- Convenor:
-
Giulio Pugliese
(European University Institute)
Send message to Convenor
- Chair:
-
Giulio Pugliese
(European University Institute)
- Discussant:
-
Ken Endo
(The University of Tokyo)
- Format:
- Panel
- Section:
- Politics and International Relations
Short Abstract
Amid a more insular United States, the Takaichi government is doubling down on the path set forth by the late Abe Shinzo. This panel examines Japan’s strategic embrace of emerging disruptive technologies, government financing, and cross-Strait deterrence under a less reliable US-Japan alliance.
Long Abstract
The establishment of the minority government led by Takaichi Sanae implies structural changes – both domestic and international – that are transforming (or, in fact, have already transformed) post-Cold War Japan. Despite the Liberal Democratic Party finding itself in a minority in both houses of the Diet due to recent electoral defeats, the government appears determined to vigorously pursue policies dear to the conservative Prime Minister, also as a byproduct of the external support of the Ishin no Kai.
This panel aims to examine the structural factors underlying the policies of the Takaichi government. The prime minister must first and foremost satisfy the demands coming from Washington, complying with the trade agreement extorted by the US from her predecessor, Ishiba Shigeru. And due to US pressure as well as incognita surrounding the direction of travel of US-China relations, Japan finds itself having to increase military spending, potentially up to 3.5% of GDP.
The panel examines the economic drivers and latent strategic objectives in the pursuit of new industrial policies, especially those aimed at the technological frontier, such as quantum computing. A similar argument will apply to developmental aid, which is characterized by a neo-mercantilist and an increasingly strategic component. Finally, the panel unpacks the Takaichi government’s foreign and security policy across the Taiwan Strait to find substantial continuity with the revolutionary, albeit whispered, reforms of the second Abe Shinzo administration. In fact, the panel argues, the prime minister is following in the footsteps of her immediate predecessors, but especially her political mentor, the late Abe.
| Abstract in Japanese (if needed) |
Accepted papers
Paper short abstract
Amid heightened tensions with China following PM Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan, the Japan–US alliance faces new strains. President Trump’s softer stance on China and unilateral actions, including on Venezuela, highlight growing gaps between US and Japanese priorities regionally and globally.
Paper long abstract
Under the Takaichi administration, Japan–China relations have reached a historic low. The trigger was Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks in the National Diet on November 7, 2025. Responding to former Foreign Minister Okada Katsuya of the Constitutional Democratic Party who asked the Prime Minister to provide a concrete example of a “survival-threatening situation,” in which the country could exercise its right to collective self-defense, Takaichi responded, “If it involves the use of battleships and military force, that would clearly constitute a survival-threatening situation.” The Chinese government, which defines the Taiwan issue as a “core interest,” reacted with strong indignation. Xue Jian, Consul-General in Osaka, posted on social media (later deleted), “I’ll cut off [your] filthy head.” The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has since intensified economic pressure, including calls for Chinese citizens to refrain from traveling to Japan.
The Takaichi administration was also caught off guard by US President Donald Trump's reluctance to criticize China. With midterm elections approaching, the suspension of agricultural exports to China has dealt a severe blow to American farmers. For Trump, the outcomes of the October 2025 US–China summit, such as a one-year suspension of China’s export restrictions on rare earths and the expansion of US agricultural exports to China, are political achievements he cannot afford to lose. Recently, Trump has even begun referring to the US and China as the “G2,” a term rarely used by past US presidents, as it could be interpreted as treating China more favorably than allies. Furthermore, on January 3, 2026, the United States launched a military operation in Venezuela, detaining President Maduro and transferring him to American territory, which has raised concerns about violations of international law.
This presentation examines how shifting international dynamics and Trump 2.0 are challenging the Japan–US alliance and Japan’s broader diplomatic posture.
Paper short abstract
Quantum computing is a key domain in geopolitics. PM Takaichi defined it a “strategic technology.” This paper traces the development of Japan’s quantum strategy and argues that it exemplifies the persistence and adaptation of the developmental state model in an era of securitized technology policy.
Paper long abstract
Rather than merely being a matter of scientific prestige, advances in quantum technology are now regarded as “critical technologies” that will impact the global economic and military balance of power. The United States and China are investing heavily in quantum computing, thus defining it as a core strategic domain. In this quantum race, policymakers and scientists must address concerns about supply chain security, military applications, and open scientific exchange. As a key US security ally and Chinese trading partner located at the forefront of the Sino-US rivalry in the Indo-Pacific, Japan’s stakes are especially high. Despite its strong legacy of industrial policy and technological development, Japan’s position has weakened in the face of US dominance in cutting-edge technology and China’s state-driven technological ascent. This includes China’s control over rare earth minerals, which are essential to semiconductor supply chains. Against this backdrop, quantum computing is not just another high-tech sector; rather, it is a field in which Japan’s broader economic security strategy, as well as its norms and principles on military-related research, are being tested. Consequently, Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru declared 2025 “the first year of quantum industrialization.” His successor, Takaichi Sanae, defined quantum technology as a “strategic technology” for economic security and growth.
In this paper, I trace the development of Japan’s quantum strategy back to the late 2010s. In doing so, I identify the key actors and critical junctures that defined its development and argue that Japan’s strategy exemplifies the persistence and adaptation of the developmental state model in an era of technology policy securitization. Facilitated by the Cabinet Office, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, this strategy promotes public-private partnerships in quantum computing-related R&D and international cooperation with the US and the EU. Unlike earlier projects, which primarily focused on industrial competitiveness and growth, Japan’s quantum strategy explicitly links technological development with national security amid competition over critical technologies to maintain strategic relevance.
Paper short abstract
Since Abe 2.0, Japan has overhauled its security doctrine, force posture and China diplomacy to focus on cross-Strait deterrence. Yet, the implications of Japan’s policy changes on Taiwan are underappreciated. In fact, the Takaichi administration has simply made overt what was previously covert.
Paper long abstract
Assessments overlook the timeline and magnitude of Japan’s recent security and diplomatic moves in support of Taiwan. The literature tends to emphasize a consistent Japanese allergy to security support of Taiwan, emphasizing instead territorial defense and a coherent diplomatic stance, while a minority of views suggests Japan’s reactiveness to China’s expansive aspirations for national reunification. In fact, Tokyo has notably step-changed its security embrace of Taiwan and coupled that with new diplomatic rhetoric that suggests change over its earlier “One China” policy, also as leverage against Beijing. In this context, then, it is best to understand China’s remonstrations on Japan’s handling of Taiwan and its behavior as also reactive to initiatives taken elsewhere.
The seeds sown by the second Abe administration through the little-understood 2014-15 strategic and legislative revolutions bore fruit in Japan’s December 2022 three strategic documents, which are chiefly preoccupied with the geopolitics of the first island chain, including bolstering deterrence around Taiwan. The article concludes with implications about sustainability and credibility.
Tokyo’s quiet insistence that it does not have a “One China” policy signals to Beijing it has leeway for a “One China/One Taiwan” policy. Such understated diplomatic revolution would allow Tokyo to legitimize military intervention in a Taiwan contingency scenario, including the application of the right of collective self-defense to the self-governed island. At the same time, Japan’s dangling of Taiwanese statehood may be a lever to deter China– Japan’s de facto lawfare. Still, Japan and the U.S. should also prioritize assurances by buttressing dialogue and diplomacy with Beijing, including pledges that all interested parties abide by their One China policy, to avoid feeding into China’s assertiveness.
Finally, legal and strategic revolutions were passed with little understanding from the Japanese population, which retains a risk-averse antimilitarist ethos, prioritizes welfare over warfare, and is shrinking and greying, with implications also for the defense buildup’s fiscal sustainability.
Paper short abstract
Japan’s Official Development Assistance has undergone several changes in its 70-year history. This paper discusses how the newly appointed Takaichi cabinet is readjusting Japan’s long-standing aid-giving philosophy to address new needs emerging from strategic shifts within the global aid industry.
Paper long abstract
Amidst significant shifts in the regional and international security environment, Japan’s international cooperation reached its 70th anniversary in 2024. As a cornerstone of postwar diplomacy, Official Development Assistance (ODA) was instrumental in reshaping Japan’s global image and cementing its reputation as an “aid superpower” during the 1980s and 1990s. While Japanese leaders aimed to contribute to the international community, this resolve was only one facet of the narrative. During the 1980s, aid evolved into a cornerstone of Japan’s 'comprehensive security' strategy, serving to secure raw materials and stabilize the US-Japan alliance. However, as cases of ODA misuse emerged in the 2000s, public and political opinion began demanding that aid primarily serve the national interest. This shift crystallized in 2015 under the second Abe administration. Yet, it was under former Prime Minister Kishida, against the backdrop of the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, that Tokyo further tightened the nexus between aid and security. This culminated in the Official Security Assistance (OSA) framework, aimed at partners in the Indo-Pacific. This trajectory has persisted with the rise of a more conservative faction within the ruling LDP. As a candidate in 2025, Prime Minister Takaichi pledged to further boost ODA and OSA to strengthen Japan’s diplomatic influence vis-à-vis China's clout over the Asia-Pacific by providing aid more strategically and prioritizing defense -- particularly in the ASEAN subregion. Indeed, the December 2025 announcement of funding cuts to the UN Global Fund (for AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria) signals a retreat from the "civilian power" legacy built over seven decades. Nevertheless, the new government’s strategy remains consistent with the incremental changes enacted since the 2010s and aligns with public scepticism of international cooperation, amidst sluggish growth and high inflation.