Paper short abstract:

Studying the effectiveness of leaders raises questions about state capacity. This paper explores the impact of different political settlements on state capacity. Initial illustrative evidence comes from case studies of Zambia and Uganda, and Rwanda and Burundi.

Paper long abstract:

The effectiveness of leaders inevitably raises questions about state capacity—why states in some parts of the world have become more effective at providing valued social goods than in others. In this paper I draw on insights from political settlements analysis and explore the likely impact of different power configurations on state capacity. Specifically, I analyze (1) the political cohesion of the political settlement, that is, the groups in control of political authority and state resources, and (2) its social foundation, or the amount of support and resistance the governing coalition faces from the wider population. I expect a unipolar settlement to be more effective than a multipolar one in accomplishing what they set out to do (for better or for worse), largely because they allow state leaders to operate within a longer time horizon and enable the political protection particular state agencies. The expected impact of social foundations on state capacity is less clear-cut and likely varies across different policy domains (e.g., economic projects, social provision). Initial evidence to illustrate the insights and limitations of this framework will be drawn from comparative case studies of Zambia and Uganda, and Rwanda and Burundi.