Paper short abstract:

This paper provides an introduction to the approach and findings of ESID's 'defining and measuring political settlements' programme.

Paper long abstract:

Over the past three years ESID's 'Defining and Measuring Political Settlements' project has devised a system for coding and measuring political settlements based on the relative strength and social composition of the de facto political leader's support coalition. This, introductory, panel paper provides an overview of the project and a brief preview of the findings of a 42 country survey, of which a subset was chosen for a QCA.

Paper short abstract:

A political settlement typology facilitates analyzing how social context influences development. Specific settlements types and associated distributions of power shape configurations of institutions that then condition prospects for resolving underlying developmental collective-action problems.

Paper long abstract:

This paper proposes a conceptual framework for developmental political economy based on three propositions: 1) Achieving economic and political development requires resolving underlying collective-action problems; 2) Institutions facilitate resolving complex collective-action problems; 3) Political settlements—that is, mutual understandings held among powerful parties that they will rely primarily on politics rather than violence to resolve disputes—underlie configurations of institutional systems that, in turn, arise from and shape developmental prospects. A simple typology of political settlements serves as a conceptual lens for analyzing how contours of social context influence developmental prospects. Here, two dimensions yield four basic categories. First, the breadth (broad or narrow) of a political settlement's social foundation—that is, the extent to which socially relevant groups are party to the settlement in the sense that policymakers must pay some attention to them. Second, whether its configuration of power—namely, the degree to which insiders can resolve collective-action problems associated with achieving rough agreements about allocating decision-making power and broad national purpose—is concentrated or dispersed.

Each of four basic settlement types shapes the subsequent evolution of a society's institutional system (its social order). Each type poses its own set of developmental collective-action problems whose resolution, or lack thereof, conditions prospects for development. The paper illustrates key principles with simple game-theoretic representations of rival coalitions and various proclivities for inclusion, cooptation, repression, staging a coup, or pursuing a civil war. This analytical approach should facilitate both developmental policy analysis and broad inquiry into the political economy of development.

Paper short abstract:

Studying the effectiveness of leaders raises questions about state capacity. This paper explores the impact of different political settlements on state capacity. Initial illustrative evidence comes from case studies of Zambia and Uganda, and Rwanda and Burundi.

Paper long abstract:

The effectiveness of leaders inevitably raises questions about state capacity—why states in some parts of the world have become more effective at providing valued social goods than in others. In this paper I draw on insights from political settlements analysis and explore the likely impact of different power configurations on state capacity. Specifically, I analyze (1) the political cohesion of the political settlement, that is, the groups in control of political authority and state resources, and (2) its social foundation, or the amount of support and resistance the governing coalition faces from the wider population. I expect a unipolar settlement to be more effective than a multipolar one in accomplishing what they set out to do (for better or for worse), largely because they allow state leaders to operate within a longer time horizon and enable the political protection particular state agencies. The expected impact of social foundations on state capacity is less clear-cut and likely varies across different policy domains (e.g., economic projects, social provision). Initial evidence to illustrate the insights and limitations of this framework will be drawn from comparative case studies of Zambia and Uganda, and Rwanda and Burundi.

Paper short abstract:

Conducting a QCA of six selected countries (and 64 country-periods), using data from our "ESID Political Settlements Survey", this paper studies whether the relative size, strength and social composition of the leader's support coalition affect a country's development trajectory.

Paper long abstract:

The aim of this paper is to explore whether there are relationships between political settlement types and countries' development experiences. In particular, does the relative size, strength and social composition of the leader's support coalition affect a country's willingness and ability to implement inclusive growth or social policies, and to what extent is this mediated or affected by other variables such as economic ideologies or systemic threats? To approach this goal, it conducts a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of six selected countries (and 64 country-periods), using data from our "ESID Political Settlements Survey". The six countries - Ghana, Tanzania, Kenya, Myanmar, Malaysia, and Sri Lanka - were selected since all are medium-sized, predominantly agricultural, resource 'poor', coastal, former British colonies, thus enabling us to hold these potential explanations constant in the QCA while leveraging variation in other factors. Allowing for equifinality, QCA analysis is particularly powerful as a first tool to identify parallel potential pathways that can explain developmental success and other outcomes of interest in developing countries. It hereby provides important guidance for future analyses.