the migrants’ birthplace on the Korean Peninsula. Birthplace characteristics—reflecting historical regional differences in economic and political conditions—exert lasting and spatially diverse effects on voting patterns, party support, and turnout across Japan’s 47 prefectures. These effects operate primarily through neighborhood-level social interaction and local diffusion. By linking colonial-era migration patterns to contemporary political behavior, this study demonstrates that imperial and migratory legacies continue to shape the structure of democratic politics in postcolonial Japan.

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How do cuisines travel when vloggers, not diplomats, introduce them? This study examines culinary influencers as cultural mediators in India–Japan relations, showing how everyday cooking videos on YouTube and Instagram spark cross-cultural curiosity and emotional connection.

Paper long abstract

This paper examines how culinary influencers act as digital diplomats and cultural mediators, shaping national food imaginaries through online storytelling. Focusing on India–Japan relations, the study explores how food creators on YouTube, Instagram, and TikTok construct narratives of authenticity, fusion, everyday cooking, and cultural curiosity that shape cross-cultural perceptions beyond formal diplomatic spaces.

While institutional diplomacy relies on state-led initiatives, influencers build affective connections through personal stories, visual aesthetics, and parasocial intimacy. Drawing on theories of soft power (Nye 2004), culinary nation branding (Ooi 2015), and cultural intermediation (Bourdieu 1984), the paper identifies three key categories of culinary influencers:

(1) diaspora bridge figures such as Indian cooks and restaurateurs in Japan or Japanese chefs in India who translate food cultures for local audiences;

(2) professional chefs who collaborate with tourism boards or cultural institutions and actively shape national cuisine narratives online;

(3) lifestyle and wellness creators who link Indo–Japanese culinary exchange with themes like sustainability, mindfulness, and global living.

Methodologically, the study uses digital ethnography, discourse and visual analysis, and engagement metrics to understand how platform algorithms highlight specific styles of representation such as minimalism, home cooking, or creative fusion. These patterns reveal how influencers function as para-diplomatic actors who negotiate taste, identity, and belonging in digital spaces.

By centering influencers within the study of contemporary cultural diplomacy, this paper contributes to discussions on digital Asia, soft power, and the sensory politics of food. It argues that in an era of algorithm-driven visibility, intercultural understanding increasingly emerges through everyday online food storytelling rather than through traditional diplomatic channels.

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The paper examines the effect of LDP factionalisation on Japan's foreign affairs decision-making ability in 1980-82 period, characterised by one of the most intense phases of LDP factionalism. The research provides insights into the impact of domestic institutions on the formation of foreign policy.

Paper long abstract

In contemporary International Relations, neorealism has been the dominant realist theory for explaining state decision-making in international politics. Over the past two decades, this approach has guided research on Japan’s foreign policy, particularly in Japan’s relations with China and the U.S. However, the exclusive focus on structural factors fails to fully account for Japan's predominantly restrained and reactive foreign policy in the face of threats from external powers. Other realist approaches, such as neoclassical realism—especially its focus on the impact of elite fragmentation on foreign affairs decision-making and unit-level characteristics—have been largely overlooked in analyses of Japan’s foreign affairs decision-making.

This study presents the results of a scrutiny of the relatively neglected 1980-82 period of Japanese foreign policy formation, marked by arguably one of the most intense phases of factionalism within the then-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japanese political history. Using the case study, I argue that foreign policy-making was weakened by the intra-party rivalry among several powerful factions, rooted in unique institutional forms developed within the LDP. Applying the theory of neoclassical realism and drawing on available internal party reports, diplomatic bluebooks, and Cabinet records, my results demonstrate how elite fragmentation constrained Japan's ability to address external challenges, such as the shift in the U.S. policy under President Reagan towards Japan.

The findings contribute to a deeper understanding of the institutional power of factions in overall decision-making and to refining the neoclassical theory of IR by incorporating the role of domestic political institutions.

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The research examines how three diplomats of Armenian origin, Diana Apcar, Hovhannes Masehian, and Hovhannes Tevosyan, each serving under different states, played a decisive role in establishing and restoring diplomatic relations with Japan on behalf of Armenia, Persia, and the Soviet Union.

Paper long abstract

This research examines the work of Armenian-origin diplomats who served in Japan in the first half of the 20th century on behalf of the First Republic of Armenia, Persia, and the Soviet Union. The study aims to reveal their contributions to the establishment and development of bilateral relations between Japan and the countries they represented.

Diana Apcar, the first Armenian woman to hold the title of honorary consul, became a central figure in early Armenian-Japanese relations through her work in Japan in the early 20th century. Apcar distinguished herself by protecting Armenian refugees. She promoted international awareness of the Armenian Question, acted as an intermediary in diplomatic matters, and produced a body of literary work that supported her mission.

The appointment of Hovhannes Khan Masehian as the first Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Persia to Japan carries special significance. Following the establishment of diplomatic and commercial relations with Japan, the Persian government entrusted its representation in Japan to Masehian, an Armenian Christian who was held in high regard by the Persian royal family. His role reflects both the trust placed in him and the broader presence of Armenians within the administrative structures of Persia.

Hovhannes Tevosyan became the first Soviet ambassador to Japan after the WW2, during the period when diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan were being restored. His mission was vital for renewing political dialogue. His contribution became even more important given the tense political climate of the time. He facilitated the easing of hostility between the two countries and supported the development of a new diplomatic course.

The careers of these Armenian diplomats show that their appointments were shaped by the global dispersion of Armenians, their personal and professional skills, the international respect they enjoyed, and their strong presence within the state institutions they served. Their work left a lasting mark on the history of bilateral relations between their respective states and Japan, and highlights the broader diplomatic potential of Armenians on the international stage.

Keywords: Armenian diplomats, Japan, 20th century, Diana Apcar, Hovhannes Masehian, Hovhannes Tevosyan, Armenian-Japanese relations, Persian-Japanese relations, Soviet-Japanese relations.

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This presentation explores Japan’s leadership on drug resistance, a major global health threat. Drawing on interviews and document analysis, it shows how Japan shapes G7/G20 agendas, exerts financial and technical influence, and strengthens its role in global health governance.

Paper long abstract

Drug resistance, or antimicrobial resistance (AMR), is often called the “silent pandemic”, threatening the lives of tens of millions worldwide. In 2016, Japan launched its first National Action Plan on AMR, emphasizing its leadership in promoting international collaboration against this global health threat.

Yet little attention has been paid to how Japan has translated this commitment into concrete actions – particularly within global governance systems dominated by the West, such as the G7, G20, and others. Using AMR policy as a case study, this paper asks: In what ways does Japan shape global and Western health policies on AMR, and how is Japan’s leadership received by the West?

Drawing on document analysis, interviews with Japanese and global policymakers, and participant observation at the Global AMR R&D Hub, a G20 agency initiated by Germany where Japan serves as a board member, this paper shows that Japan actively shapes global and Western AMR strategies through political, financial, technical, and diplomatic influence.

First, Japan’s active membership in key multilateral forums secures its political influence to set the agenda. Second, Japan provides significant financial and political support to Western-led AMR initiatives. Third, Japan contributes technical expertise in multilateral working groups that inform Western and global AMR practices. Fourth, Japan acts as a crucial bridge between East and West, gaining influence through its consistent presence at, and organization of, high-profile diplomatic events. This study highlights Japan’s leadership in global health, contributes to our understanding of contemporary Japan–West relations, and offers insights into the dynamics of today’s global governance.

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The 2022 assassination of Shinzō Abe exposed the clientelist ties between Japan’s LDP and the Unification Church. Using systems theory, the case exemplifies how parasitic structural couplings are inherent to clientelism and subsequently collapse under public scrutiny, restoring order through crisis.

Paper long abstract

The assassination of former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe on 8 July 2022 brought the previously covert politico-religious clientelist relationship between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the 'New Religion' Unification Church (UC) to public attention. The perpetrator, Tetsuya Yamagami, attributed his motive to the disruptive impact of the UC on his family’s financial and interpersonal stability. According to his assessment, this was made possible by the political legitimization and structural protection that the LDP and especially Abe had granted the UC.

In clientelist relationships, client and patron monitor one another with regard to resources advantageous for their own structural development. The LDP translated the UC’s resources (personnel, finances, information, and mobilization capacity) into electoral and administrative benefits, while the UC translated political prestige, lobbying influence, and protection from regulatory oversight into support for its dogma. Drawing on Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory, the clientelist relationship can thus be analyzed as a form of structural coupling. Typical for such couplings, it remained functional as long as it remained concealed. However, such clientelist arrangements are only possible by accessing parasitic resource extraction from third-party systems – in this case, money from the family system. Building on Michel Serres’ concept of the parasite, it becomes evident that such precarious strains inevitably lead to the clientelist relationship becoming publicly visible – exemplified by the assassination of Abe. This resulted in scandal, a loss of legitimacy for the LDP, and attempts at political disentanglement, which in turn led to a (temporary) suspension of relations.

Thus, the guiding hypothesis is that the case exemplifies how parasitic dynamics and structural coupling are inherent to clientelism. They operate in a corrupting manner, yet also (unintentionally) restore political order through destabilization and subsequent implosion.

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Why has Taiwan substantially narrowed the gender gap in politics while Japan has not? Drawing on two decades of nomination and election data, this paper compares Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan to show how institutions, elite recruitment pathways, and partisanship shape gender gaps in politics.

Paper long abstract

Despite sharing advanced economic development, democratic institutions, and broadly similar socio-cultural contexts, Japan continues to lag significantly behind Taiwan in gender equality in politics. This paper revisits this well-known puzzle by asking a more specific question: why has Taiwan been able not only to elect more women, but also to sustain their political careers over time, while Japan has struggled to do so?

Building on original nomination, election, and re-election data and elite interviews with legislators, this study adopts a comparative perspective that places Japan at the centre of analysis, with South Korea and Taiwan serving as analytically strategic contrasts. Applying a mixed-method approach, the paper highlights three underexplored dimensions. First, it shows how differences in electoral institutions—particularly the design and practical operation of mixed electoral systems—create distinct opportunity structures for women’s long-term political survival. Second, it examines personal pathways into politics, including the role of political families and inherited networks, which remain unusually salient in Taiwan and disproportionately benefit female politicians. Third, it reassesses the role of partisanship, arguing that gender equality largely functions as a broadly non-partisan, valence issue in Taiwan, while remaining deeply politicised and polarised in Japan (and South Korea).

Rather than presenting gender equality as a simple outcome of quotas or cultural change, the paper conceptualises women’s presence in politics as a career-contingent process, shaped by institutional incentives, elite recruitment practices, and partisan competition. By situating Japan’s experience within a broader East Asian comparison, the paper contributes to Japanese studies by offering a reframed explanation for Japan’s persistent gender gap—one that foregrounds political structure and career sustainability over participation alone.

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My paper examines how Japan’s energy vulnerabilities—particularly its dependence on Middle Eastern oil—were transformed into core national security concerns, reshaping Japan’s strategic identity and policy from postwar pacifism toward a more proactive security posture.

Paper long abstract

Japan depends heavily on imported energy, mainly from the politically unstable Middle East, which has shaped its security policies since World War II. This paper examines how energy insecurity pushed Japan to gradually shift away from strict pacifism and expand its conception of national security. By examining key events like the oil shocks of the 1970s, the Gulf War, post-9/11 threats, and the Fukushima disaster, the research shows that repeated energy crises were increasingly seen as serious threats to Japan's economic stability and social well-being. This approach helps connect energy challenges with Japan's evolving security strategy.

The article investigates two central questions: how energy insecurity influenced Japan's changing security identity, and how the principles of Comprehensive Security evolved after the 1980s. Using securitisation theory, constructivism, and complex interdependence, the study shows that energy vulnerabilities were not merely economic challenges but catalysts for institutional and normative adaptation. These theoretical perspectives reveal the interplay between material pressures, pacifist norms, and the constraints of alliance politics in guiding Japan's policy choices.

The research employs historical institutionalism and process tracing to connect energy shocks with gradual changes in Japan's institutions and strategy. It examines four main periods: the Cold War, the decade after the Cold War, new global threats from 2001 to 2014, and security reforms after 2015. Throughout this period, the Middle East remained important to Japan's strategy due to its role in energy supply.

The study's results show that energy crises and other issues threatening Japan's energy security have directly affected its security identity. In particular, Japan's security identity has been reflected in the activation of its security policy. Although the main provisions of Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy have been maintained, only the Self-Defence Forces' functions have been expanded, including their peacekeeping and peace-building roles․

Keywords: Japan; Security Policy; Energy Security; Pacifism; Middle East; Proactive Contribution to Peace; Security Identity.

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Paper short abstract

Why do some Japanese cities hire foreign nationals as public employees while others restrict nationality? We argue larger, wealthier cities mobilize mayoral entrepreneurship and interest groups. Analyzing 840 cities, we find fiscal strength and city size predict openness better than demographics.

Paper long abstract

Despite national government guidance reserving public sector positions involving the "exercise of public power" for citizens, Japanese municipalities exhibit striking variation in openness to hiring foreign residents. Why do some cities maintain strict nationality requirements while others have progressively expanded opportunities for foreign residents across administrative, technical, and specialized positions? This paper argues that policy innovation emerges from the strategic interaction between entrepreneurial mayors and organized interest groups. This dynamic is concentrated in larger, financially stronger cities.

Drawing on Schneider and Teske's (1992) political entrepreneurship framework, we theorize that mayors in larger cities possess advantages for challenging the status quo. Larger cities have more developed advocacy infrastructures, including organizations specifically mobilized around foreign resident rights. Operating most effectively in large cities, groups such as the Korean Residents Union in Japan (Mindan); the Tokyo Liaison Council for Realizing Foreign Resident Employment in Public Service; and the Japan Federation of Bar Associations have systematically campaigned to remove nationality restrictions. These interest groups can provide entrepreneurial mayors and local councils with important resources that enable change, including interest groups demonstrating political demand for reform, legal advice, and coalition partners. However, smaller municipalities do not benefit from such organizational infrastructure. As a result, mayors in these municipalities face higher costs and greater risks when considering change to the status quo.

Our framework further emphasizes how fiscal capacity enables entrepreneurial politics. Larger municipal budgets create "slack resources"—discretionary funds not committed to fixed obligations that political entrepreneurs can strategically reallocate toward policy experimentation, such as the hiring of foreign nationals. This fiscal flexibility, combined with dense interest group networks, allows entrepreneurial mayors to challenge restrictions on hiring foreign nationals without triggering conflicts over budget.

Analyzing 840 Japanese cities in 1997 and 2020 using ordered logit regression, we find that fiscal strength and city size significantly predict municipal openness while demographic factors show weaker relationships. These findings confirm previous studies that have demonstrated that local governments are important for progressive policy innovation in Japan. Entrepreneurial mayors partnering with organized advocacy movements can lead reforms that challenge assumptions about the role of foreign nationals in Japan.

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To respond to geopolitical challenges, Japan’s science and technology diplomacy toward the Global South has shown new trends in five aspects. Reasons on three different levels have collectively contributed to the shift.

Paper long abstract

Faced by increasing Geopolitical Challenges, Japan’s science and technology diplomacy toward the Global South has shown some new trends. In terms of its function positioning, the science and technology diplomacy has attached greater importance to safeguarding Japan’s national security and its advantage in strategic competition. In terms of partner selection, Japan has chosen key partners in the Global South based on a comprehensive consideration involving ideology, geographical location, and resource endowment rather than only economic benefits and technological level. Technological hotspots crucial to geopolitical competition such as defense technology, cutting-edge technology, and critical minerals have become new elements in Japan’s cooperation agenda with Global South countries. In terms of participating agents, Japanese government‘s strategic leadership and defense sector’s involvement have been strengthened. In terms of the cooperation model, Japan’s cooperation with the Global South has evolved from standalone technological assistance to strategic cooperation linked with multiple fields and multiple allies. The shift in Japan’s science and technology diplomacy toward the Global South is driven by the demand to enhance its technological power amid great power rivalry, secure a favorable position in its competition against China in the Global South, and ensure its national economic security. Japan's behavioral logic in its science and technology diplomacy toward the Global South shares similarities with that of many other Western middle powers amid increasing Geopolitical tensions. Therefore, this paper is supposed to contribute to providing an analytical framework that can also be generalized to analyze other countries’ science and technology diplomacy.

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The paper flips a core premise in the Japan security debate by identifying cultural artefacts that support rather than resist remilitarisation. Introducing the concept of cultural remilitarisation, it discusses manga featuring the JSDF that challenge Japan’s “culture of antimilitarism”.

Paper long abstract

There is an impasse in Japan’s security debate, obscuring evaluations of Japan’s military capabilities at a time of turbulence and tension in East Asia’s security environment. Material-focused scholarship emphasises defence build-up programmes and policy reforms that are cumulatively developing Japan’s autonomous security capabilities to argue Japan is remilitarising; and culture-focused scholarship emphasise a ‘culture of antimilitarism’ to argue these changes are insignificant. This paper explores a route through this impasse by flipping the premise on which it rests: that Japan’s culture resists remilitarisation. Using Jeffrey Alexander’s New Durkheimian conceptualisation of societal consensus, it frames manga as important cultural texts that reinforce, challenge, and otherwise shape Japan’s societal consensus. It explores a collection of manga that positively portray Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) enactments of violence, identifying three patterns of violence: constrained, frantic, and dominant, that frame JSDF violence as a legitimate tool of statecraft. The paper thereby illustrates (pun intended) how these manga represent interpretive challenges to the antimilitarist societal consensus identified by Thomas U. Berger and others. The paper outlines a process of “cultural remilitarisation” connected to manga, introducing nuance to a key premise of the Japan security debate: Japan’s culture can support and encourage, as well as resist, remilitarisation. Moreover, it demonstrates the value of manga studies in the context of politics and international relations.

Keywords: international security, manga, militarism, new Durkheim, popular culture and politics

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How do individuals in apolitical organizations become politically active? We refine the Civic Voluntarism Model to understand political engagement in Sōka Gakkai. We show that it is not obedience, but interpersonal recruitment, driven by a “core group” of highly active members, that is key.

Paper long abstract

Citizen participation is the foundation of thriving democracies. However, many democracies face the challenges of affective polarization or widespread political disinterest and disengagement. Against this backdrop, it is important to understand how apolitical individuals are mobilized and become politicized. Researchers have produced a large body of literature on civil society organizations and its role in liberal democracies, addressing among others the politization of otherwise apolitical organizations. How, for example, do the rank-and-file members of religions, professional associations, sports-clubs etc. become mobilized not only to turn out to vote, but In Japan, however, much of the literature pays little attention to the importance of social context, as can be seen in publications not just on religious movements, but on other groups, too, such as business, farm, or labor networks. These organizations are often grouped together as the ‘organized vote’ (soshikihyō), with little consideration of how votes are actually mobilized, what motivates members to vote along the organizational recommendation. The assumption has often been that networks are simply tools that are used to pressure voters into mobilizing for paternalistic politicians to mobilize others to do so. This question is not only important to understand how political participation is influenced by membership in apolitical organizations, but also given the substantial decline in Kōmeitō’s voter support over the last twenty years. We reject the simplistic claims from some commentators that adherents are simply following orders and instead focus on processes of internal mobilization within the organization. We base our investigation on the civic voluntarism model (CVM) that posits that people participate in politics because they can, they want to, or someone asked them. We show how this model works in a religious setting by refining it to show that a group of people who are largely apolitical are mobilized by their fellow adherents, a ‘core group’ of highly religious and politically active members.

We base our analysis on in-depth interviews and ethnographic research conducted in the early to mid-2020s and on an original survey we conducted among Gakkai members in the late summer of 2024.

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The inauguration of the Takaiichi administration in 2025 ignites debates over Japan’s rightward shift. This study examines the LDP–Nippon Kaigi relationship through text analysis of party and movement documents (1995–2025), focusing on leadership ideology, mobilization, and ideological congruence.

Paper long abstract

In 2025, following the inauguration of the Takaiichi administration in October, debates over the conservative and rightward shift of Japanese politics have been reignited, prompting renewed attention to developments that began under the second Abe administration. In this context, the relationship between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Nippon Kaigi has once again emerged as a focal point of discussion. In particular, scholars and commentators have highlighted their close ties over constitutional revision, especially with regard to Article 9. Despite this renewed interest, systematic empirical analyses examining how and under what conditions the LDP and Nippon Kaigi have aligned remain limited.

This study aims to contribute to debates on political rightward shift in Japanese politics by examining one aspect of the relationship between the LDP and Nippon Kaigi through an analysis of their respective activities. Specifically, it tests two hypotheses concerning factors that shape relations between political parties and social organizations (interest groups): party leadership ideology and organizational resources. First, when the LDP president holds a more right-leaning ideology and Nippon Kaigi’s mobilizational capacity (measured by membership and number of local branches) increases, the degree of congruence between the two actors is expected to rise. Second, when the LDP president adopts a more liberal ideological stance and Nippon Kaigi’s mobilizational capacity declines, the level of congruence is expected to decrease.

To test these hypotheses, this study conducts a text analysis of official documents produced between 1995 and 2025, including LDP party convention materials (such as party platforms and policy guidelines) and Nippon Kaigi's general assembly documents (such as activity and policy statements). By tracing patterns of alignment over three decades, this research seeks to shed light on the conservative turn in Japanese political society since the mid-1990s and to contribute to broader discussions on party–society relations, mobilization, and advocacy by social organizations.

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This paper examines the role of governing parties in Japan’s foreign and security policymaking by focusing on the formulation of the National Security Strategy (NSS) under the Abe and Kishida administrations.

Paper long abstract

This paper examines the role of governing parties in Japan’s foreign and security policymaking by focusing on the formulation of the National Security Strategy (NSS) under the Abe and Kishida administrations. Existing scholarship often portrays Japan’s security policy as an executive-dominated domain, emphasizing the centralization of authority in the Prime Minister’s Office and the expansion of prime ministerial leadership. While this literature captures significant institutional developments, it tends to understate the continued involvement of governing parties in shaping high-stakes strategic decisions.

To address this gap, the paper integrates insights from Principal–Agent (PA) theory and the Party Government perspective. PA theory conceptualizes governing parties as collective principals tasked with monitoring and constraining executive agents, but it also highlights the structural limits of such control in policy areas characterized by high information asymmetry and executive discretion. The Party Government approach, by contrast, emphasizes the organizational functions of governing parties in coordinating internal preferences, absorbing conflict, and providing political justification for government decisions. Rather than treating these approaches as competing explanations, this study advances a dual-function framework in which governing parties perform both control-oriented and coordination-oriented roles, with the relative balance between these functions varying according to prime ministerial leadership conditions.

Empirically, the paper conducts a comparative, process-oriented analysis of the NSS under the Abe and Kishida administrations. Drawing on official policy documents, party-level deliberations, and contemporaneous media reports, it traces governing party involvement across different stages of the policy process. The analysis suggests that under the Abe administration’s strong, centralized leadership, governing parties primarily served as mechanisms for absorbing conflict and legitimation, helping to internalize dissent and transform potentially contentious security reforms into party-backed policies. Under the Kishida administration, by contrast, governing party organizations played a more visible role as arenas of coordination and balancing, reflecting more constrained leadership conditions and heightened intra-party and coalition considerations.

As a preliminary study, the findings aim to establish the plausibility of this dual-function framework and lay the groundwork for future research on party–executive relations in foreign and security policy across parliamentary systems.

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This paper examines the Japanese factor in Afghanistan’s international relations from the Mukden Incident to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and aims to offer a more three-dimensional understanding of the Great Game.

Paper long abstract

This paper examines the Japanese factor in Afghanistan’s international relations from the Mukden Incident to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Despite Afghanistan’s attainment of independence in 1919, Anglo-Russian rivalry over the country, known as the Great Game, persisted. Under these circumstances, the Afghan government sought to approach extra-regional great powers capable of acting as a “powerful patron” within the Great Game. In particular, considering the shift of Soviet strategic reorientation from Central Asia toward Far East following the Mukden Incident, the Afghan government moved closer to Japan, one of the principal actors in this shift, in an effort to counterbalance the Soviet influence.

Nevertheless, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought closer relations with Afghanistan as a means of establishing an intelligence-gathering base concerning Xinjiang and of gaining diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, the Kwantung Army conceived plans to link up with the Berlin–Kabul route operated by Lufthansa, conceptualizing Afghanistan as a communications hub linking Japan and Germany. Taken together, these initiatives positioned Afghanistan within Japan’s external strategy as a nodal point for intelligence and communications oriented toward Central Asia.

Following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese Army General Staff sought to disrupt Soviet supply lines to China by inciting the Basmachi movement, using Japan’s legation in Kabul as a base of operations. Such actions risked entailing Afghanistan into a conflict with the Soviet Union and consequently led the Afghan government to adopt a more cautious stance toward Japan. Concurrently, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey concluded a mutual non-aggression pact―the Saadabad Pact―, thereby constructing a regional security system designed to counter great-power rivalry. Japanese maneuvers threatened to destabilize this system, and Turkey in particular came to perceive Japan as a potential security threat, even contemplating the possibility of declaring war.

By analyzing Japanese–Afghan relations in the 1930s, this paper aims to offer a more three-dimensional understanding of the Great Game, which has hitherto been predominantly interpreted through the trilateral relationship among Britain, the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan.

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Since 2022, Japan has shown unprecedented support for Ukraine under PM Kishida. This paper examines Japan’s "diplomacy of sympathy," using symbolic and financial aid to defend the global rules-based order, boost its standing in Europe, and spark domestic debate on conflict response.

Paper long abstract

This paper investigates the evolution of Japan’s foreign policy toward Ukraine between 2022 and 2024 through the conceptual lens of "diplomacy of sympathy" (DoS). Centered on the leadership of Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, the study explores how Japan utilized coordinated, state-level behavior to project official emotional responses—such as solidarity and a benign attitude—toward a victimized state. This strategic pivot represents a departure from the "stunted" and asymmetrical diplomacy of the Abe era, which previously prioritized rapprochement with Moscow to resolve the Northern Territories dispute.

The paper categorizes Japan’s DoS into two primary dimensions. First, expressive gestures utilized emotionally rich language to unequivocally condemn Russia’s "illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked" aggression. By labeling Russian actions as "absolutely intolerable war crimes" and "outrageous," Tokyo validated the victimization of the Ukrainian people while expressing "utmost respect" for their perseverance. Second, these symbolic acts were reinforced by substantive gestures, including approximately 12 billion USD in financial and humanitarian aid by 2024. This material backing, focused on de-mining and reconstruction, positioned Japan as a top-five donor and a principled defender of the rules-based world order.

Furthermore, the paper elucidates the utilitarian and strategic benefits of this diplomacy. Internationally, Japan reinforced its status as a dependable partner to the USA and EU. Regionally, Japan revitalized its standing in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), countering Chinese influence by deepening ties with "like-minded" states such as Poland and the Baltic nations. Historically, Japan’s stance serves as a discursive tool against Russian and Chinese narratives regarding the wartime past. Domestically, evocative language helped justify unprecedented expenditures and stimulated debates on civic duty and national defense, particularly regarding a possible Taiwan contingency. Ultimately, the study demonstrates that sympathy serves as a potent political tool, linking European security to the Indo-Pacific under the warning that "Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow".

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The paper tries to examine the changes in Japan’s agricultural policy by exploring the definitions of some key policy terms such as “the food self-sufficiency rate” and “bearers of agriculture.” It argues that as their meanings changed overtime, a major shift occurred in Japan’s agricultural policy.

Paper long abstract

Japan’s agricultural policy has been aimed “to improve the food self-sufficiency rate” and “to foster bearers [ninaite] of farming.” Even though these goals remained unchanged for several decades, the actual policy measures to achieve them have altered from time to time. The conventional explanation that focuses on interests of political actors [farmers, the governing party, and the Agricultural Ministry] have difficulties in explaining the incremental policy change, because their interests have remained largely the same. This study proposes a new explanation focusing on the definitions of such key policy terms as “the food self-sufficiency rate” and “bearers of agriculture.” The author hypothesizes that changes in the definition of those terms that defined some policy goals brought about a major shift in Japan’s agricultural policy. To test the hypothesis, the author conducts a historical analysis of Japan’s agricultural policy between the 1970s and the 2010s. In the analysis, the author explores policy discourse concerning agricultural policy among policymakers, the media, and intellectuals by conducting text analyses of such materials as the Japanese Agricultural Ministry’s policy documents, the minutes from the Japanese Diet, and the articles of Japanese newspapers. Also, the author conducts a set of interview survey of Japanese policymakers such as Diet members and retired bureaucrats. Through the analyses, the author tries to present the evidence for the causal link between the definition of key policy terms and a shift in Japan’s agricultural policy. The author expects to detect the changes in the meanings of those key terms, the ways in which those changes were translated into actual policies, and the reasons why the meanings and policies changed during the time period.

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How do municipal governments in Japan cope with various types of debris, in addition to household waste, when natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods occur? While tracing their activities, this study pays particular attention to the central government’s underlying intention to assist them.

Paper long abstract

Municipal governments in Japan have traditionally managed daily waste for many years, even as decentralization has been developing since the 1990s. However, natural disasters in recent years, such as earthquakes and floods, have generated large quantities of debris. How do these governments cope with such debris, in addition to household waste, in case of emergency? By tracing their activities after the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, this article examines the idea of “state will,” which refers mainly to the central government’s efforts to reassert centralized control through several projects of Japan’s Ministry of the Environment, despite the ongoing decentralization process. The findings reveal that more attention should be paid to the hidden politics of environmental governance, as illustrated in this case.

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Japan frames climate change as an element of its diplomacy. Building on interviews with policymakers and primary sources, a process tracing analysis Japan’s climate security strategy reveals that narrative framing enables Tokyo to shape regional order and legitimize engagement beyond military means.

Paper long abstract

Recently, Japan has increasingly framed climate change as a central element of its Indo-Pacific diplomacy, positioning climate action not only as an environmental concern but as a key dimension of non-traditional security. While extant scholarship extensively analyzes Japan’s FOIP vision little attention has been paid to how Japan strategically narrates climate security as a means of shaping shared understandings of order beyond military instruments.

This paper addresses this gap by examining Japan’s strategic narratives on climate security and situating them in a comparative perspective with Germany as another norm-oriented middle power. It advances two core arguments. First, Japan employs climate security narratives to reconcile an increasingly proactive regional posture with domestic constraints on the use of military force, framing climate cooperation, decarbonization support, and capacity-building as legitimate and necessary components of regional security. Second, compared to Germany, Japan’s climate-related narratives exhibit stronger regional embeddedness and greater linkage to concrete policy practices in the Indo-Pacific, reflecting Japan’s exposure to geopolitical competition.

The analysis is grounded in the theoretical framework of strategic narratives, which conceptualizes foreign policy discourse as a tool through which states construct shared interpretations of international order and define their own roles within it. The paper combines qualitative analysis of policy documents, strategy papers, and speeches by Japanese and German climate policy actors since the mid-2010s with insights from semi-structured interviews with practitioners and experts. This mixed qualitative approach allows to capture not only formal policy positions but also underlying perceptions, role conceptions, and narrative structures that shape climate diplomacy.

Empirically, the paper investigates discourses on as climate-resilient infrastructure, maritime environmental governance, and energy transition support. These cases illustrate how Japan positions itself as a normative partner in regional climate governance while avoiding overt securitization. By contrast, Germany’s Indo-Pacific climate narratives remain more globally framed and less tightly connected to region-specific policy implementation. By foregrounding climate security narratives, the paper contributes to Japan Studies and lR scholarship by demonstrating how climate diplomacy functions as a key instrument of Japan’s contemporary Indo-Pacific strategy and as a source of diplomatic agency for middle powers under conditions of intensifying great-power competition.

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By exploring the narrative power of myth, this article will demonstrate how the recent shift from a Yasukuni-based to an Ise-based Shinto nationalist narrative is to be read in parallel with Japan's changing security policy towards a more 'proactive pacifism'.

Paper long abstract

Despite having a secular constitution that restricts the interplay between politics and religion, Japanese elected officials and Prime Ministers have leveraged on Shinto narratives as a rhetorical tool to obtain the support of powerful domestic groups. The controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo has been the focal point from which to articulate such narratives, at the same time attracting the allegiance of conservative associations and the lambasting criticism of former colonial states. In the past two decades, and especially at the hand of Abe Shinzo, Shinto nationalist narratives have shifted in favor of a mythological imagery informed by the Ise Grand Shrine. This study advances the suggestion that this narrative shift from a Yasukuni-based to an Ise-based Shinto nationalism is to be read in parallel with Japan's changing security policy towards a more 'proactive pacifism'. Against a mainstream interpretation of power as hinging on the allocation of material capabilities, this paper builds-up on the view that power structures cannot be made sense of and neither can they exercise influence outside of the narrative meaning-making behind them. Here it is argued that, differently from Yasukuni narratives, Ise narratives can leverage successfully on, and in turn reinforce, both narratives of Japan's identity as great power state and as responsible ally of the US in the Asia-Pacific. Drawing from interpretivist literature on narratives in IR and political myths, it will be demonstrated how the foundational myth ascribed to the Ise shrine complex is a powerful soft power tool that can be reshaped to suit foreign policy needs, advance efforts in constitutional reform, and assuage international audiences otherwise critical of nationalist discourse. Additionally, this contribution is aimed at addressing a literature gap in the study of IR and political myth narratives. It will show how a Japanese ethnic myth can politically resonate not only domestically or within Asian boundaries, but can also be integrated in the security standards of the rules-based international order.

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Focusing on Japan’s 80th anniversary of WWII surrender, this paper examines how selective historical memory in Prime Ministerial and party statements, and media coverage, shapes domestic debates and informs regional security and diplomacy with China.

Paper long abstract

August 15, 2025, marked the 80th anniversary of Japan’s surrender in World War II. Past statements (danwa) issued by prime ministers as cabinet decisions on the 50th, 60th and 70th anniversaries drew significant international attention, setting high expectations for the 80th anniversary. The anticipated statement, released two months after the date as personal opinion, failed to meet most of those expectations and was soon overshadowed by Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s resignation and Takaichi Sanae’s more assertive political turn. In the context of heightened regional tensions, particularly with China, historical narratives once again became an active component of contemporary foreign and security discourse.

This paper examines how historical memory is mobilized in Japanese political debates, both within domestic politics and in relation to Japan’s external positioning. Focusing on statements issued by Prime Minister Ishiba and Japanese political parties in connection with the 80th anniversary, it analyzes how different political actors invoke, reinterpret, or challenge earlier narratives, such as the Murayama Statement issued on the 50th anniversary, to shape domestic discourse and Japan’s regional diplomacy.

The analysis further considers how these historical framings intersect with ongoing debates on defense policy, Japan-China relations, and the Taiwan question. In particular, it examines how Chinese state-controlled media, such as the English-language China Daily, selectively cite Japanese scholars or politicians to reinforce Party-aligned narratives, underscoring the cross-border dimension of memory politics.

To better understand how historical narratives interact in both domestic and regional arenas, this paper uses qualitative discourse analysis of official statements, party documents, and public commentary. It is also informed by author’s ongoing policy and media analyses published at the Centre for Asian Affairs, University of Lodz.

Preliminary findings suggest that the selective mobilization of historical memory continues to shape Japan’s domestic debates and regional diplomacy. This ongoing linkage between memory politics and contemporary security challenges underscores how Japan's instrumentalized historical narratives influence its political discourse and its role in the region.

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Despite growing attention to parliamentary diplomacy, the Korea–Japan Parliamentarians’ League has struggled to manage bilateral conflicts since the early 2000s. This study explains why and examines future prospects by analyzing post-2001 changes in Japan’s foreign policy system.

Paper long abstract

Parliamentary diplomacy has gained increasing attention as a complementary instrument to executive-led foreign policy, particularly in the management of bilateral tensions. Despite this growing emphasis, parliamentary diplomacy conducted through the Korea–Japan Parliamentarians’ League has struggled to function effectively during periods of heightened conflict since the early 2000s. This paper seeks to explain why parliamentary diplomacy has failed to operate as a viable mechanism for conflict management under adverse bilateral conditions between Japan and Korea, and to examine the prospects for its future expansion.

The study identifies the distinctive nature of historical and territorial disputes, structural transformations in Korea–Japan relations, and shifts in Japan’s domestic political and public opinion environment as key contextual constraints. Focusing on developments since 2001, the paper analyzes how changes in Japan’s foreign policy system—particularly evolving political structures, dominant actors, and legislative incentive frameworks—have reshaped the conditions under which parliamentary diplomacy operates. The analysis is based on qualitative comparative research drawing on parliamentary records, policy documents, and secondary sources in Japan.

Through a comparative examination of institutional arrangements and support mechanisms for parliamentary diplomacy, the paper assesses how existing frameworks constrain legislators’ capacity to engage in conflict mediation. It further explores the institutional, political, and policy-level changes required for parliamentary diplomacy to regain relevance as an effective channel for dialogue and adjustment. By situating parliamentary diplomacy within Japan’s evolving political landscape, this study contributes to broader debates on the conditions under which legislative diplomacy can function as a meaningful tool for conflict management in contentious bilateral relationships.

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This study compares the responses of Japan and Germany to the Russian invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, considering their post-war security identities as liberal democracies with a reluctance to use military force in foreign policy.

Paper long abstract

Japan and Germany have had many similar issues to face in the post-war period in their international relations. Both have experienced economic growth under the US-security umbrella, and both have been reluctant to abandon anti-war foreign policies. However, in recent years both countries have had to face increasing tensions due to actions of authoritarian states with which they have built up important economic ties. Although China has been posing serious challenges in terms of its economic competition and hybrid security threats to both Germany and Japan, it is Russia which both Germany and Japan have had to deal with in a more direct manner, due to its actual invasions of Ukraine and security threats to several other countries. This comparative study investigates points of similarity or difference which may help to understand how the two liberal democracies have responded to challenges from authoritarian governments in their near neighbourhoods during the time period of 2014 to 2023. The focus of this comparative study will be on both countries’ responses to Russia’s actions in Ukraine, but at the same time it is also be useful to consider their parallel responses to China’s more subtle challenges under the Xi administration. The study argues that while Japan has been preparing for longer than Germany in terms of rhetoric and policy changes to deal with potential problems of reliance on authoritarian states, its precarious finances and lower economic growth mean that it has been in a weaker position than Germany to actually act on the rhetoric and respond to the perceived threats. However, both countries have exhibited caution in strengthening their security postures, based on their post-war security identities.

Keywords: Japan Germany comparative security identity

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The paper will analyze Japan's recent diplomatic policies of their impact on Japan's economic and security situation with regard to China and the U.S.'s attitude to propose future hedging strategies that maximize Japan's benefit.

Paper long abstract

Japan, a major middle power country in the Asia-Pacific, is facing another diplomatic challenge in 2026. China, Japan’s largest trade partner and security threat, has increased its assertiveness in the geopolitical dispute with Taiwan. Meanwhile, the United States, the pillar of Japan’s national security, is retreating into a protectionism that does not prioritize international peacebuilding over domestic economic interests under Donald Trump’s administration. While Japan still relies on both superpowers, the country's current prime minister Takaichi Sanae’s U.S.-favoring diplomatic policies are raising concerns regarding the future of the hedging strategy. This paper, on the basis of Japan’s diplomatic situation in 2026, compares Japan’s benefits from China and the U.S., analyzes the shortcomings of Japan’s recent diplomacy, and then offers a solution for the future. It argues that, firstly, based on the current context, Japan should adopt a China-leaning strategy for at least the next three years because the economic gains outweigh the destabilizing security reliance on the U.S. Secondly, Japan’s recent diplomatic strategy, although long-term beneficial, is overly pressuring its economy and security issues in the short term. Finally, Japan’s hedging strategy should be leaning towards China in the next three years to reduce economic and security pressure and prepare for the decoupling from China. Then, Japan can hedge back to the U.S. after it withdraws from protectionism.

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This paper presents the conspiratorial discourse of an emerging Japanese party from an interpretive perspective and asks why conspiracy theories are so often used by political actors who paradoxically seek to become part of the mainstream.

Paper long abstract

Sanseitō is a far-right challenger party founded in 2020 and gained its initial set of seats on a platform criticizing COVID-19 vaccines, pandemic measures, and other policies related to fringe conspiracy theories. The party broke into the mainstream during its 2025 Tokyo Assembly and the Upper House election campaigns, which both centered on the party's nativist platform under the slogan "Japanese First" (Nipponjin fāsuto). The party's subsequent success---particularly its staggering 14 new seats in the National Diet---suggested a latent demand for more stringent controls on immigration policy and inbound tourism.

Challenger parties typically seek to exploit their comparative advantages: its anti-immigration platform (aided by its overall credible and professional image) allowed it to outmaneuver the pro-business LDP, other rightwing conservatives, and the liberal opposition as the media framed the issue as a legitimate concern held by a growing number of Japanese voters. By contrast, conspiracy theories are socially costly and unlikely to be taken up by the mass media. One would therefore be excused in expecting the party to tone down its extreme rhetoric as it instead expanded its far-right political platform.

And yet, the party rapidly doubled down on some of its most extreme claims. In the immediate aftermath of UH elections, Sanseitō re-committed to its anti-COVID-19 vaccine rhetoric and its belief that the LGBTQ movement is part of a Cultural Marxist scheme to undermine the domestic traditions and security. Moreover, the party continues to use its limited resources to call attention to these issues. This raises the question: why are conspiracy theories so often used by political actors who paradoxically seek to become part of the mainstream? This chapter uses the case of the far-right conspiracy party Sanseitō to shed light on what conspiracy theories do for political actors. It focuses on the interpretive role of conspiracies, analyzing Diet interactions, public media appearances, and the party's official YouTube channel. In doing so, it gives valuable insights into the ways in which politicians represent their constituents through the advancement of conspiracy theories.

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Using the strong state concept, this study examines the pluralization of refugee in Japan, focusing on country-based emergency measures. Through ISA circulars, it shows how bureaucratic autonomy is used to selectively determine who is deserving of support versus those who remain under surveillance.

Paper long abstract

Japan has long faced international and domestic criticism for its restrictive refugee policies, often described as "refugee isolationism" (nanmin sakoku). In recent years, several changes—including the implementation of resettlement and complementary pathway programs, the introduction of complementary protection, and country-based emergency measures—have emerged, characterizing what Naoko Hashimoto terms the pluralization of “refugee” (nanmin no tagenka). Utilizing the concept of the "strong state," this study focuses on country-based emergency measures, analyzing administrative circulars and parliamentary debates to demonstrate how the Immigration Services Agency (ISA) navigates external criticism and pressure. Based on primary sources, It explores how the ISA responds to humanitarian emergencies—including those in Myanmar, Afghanistan, and Ukraine—while maintaining its discretionary power.

In response to the 2021 Myanmar coup, Japan introduced an emergency measure (kinkyu hinan sochi) promising that no Myanmar citizens would face repatriation against their will, regardless of their legal status. To ensure this non-refoulement policy, the ISA allows individuals to obtain a “Designated Activities” (tokutei katsudo) resident status under specific conditions. Following the crises in Afghanistan, Ukraine, Syria, and Sudan, the ISA implemented comparable approaches but maintained significantly different conditions based on nationality. For instance, Ukrainians are treated as an "exception of exceptions," receiving one-year residency, full work permits, and social support. In contrast, Afghans initially required a financial guarantor to cover living expenses and future repatriation costs, while Myanmar nationals who failed to extend their previous status due to their "own fault" received only six-month permissions with restricted work hours.

Over time, emergency measures for Myanmar and Afghan nationals have been standardized, yet the treatment of Ukrainians remains uniquely exceptional. The ISA maintains these as country-based measures, allowing the agency to modify conditions through administrative discretion without requiring parliamentary approval. The October 2024 modification excluding Myanmar technical interns who failed to complete programs due to their "own fault" serves as a symbolic example. I argue the ISA utilizes Japan’s "strong state" structure to preserve its discretionary power, selectively determining who is "deserving" versus those who remain under surveillance. This research reveals how the Japanese state reconciles international humanitarian expectations with a domestic agenda of migration control.

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This article considers China's emotional assertiveness vis-a-vis Japan related to the persistent and intractable issue of Taiwan and specifically what the effects of this are on Japan-Taiwan relations and on Japan’s own diplomatic practices toward Taiwan.

Paper long abstract

Taking its point of departure in the “emotional turn”, this article considers the interactive process of conflict escalation and emotional assertiveness related to the persistent and intractable issue of Taiwan and specifically, when, why and how Beijing’s diplomatic practices directed towards Tokyo and related to Japan’s engagement with Taiwan take an emotionalized form. Emotional assertiveness – where state representatives publicly express moral indignation and urge offenders to apologize in order to stop them, or to deter others, from violating China’s red lines (Forsby 2025) – has become a defining feature of China’s diplomacy. It has also been a feature of Sino-Japanese political relations, albeit to varying degrees and at different junctures over more than 50-years of diplomatic ties. Based on a systematic review of episodes since 2010 and through a discursive analysis of written sources and semi-structured interviews, the article considers the responses of Japan and Taiwan to Beijing’s emotional assertiveness. It asks: what are the effects of China’s emotional assertiveness on Japan-Taiwan relations and on Japan’s own diplomatic practices toward Taiwan? It demonstrates how issues where Japan may have made conciliatory gestures in the past are increasingly becoming issues where Tokyo opts to either wait out the episode or respond defiantly.

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This paper examines how institutionalized factions shape cabinet survival before and after the 1994 electoral reform. Using survival analysis of Japanese cabinets from 1958 to 2023, it shows how electoral rules change the relationship between factionalism and government durability.

Paper long abstract

Factionalism has been a defining feature of Japanese party politics, yet its implications for cabinet survival remain contested. While intra-party factions are often portrayed as sources of conflict and instability, postwar Japanese governments have frequently combined highly institutionalized factional structures with relatively durable cabinets. This paper revisits the relationship between factionalism and cabinet survival by examining how electoral institutions shape factional dynamics within governing parties.

Japan offers a particularly suitable case for addressing this question. For much of the postwar period, Japanese cabinets operated under the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, which encouraged intra-party competition and strengthened factional organization within governing parties. The 1994 electoral reform, which introduced a mixed-member majoritarian system, fundamentally altered these incentives by centralizing candidate selection and resource allocation under party leadership. This institutional shift provides an opportunity to examine whether changes in electoral rules transformed the role of factions in sustaining or undermining cabinet survival.

Building on research on Japanese party factions, cabinet survival, and electoral institutions, this paper argues that factionalism is not inherently destabilizing. Instead, its impact on cabinet survival depends on whether electoral rules facilitate bargaining and coordination between party leaders and factions or disrupt established patterns of intra-party equilibrium. The empirical analysis draws on an original dataset covering Japanese cabinets from 1958 to 2023 and employs Cox proportional hazards models to examine cabinet termination. The key explanatory variables are the degree of factionalization within governing parties and the post-1994 electoral reform, alongside standard political and economic controls. By comparing pre- and post-reform periods, the analysis demonstrates how electoral rules change the relationship between factionalism and government durability.

By situating Japanese factional politics within an institutional framework, this paper contributes to debates in Japanese political studies while engaging broader comparative discussions on government stability. It also invites feedback on how electoral reform reshaped factional bargaining and leadership authority in postwar Japan.

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This paper analyzes Japan’s reliance on US nuclear deterrence despite Article 9. It argues the constitution acts as a “committee of restraint,” paradoxically enabling deeper conventional integration and “counterstrike capabilities” while precluding indigenous nuclearization amidst regional crises.

Paper long abstract

Japan presents a unique paradox: it is the only democracy to constitutionally enshrine pacifism (Article 9) while relying explicitly on another state’s nuclear arsenal for security. This paper investigates how Tokyo reconciles its anti-nuclear national identity with an escalating dependence on U.S. extended deterrence amidst a volatile regional environment marked by North Korean missile tests, China’s nuclear modernization, and the normalization of nuclear coercion following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Drawing on alliance theory, two-level game analysis, and literature on the nuclear taboo, the study traces Japan’s security evolution from the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” through successive crises to the watershed 2022 National Security Strategy. The analysis argues that Japan is pursuing a strategy of “maximizing extended deterrence under strategic ambiguity.” By leveraging interpretive flexibility within Article 9, Tokyo deepens security cooperation—such as real-time intelligence sharing and “counterstrike capabilities”—while maintaining domestic constraints that preclude public discussion of NATO-style nuclear sharing.

The paper highlights three key tensions: (1) credibility concerns regarding U.S. decoupling; (2) the ideological cleavage between the Hiroshima-Nagasaki anti-nuclear memory and conservative realism; and (3) the gap between public opposition to nuclear acquisition and elite moves toward contingency planning. Comparative analysis reveals that Japan’s trajectory diverges from Germany’s acceptance of nuclear sharing and South Korea’s mainstreaming of indigenous nuclear debates.

Ultimately, the study concludes that Article 9 functions not as an obsolete relic but as a domestic “committee of restraint.” Paradoxically, this constitutional constraint enables deeper conventional integration with the United States by reassuring neighbors of Japan’s non-nuclear intentions. However, this delicate balance faces mounting strain should the credibility of U.S. deterrence erode or a Taiwan contingency force a choice between constitutional principles and survival.

Keywords: Japan security policy, Article 9, extended deterrence, nuclear taboo, U.S.-Japan alliance, strategic ambiguity.

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Paper short abstract

Research on citizenship has emphasized national and global identities, while local and cultural understandings remain underexplored. Focusing on Japan, this study examines four citizenship identities - Kokumin, Shimin, Koumin, and Jumin - and their relationships with citizenship norms.

Paper long abstract

Studies on citizenship have predominantly focused on how national and global identities, as well as civic and ethnic forms of nationalism, shape various citizenship norms. However, the understanding of citizenship or citizenship identity at the local and cultural levels remains relatively underexplored. This study examines the case of Japan, where understandings of citizenship vary. In Japan, the term “citizen(ship)” has been interpreted and translated into four distinct collective identities – Kokumin, Shimin, Koumin, and Jumin – which can be literally translated as the people of the “Country”, “City”, “Public Space”, and “Residence” respectively. Studies on these concepts remain theoretical, and it is unclear which identity contributes to differing perceptions of good citizenship. Hence, an original survey was conducted in Japan (N = 900), and Ordinary Least Squares regressions were performed. The results indicate that Koumin is positively associated with both duty-based and engaged forms of citizenship, whereas attachment to Jumin is linked to a decline in engaged citizenship. While the effect of Koumin on both forms of citizenship diminishes with age, the effect of Jumin, by contrast, increases as age rises. However, while both Koumin and Jumin predict participation in protests and assemblies, neither showed a significant relationship with voting in elections. This study provides insight into the nuances of citizenship identity, attachment, and norms in the case of Japan. It not only lays the foundation for future research on citizenship behaviour in Japan but also offers a basis for cross-national studies to explore the local and cultural dimensions of citizenship.

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Using mixed methods, this study re-examines claims of Japan’s "right-leaning youth". By linking young people’s political information sources to socioeconomic traits and political orientations, it identifies political cleavages and provides a basis for assessing the effects of Heisei-era politics.

Paper long abstract

In response to claims of a “right-leaning youth” that circulated widely in Japanese and international media in the early 2000s, subsequent research has shown that this apparent trend is better understood as a reflection of socioeconomic insecurity among young people rather than a clear ideological shift to the right. Existing scholarship has further argued that this trend cannot be readily discussed in comparative terms with the rise of the right in other advanced democracies, owing to fundamental differences in ideological semantics. Despite these contributions, comprehensive knowledge of young people’s political orientations in Japan remains limited. One reason for this gap lies in the inconsistent use of ideological axes in survey research, most notably progressive-conservative, liberal-conservative, and left-right, which makes it difficult to develop an integrated understanding of young people’s political attitudes, let alone to facilitate cross-national comparison. Against this backdrop, this presentation asks: how do young people in Japan orient themselves politically? What factors help explain these orientations? Combining quantitative analyses with qualitative insights, the presentation identifies the location of political cleavages among young people and examines the rationales underpinning them, contributing both to and beyond Japan-focused scholarship. The study makes three main contributions: first, drawing on original survey data, it examines how young people interpret and engage with the three major ideological axes. Second, by linking patterns of political information acquisition to socioeconomic characteristics and political attitudes, it sheds light on how information sources shape young people’s relationship with politics. Third, focusing on individuals who came of age during the Heisei era, the study captures the longer-term effects of political developments during this period, providing a foundation for analysing generational effects. These findings are particularly salient in light of young people’s growing support for the current prime minister, whose robust defence posture and restrictive social policies signal social conservatism and diplomatic assertiveness. Situated within a context of party politics adrift and an increasingly tense security environment, this presentation offers broader insights into the political psychology and political sociology of youth in contemporary Japan.

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Paper short abstract

Japan is often viewed as a model of good international citizenship, yet its engagement with liberal norms has differed substantially. We argue that Japan's selective norm adoption has enhanced its reputation and economy while contributing to the gradual fragility of the liberal international order.

Paper long abstract

The growing backlash against liberal norms and the international order raises a crucial question: to what extent did self-proclaimed liberal states such as Japan ever truly adopt liberal norms? Rather than attributing the erosion of the international order solely to authoritarian challengers, an increasing amount of research suggests that the biggest threat to liberal norms comes from shallow commitments and symbolic compliance among liberal states themselves (Gao 2023; True 2010). Such practices have made norms such as climate protection and gender equality particularly susceptible to misappropriation or co-optation. Japan, commonly portrayed as a 'civilian power' and a model of good international citizenship, has promoted cooperation, diplomacy and pacifism as defining elements of its post-war middle power identity (Clasen, 2024; Maull et al., 2023; Abbondanza, 2021). However, Japan's engagement with liberal norms, such as human rights, democracy, gender equality and refugee protection, has varied considerably, often remaining largely symbolic (Adachi, 2020; Motoyama, 2020; Flowers, 2009; Gurowitz, 1999). While previous research has examined this selective engagement, this paper considers how long-standing practices of selective and symbolic adoption of norms have benefited Japan, both in terms of its reputation and its economy, over time. It also considers how these practices are being recalibrated in response to the current backlash against liberalism.

Drawing on a discourse analysis of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Blue Books, Ministry of Defence White Papers and speeches delivered at the United Nations Security Council, the paper argues that Japan’s middle-power diplomacy has relied on strategically performing liberal norms in a way that enhances its international standing and economic positioning while simultaneously contributing to the gradual fragility of the international liberal order.

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This study traces the origins of U.S.-Japan defense cooperation by showing how the two countries began joint military planning in the early 1950s. Examining the actual practice of defense cooperation under domestic constraints, it reevaluates the U.S.-Japan security relationship during the Cold War.

Paper long abstract

In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and growing concerns about a potential contingency involving Taiwan, the role of the U.S.–Japan alliance and specifically collective defense in a contingency—has taken on unprecedented importance. This study explores the historical origins of bilateral defense cooperation that are directly relevant to this contemporary concern.

It shows how the United States and Japan began to develop combined military plans in the early 1950s. The study clarifies points that existing works have not fully explained: why Japan, initially reluctant toward the formulation of these plans, later re-engaged in the planning process, and what negotiations took place behind the scenes. During these negotiations, the most divisive issue was the command relationship between the two forces—what kinds of command structures were considered between the United States and Japan? The study also demonstrates that, in the early 1950s, Japan sought approval of these plans by the highest governmental authorities in both countries. Furthermore, it illuminates the challenges faced by both the United States and Japan in balancing the military necessity of undertaking joint defense measures against the Soviet Union and other communist forces with the constraints of their respective domestic politics. These findings challenge the prevailing view that the plans were merely staff-level research by the two forces and instead reveal the early origins of collective defense in the U.S.–Japan alliance.

This study draws on extensive multi-archival research, particularly newly declassified materials from both U.S. and Japanese sources. By uncovering the actual practice of U.S.–Japan defense cooperation under domestic constraints, it offers a re-evaluation of the Cold War U.S.–Japan security relationship. Moreover, this study distinguishes itself from conventional scholarship by emphasizing not only the political and diplomatic dimensions of the U.S.–Japan security relationship but also its military and, crucially, operational dimension—an aspect that has been largely overlooked. This approach offers novel insights into the fundamental nature of the U.S.–Japan security relationship.

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This paper examines how young activists in Japan in the 1970s-80s pursued political autonomy through the small liberal party Kakushin Jiyū Renmei. It explores the concepts of participation within the party, shedding light on the tensions between postwar democracy and alternative politics.

Paper long abstract

　　This paper examines how young activists in 1970s and 1980s Japan sought to realize political autonomy through the establishment and operation of a small liberal party, the Kakushin Jiyū Renmei (Innovative Liberal Party). While existing scholarship on postwar Japan has increasingly focused on youth culture, subcultures, and media in the context of the expanding consumer society of the 1970s and 1980s, far less attention has been paid to how the political interests and cultural practices of young people became connected to party politics. By addressing this gap, the paper explores the relationship between youth culture, political participation, and institutional politics.

　　The analysis is based primarily on the magazine Hanashi no Tokushū (1965–1995), a subcultural and political publication closely associated with liberal youth activism. Drawing on articles, editorials, and political commentary in the magazine, the paper traces how young activists articulated dissatisfaction with existing political parties and social movement organizations and attempted to create an alternative political space through party formation. Particular attention is paid to the ways in which autonomy, independence, and participation were framed as core political values and translated into organizational practices and electoral strategies.

The paper further examines the role played by the Kakushin Jiyū Renmei within parliamentary politics, including its initial electoral success under the nationwide constituency system in the 1970s and the challenges it faced following changes to the electoral system in the early 1980s. It also analyzes internal transitions that emerged as party members increasingly emphasized less inclusive and aggressive discourse in Hanashi no Tokushū, a shift that coincided with the party’s fragmentation and eventual split in 1983.

By tracing these developments, this study raises a broader question: why did actors who were critical of postwar democracy and committed to autonomy and participation encounter difficulties within institutional politics, at times undermining the very values they sought to promote? The paper argues that this tension highlights the complex relationship between social consciousness and party politics in late postwar Japan and offers new insight into the limits of small-scale political experimentation within democratic institutions.

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This dissertation argues that Japan’s persistent status seeking reflects a continuous performance of the state as a “real” actor. Using a performativity approach, it shows continuity in status construction across varied Japanese governments in the period 2006–2020.

Paper long abstract

This dissertation project answers the overarching question of why Japan keeps pursuing status without end in its international relations. Concern about status is perhaps the constant in Japanese international relations, from the Meiji Restoration to the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars to the imperial pursuit leading up to WWII to the economic boom of the 1960s-80s through to the “normal state” discourse of the post-Cold War and Japan’s subsequent military buildup. Through these more than 150 years, Japan achieved much across every thinkable metric, yet status insecurities never seem to dissipate. This observation goes against traditional IR scholarship on status, which assumes a finality to status seeking. To answer the overarching question, the dissertation examines how Japanese status was produced in its international relations in the years 2006-2020. Previous research on Japanese foreign policy – a key institution in a country’s international relation – during these years emphasizes the differences between the different LDP governments 2006-2009, the DPJ governments 2009-2012, and the second Abe government 2012-2020. This dissertation therefore takes these years to be a “least likely case” of Japan pursuing status in a consistent way. Analyzing the three political sites of elite narratives, academic narratives and visual narratives, it argues that, in fact, these years saw a core continuity in the construction or “performance” of Japan as a “real actor” that is “strong”, “autonomous” and of “high rank” in international relations, the status construction that reappears perennially in discourses on Japan’s international relations at large. The dissertation employs a performativity view of “status”, where status is seen as part of “statecraft” that is constantly performed, or in other words, that which makes up the subject of the “state”. Japan’s perennial status seeking is, as such, an effort to constantly reproduce the state, more specifically as a “real actor”. The attraction toward producing the state as a “real actor” stems from, the dissertation argues, a normative commitment among actors to “autonomous individuality” as the ideal type of agency in various fields of social life, a commitment that cuts across the mutually constitutive fields of (academic) International Relations and world politics.

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This study will examine the case of the Network Nikkei Initiative (NETNI Chile), to explore the actions and practices of Nikkei actors, and their relationships with the Japanese government. It is argued that young Nikkei are integral participants in Japan’s public diplomacy in Chile.

Paper long abstract

This study will examine the case of the Network Nikkei Initiative (NETNI Chile), created in 2018 by young Nikkei Chileans to identify new generations of Nikkei in Chile, with the support of the Japanese government, to both address the low participation of Chilean Nikkei youth in social and community activities, and to develop a network.

Through this case, this presentation aims to reflect on the initiatives and agency of Japanese-Chilean (Nikkei) associations and networks in Chile. It seeks to explore the actions and practices of Chilean Nikkei actors, as well as their relationships with Japanese government agencies such as JICA and the respective embassy. Central questions guiding this study include: Can their practices and initiatives be understood as diplomatic actions? And how can their relationship withthe Japanese government be interpreted?

For that, this presentation will examine data collected through document and secondary research, as well as fieldwork conducted in Chile between 2023 and 2026. Drawing on relational and diaspora diplomacy, this presentation argues that through initiatives like NETNI, young Nikkei are demonstrating strong agency, positioning themselves as valid diplomatic actors and integral participants in Japan’s public diplomacy in Chile, by establishing a collaborative diplomatic relationship with the Japanese government, despite the difference in their purposes.

The ultimate goal of this presentation is to explore the scope of the conceptual framework of diaspora diplomacy and to propose a new way of understanding the practices and actions of Nikkei actors within Japan’s diplomacy.

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Paper short abstract

This study analyzes four recent METI reports (2019–2025) to show how Japan's concept of agile governance is shaped by four distinct sociotechnical imaginaries. Global ideas regarding AI governance are adapted to emphasize flexibility, collaboration, and competitiveness in pursuit of Society 5.0.

Paper long abstract

This paper analyzes Japan’s transition to agile governance through an in-depth examination of the policy discourse surrounding the formulation of Japan’s AI Law. Grounded in the concept of sociotechnical imaginaries, the study explores how shared visions of technology, society, and governance co-evolve within Japan’s consensus-oriented political economy. Empirically, the analysis focuses on four editions of the “Advisory Council for a New Governance Model for Society 5.0” reports published between 2019 and 2025 under the auspices of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI). These reports serve as key coordination devices linking governmental, industrial, and expert perspectives on emerging technologies.

Using qualitative content analysis, the paper identifies four dominant imaginaries underpinning Japan’s approach to agile governance: human-centric innovation aligned with Society 5.0, risk-responsive and adaptive regulation, collaborative public–private governance, and alignment with international regulatory norms. The study traces how these imaginaries evolve over time in response to rapid advances in artificial intelligence as well as heightened global regulatory activity, most notably the European Union’s AI Act.

The findings demonstrate that while Japan draws heavily on globally circulating narratives emphasizing trustworthy and accountable AI, these ideas are selectively reframed to prioritize regulatory flexibility, policy experimentation, and industrial competitiveness. This reframing reflects Japan’s broader strategic objective of balancing innovation promotion with risk management without resorting to rigid, ex ante legal constraints. The paper further highlights both synergies and tensions among the four imaginaries, showing how their interaction enables a multi-dimensional governance strategy while also generating unresolved trade-offs between legal certainty, adaptability, and international harmonization.

Overall, the study argues that the METI reports play a performative role in institutionalizing agile governance by mobilizing stakeholders, shaping expectations, and legitimizing incremental regulatory approaches. In doing so, they embed Japan’s AI Law within the broader national project of realizing Society 5.0.

Keywords: agile governance; AI regulation; sociotechnical imaginaries; Japan’s AI Law; Society 5.0; METI; public–private collaboration; comparative AI governance.

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Paper short abstract

Why did the “comfort women” movement globalize amid memory contestations? Using norm localization theory, this paper draws on interviews and fieldwork with advocacy actors to show how memory politics localizes global justice norms in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, prompting varied state responses.

Paper long abstract

Why and how did the “comfort women” redress movement evolve from a marginalized regional movement into a global justice movement amid persistent memory contestations? This paper addresses this question by applying Acharya’s (2004; 2011) concept of norm localization to the study of “comfort women” advocacy in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Rather than treating the movement as a case of linear norm diffusion or normative convergence, it conceptualizes globalization as a process through which international norms related to global justice are reinterpreted and embedded within distinct local political and mnemonic contexts.

Empirically, the paper draws on field visits and qualitative interviews conducted at key advocacy museums and organizations, including the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace in Tokyo, the War and Women’s Human Rights Museum in Seoul, and the Ama Museum in Taipei, as well as interviews with affiliated foundations and local activists. These sites are examined as arenas of memory politics where international norms concerning women’s human rights, wartime sexual violence, and accountability for past injustice are negotiated and selectively adapted rather than uniformly adopted. The comparative analysis demonstrates significant variation across cases. In Japan, advocacy institutions localize global justice norms through oppositional memory practices that challenge state denial and nationalist resistance. In South Korea, redress claims are embedded within a strong victim-centered memory regime that amplifies survivor voices while limiting interpretive plurality. In Taiwan, norm localization intersects with postcolonial identity formation and regional positioning, producing a distinct framing of responsibility and historical justice. Across all cases, memory politics functions as a central mechanism through which international norms are localized, shaping how justice claims are articulated, contested, and institutionalized.

The paper further argues that these localized interpretations have political consequences. As the redress movement globalized through diverse local forms, it prompted varied forms of state engagement, including diplomatic responses, policy interventions, and attempts at restraint. By foregrounding norm localization, this study contributes to constructivist international relations scholarship by demonstrating how memory politics operates as a site of international norm negotiation and by explaining why transnationalisation generates sustained contestation rather than normative convergence in global justice movements.