Paper short abstract:

This paper explores and analyses how a range of regimes – in Africa and beyond – imagine and, in turn, enact and foreclose the future in contexts where political contestation itself is either limited or non-existent.

Paper long abstract:

The future – broadly conceived – is the central concern of governments and policy-makers across the globe. It is also, though, for many of these actors principally a realm of insecurity and anxiety. In liberal democracies, the future heralds unending crises which must be predicted or mitigated, from terrorist attacks and pandemics to environmental disaster (Anderson, 2010; Massumi, 2015). In many authoritarian states, the future is an unwelcome discursive and policy arena for leaders and parties who fear being rapidly undercut through unpredictable social, economic and political realignments beyond their control (Hellmeier and Weidmann, 2020; Wedeen, 2019).

There are, however, a sub-set of authoritarian governments for whom the future is not only presented as a positive space but as the defining focus of governance and political authority. From the UAE and Singapore to Rwanda and Kazakhstan, policy-makers emphasize not only seizing the opportunities presented by the future but developing governance regimes which promote and embrace “disruption” (UAE Ministry of Possibilities, 2022) and moving away from “business as usual” (Government of Rwanda, 2020).

This paper begins to explore and analyse how these regimes – and the futurocratic research and policy cadres at their heart – imagine and, in turn, enact and foreclose the future in contexts where political contestation itself is either limited or non-existent. In doing so, the study underscores the fundamental sense of insecurity which binds these seemingly bullishly confident regimes together.

Paper short abstract:

Authoritarianism in Africa is resilient. Paradoxically, it produces benefits to the Western agency. Yet, the rise of China and the nature of the international system provide a buffer for authoritarianism. Hence, authoritarianism in Africa is durable and camouflages democracy.

Paper long abstract:

Authoritarianism in Africa is resilient. Historically, it was a distinguishing feature of pre-colonial African societies. However, with the onset of colonialism, a traditional form of authoritarianism inherently made its appearance on the continent as a colonial state. This authoritarianism was passed over to the post-colonial state in form of a one-party state, military regime or dictatorship. The fourth phase, however, began in 1990s and the authoritarianism turn took a form of hybrid regime. The evolution of authoritarianism in Africa suggests that it is resilient, and democratization has never been the agenda of the state. Paradoxically, the authoritarian state in Africa produces economic benefits to the “democratizing” Western agency in exchange for aid. Yet, the rise of China as another global superpower as well as the nature of the international system provide a buffer for authoritarian regimes in Africa to enjoy a latitude of a breathing space in case of miscalculations with the Western powers. China, like its counterparts from the West is after economic resources from Africa. However, China does not impose governance conditionalities when negotiating for aid. This paper argues that since clinging into power is the primary objective of the state in Africa, authoritarianism has been an effective means to achieve this agenda. Hence, the future of authoritarianism in Africa will be its durability and camouflage of democracy.

Paper short abstract:

The paper discusses the long-term implications of the recent military coup surge in West Africa.

Paper long abstract:

Across francopone Africa military-led governments have repeatedly delayed a return to constitutional rule. There is growing concern and evidence that the putschists in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Chad intend to entrench themselves in executive power beyond the post-coup elections. Drawing on the theoretical insights of linked ecologies, the paper compares the extent to which the military juntas have formed alliances with the military at-large and among civilian elites that are strong enough to achieve this goal. The paper demonstrates that the Malian and Chadian junta created dominant alliances with other domestic actors thereby cementing its power base. By contrast, the Guinean and Burkinabé junta faces visible and potentially strong competition within the military and civil society. The article argues that these diverging pathways are the result of two interrelated factors: First, the extent to which the political grievances of the juntas overlap with the grievances of other societal forces. Second, longstanding conditions that shaped the two countries’ political dynamics prior to the coup. This finding has implications for the study of the current coup surge in Africa and the nascent scholarship on coup outcomes.

Paper short abstract:

Research on legal authoritarianism has focused on states like Russia, China, Hungary and Poland. But most authoritarian states are comparatively less globally powerful and have limited capacity. This article studies how such states use law to offer an initial typology of legal authoritarianism.

Paper long abstract:

Many of today’s authoritarians pursue illiberal ends using rule of law compliant means. Much of the research on how authoritarians use law has been based on comparatively highly capacitated authoritarian states, including Russia, China, Hungary and Poland. These states seek to extend their control and enact illiberal political agendas, both domestically—for instance using law to narrow the space for political opposition and bolster the advantage of incumbency, and internationally—for instance by strengthening sovereign claims and undermining human rights norms. With a regional focus on sub-Saharan Africa, and especially Uganda, this article examines how authoritarians use law in lower-capacity states to make an empirical and analytic contribution to this emerging scholarship. Lower-capacity states may lack the ability to pursue authoritarian interests directly, instead adopting strategies that indirectly weaken the rule of law. For instance, in addition to subverting law, some authoritarians destabilize jurisdictional claims, thereby making it uncertain when a given institution will be the relevant legal authority. Additionally, the line between domestic and international politics may be particularly blurred, as domestic political economies rely heavily on foreign markets on one hand; and a state’s sovereignty may also rely on security guarantees from foreign allies. This may complicate legal authoritarian tactics used by more highly-capacitated states. By identifying several ways that lower-capacity authoritarian states strategically use law, this article offers an initial approach to typologizing varieties of legal authoritarianism, with important implications for understanding how these states engage the international order.

Paper short abstract:

This article analyzes the dynamics and strategies of co-optation of civil society deployed by the Moroccan regime to reconfigure its authoritarian system and adapt it to emerging challenges. Particular attention will be paid to these dynamics and their effects on the Berber’s population protest.

Paper long abstract:

Different socio-political pacts have been promoted by the Moroccan monarchy after independence. This kind of pacts have been a tool in the hands of the regime to promote different alliances in those moments when its legitimacy has been contested. They have aimed at preserving the crown’s hegemonic position within the political system through stimulating and promoting changes from within, and including certain segments of society, demands and political forces over others. The incorporation into the institutional sphere through these pacts have entailed an important transformation of the Moroccan opposition structure, insofar as inclusion in the system automatically implies the moderation of the discourse and the acceptance of the limits of dissidence established by the regime However, at the same time, they have also meant a parallel modification of the cost of participation and the structure of political opportunity, opening the public space for those social and political forces that decide to take part in the process.

Mohammed VI's accession to the throne led to a new social pact that sought to respond to some of the pressing problems identified by the monarchy, such as the discredit of traditional politics. To face these challenges and preserve and enhance the king’s monopoly within the economic and political system, different strategies were adopted, including the co-opting of groups in civil society. This paper aims to analyze the effects that this cooptation strategy has had both for the civil society and the Morocco regimen thorugh the case study of Berber activism.

Paper short abstract:

The paper looks at how aid can contribute to authoritarian politics. We argue that pro-democracy donors should recognize that what we call “everyday engagement” can entrench authoritarianism. In response, we propose strategies to better account for and respond to democratic erosion.

Paper long abstract:

Authoritarian politics are on the rise. This trend is manifested in the growing number of autocracies worldwide, the increasingly diverse forms authoritarian politics take, and their growing adoption by political actors in what were previously considered democratic states. One consequence is that autocracies now receive the majority of foreign aid. Yet, despite pro-democracy donors’ concern with the current democratic recession, regime type matters little in aid decisions (OECD, 2022). Furthermore, despite regular calls to adapt the way that donors engage with autocratic partners, the reform of aid modalities has been incremental, inconsistent, and problematic. Aid geared towards political processes has been shown to be ineffective in countries that are hard autocracies or are autocratizing. Autocratic partners have grown more adept at subverting democratic norms and aid itself for authoritarian purposes. The combination of these developments means that, in worst cases, donor engagement has contributed to authoritarian entrenchment.

This suggests the need for a reboot of how pro-democracy donors engage authoritarian governments. In response, this paper seeks to answer the following questions: How can pro-democracy donors more effectively engage with authoritarian regimes, or minimally do no harm? Which international practices are most effective at promoting democracy in authoritarian contexts? Building on case studies of both failed and promising donor adaptation and a survey of over 250 sources, we argue that pro-democracy donors should recognize the way that what we call “everyday engagement” entrenches authoritarian practices, better anticipate authoritarian subversion of global norms and aid, and respond to different kinds of democratic.

Paper short abstract:

How do elites respond to autocrats´ protest management tactics? Leveraging a survey experiment administered to Ugandan elites, we find that regime insiders are most likely to support the use of violence and accusatory rhetoric, regardless of the protest’s cause. Outsiders divide depending on cause.

Paper long abstract:

Mass protests can threaten autocratic regimes by signaling an incumbent´s declining legitimacy and potential weakness. While incumbents typically respond in ways intended to shore up support to maintain themselves in power, it remains unknown how other elites — regime insiders and opposition outsiders — respond to an incumbent’s co-optation versus repression efforts. Extending prior related scholarship on authoritarianism, we argue that opposition outsiders are often unable to capitalize politically on mass protests because they are often divided in how to appropriately respond to unrest, whether due to economic or political conditions. Regime insiders, by contrast, consistently rally behind the incumbent response, regardless of the use of violence. To examine how elites respond to an incumbent’s protest management, we randomly expose Uganda’s elite class of top-level bureaucrats, business leaders, members of parliament, and civil society leaders to news radio segments depicting protest scenes in an African capital. In these news segments, we experimentally manipulate both the reason for the protests (electoral fraud versus cost-of-living hikes) and the incumbent´s response (repression, co-optation, and accusatory rhetoric). We find that regime insiders, proxied by party affiliation, are most likely to support the use of violence and accusatory rhetoric, regardless of the protest’s cause. This contrasts with opposition outsiders, who generally favor the use of dialogue to resolve protests. This group, however, divides on the support for incumbent repression depending on the protest’s cause. These findings have implications for how we understand the role that elites play in the maintenance of Africa’s autocratic regimes.

Paper short abstract:

The paper explores how local power has been re-organised in two authoritarian settings, Burundi and Rwanda, since the end of the civil war and the genocide. It focuses on the everyday practices of power, the origins of these practices, and their evolution overtime.

Paper long abstract:

The paper explores how local power has been re-organised in two authoritarian settings, Burundi and Rwanda, since the end of the civil war and the genocide. Going beyond the usual analyses highlighting the lack meaningful space for citizens’ engagement, it focuses on the everyday practices of power, the origins of these practices, and their evolution overtime. Both countries are post-conflict with authoritarian governments that have embraced decentralisation reforms. However, local governance in Burundi and Rwanda have been markedly different. Through systematic comparison, the paper shows that this difference is mainly the result of differing strategies of institutional change, clientelism, and rent capture (including aid money) in the pursue of regime maintenance. Empirically, the paper focusses on the political and financial relations between the periphery and the central state, the sociology of local bureaucrats and politicians, the incentives they are facing, as well as their relationship with the local population.

Paper short abstract:

Drawing on development studies and international relations, this paper explains how institutional donor dynamics at a number of levels (individual/ mission/ (home) capital) intersect with key-strategies of the Museveni regime in Uganda, to sustain and magnify the regime's authoritarian dynamics.

Paper long abstract:

The Museveni regime in Uganda was for long seen as an archetype of a ‘hybrid regime’, with characteristics of both authoritarian and democratic regimes. This hybridity has largely disappeared, with the Museveni regime having become outrightly authoritarian. Paradoxically, donor engagement has become more lenient towards the regime: whereas in this hybrid past, governance transgressions – such as human rights violations or corruption – could be met with strong donor reactions, this has largely disappeared under this escalation of authoritarianism. This paper sets out to explain why this is the case. Drawing on development studies and international relations, it explains how institutional donor dynamics intersect with engagement strategies of the Museveni regime towards the donors, to sustain and magnify these authoritarian dynamics. Concretely, it first focuses on donor institutional dynamics on the individual-, mission- and (home) capital- level, and the way in which economic- and (geo)political incentives at (and between) these various levels intertwine for a ‘business as usual’ approach. Second, it shows how the Museveni regime has been able to strategically make use of these donor dynamics; on the one hand to tap into donor priorities and create a form of (co)dependency; and on the other hand to avoid accountability for governance transgressions.

Paper short abstract:

This paper assesses continuity and changes in electoral authoritarianism, taking the 2021 Ethiopian election as a case. The incumbent won by upholding its ancestor’s manipulation tactics and inventing new ploys of coopting with rivals, hence creating regionally asymmetric authoritarianism.

Paper long abstract:

This paper assesses continuity and changes in electoral authoritarian regimes taking the 2021 Ethiopian election conducted after the Nobel Peace Prize winner, Abiy Ahmed, took power as a case. Though Abiy promised democratic elections when taking office, Ethiopia’s political trajectory took a fundamentally different path following the postponement of the 2020 election. Polls were held in 2021 under the shadow of war, critical opposition leaders’ detention, and election boycotts. The incumbent won in a landslide by maintaining its forerunner’s electoral manipulation tactics of harassing, detaining, and using state resources to manipulate elections and inventing new ploys of coopting with less-threatening oppositions to induce them to pursue self-defeating electoral tactics in return to power sharing. The leading prosperity party also adopted a new electoral dominance tactic of skillfully tailoring different appeals to diverse constituencies across the country. The paper uses official election data to show that Ethiopia’s electoral authoritarianism tends to vary across regions. While oppositions in Amhara and SNNP regions were relatively free to operate and conduct election campaigns, critical rivals in Oromia and Somali were suppressed, detained, and eliminated. Nevertheless, the incumbent garnered substantial public support by tailoring its rhetoric to the target constituency, reframing historical narratives, and addressing regionalized and localized demands that put no threat on the party’s grip on power. Such asymmetrical electoral authoritarianism and segmented political discourse have implications for Ethiopia’s future and state-society relations.