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Paper short abstract

This paper examines how institutionalized factions shape cabinet survival before and after the 1994 electoral reform. Using survival analysis of Japanese cabinets from 1958 to 2023, it shows how electoral rules change the relationship between factionalism and government durability.

Paper long abstract

Factionalism has been a defining feature of Japanese party politics, yet its implications for cabinet survival remain contested. While intra-party factions are often portrayed as sources of conflict and instability, postwar Japanese governments have frequently combined highly institutionalized factional structures with relatively durable cabinets. This paper revisits the relationship between factionalism and cabinet survival by examining how electoral institutions shape factional dynamics within governing parties.

Japan offers a particularly suitable case for addressing this question. For much of the postwar period, Japanese cabinets operated under the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system, which encouraged intra-party competition and strengthened factional organization within governing parties. The 1994 electoral reform, which introduced a mixed-member majoritarian system, fundamentally altered these incentives by centralizing candidate selection and resource allocation under party leadership. This institutional shift provides an opportunity to examine whether changes in electoral rules transformed the role of factions in sustaining or undermining cabinet survival.

Building on research on Japanese party factions, cabinet survival, and electoral institutions, this paper argues that factionalism is not inherently destabilizing. Instead, its impact on cabinet survival depends on whether electoral rules facilitate bargaining and coordination between party leaders and factions or disrupt established patterns of intra-party equilibrium. The empirical analysis draws on an original dataset covering Japanese cabinets from 1958 to 2023 and employs Cox proportional hazards models to examine cabinet termination. The key explanatory variables are the degree of factionalization within governing parties and the post-1994 electoral reform, alongside standard political and economic controls. By comparing pre- and post-reform periods, the analysis demonstrates how electoral rules change the relationship between factionalism and government durability.

By situating Japanese factional politics within an institutional framework, this paper contributes to debates in Japanese political studies while engaging broader comparative discussions on government stability. It also invites feedback on how electoral reform reshaped factional bargaining and leadership authority in postwar Japan.