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Paper short abstract

This paper examines the Japanese factor in Afghanistan’s international relations from the Mukden Incident to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and aims to offer a more three-dimensional understanding of the Great Game.

Paper long abstract

This paper examines the Japanese factor in Afghanistan’s international relations from the Mukden Incident to the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Despite Afghanistan’s attainment of independence in 1919, Anglo-Russian rivalry over the country, known as the Great Game, persisted. Under these circumstances, the Afghan government sought to approach extra-regional great powers capable of acting as a “powerful patron” within the Great Game. In particular, considering the shift of Soviet strategic reorientation from Central Asia toward Far East following the Mukden Incident, the Afghan government moved closer to Japan, one of the principal actors in this shift, in an effort to counterbalance the Soviet influence.

Nevertheless, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought closer relations with Afghanistan as a means of establishing an intelligence-gathering base concerning Xinjiang and of gaining diplomatic leverage vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, the Kwantung Army conceived plans to link up with the Berlin–Kabul route operated by Lufthansa, conceptualizing Afghanistan as a communications hub linking Japan and Germany. Taken together, these initiatives positioned Afghanistan within Japan’s external strategy as a nodal point for intelligence and communications oriented toward Central Asia.

Following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, the Japanese Army General Staff sought to disrupt Soviet supply lines to China by inciting the Basmachi movement, using Japan’s legation in Kabul as a base of operations. Such actions risked entailing Afghanistan into a conflict with the Soviet Union and consequently led the Afghan government to adopt a more cautious stance toward Japan. Concurrently, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey concluded a mutual non-aggression pact―the Saadabad Pact―, thereby constructing a regional security system designed to counter great-power rivalry. Japanese maneuvers threatened to destabilize this system, and Turkey in particular came to perceive Japan as a potential security threat, even contemplating the possibility of declaring war.

By analyzing Japanese–Afghan relations in the 1930s, this paper aims to offer a more three-dimensional understanding of the Great Game, which has hitherto been predominantly interpreted through the trilateral relationship among Britain, the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan.