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- Convenors:
-
Sam Hickey
(University of Manchester)
Giles Mohan (The Open University)
Send message to Convenors
- Formats:
- Papers
- Stream:
- Transnational political economies of development
- Location:
- Venables, S0049 Meeting Room
- Sessions:
- Friday 21 June, -, -
Time zone: Europe/London
Short Abstract:
'Pockets of effectiveness' have helped countries achieve growth, avoid the resource curse and deliver services. We welcome papers that locate PoEs in their political context, including with reference to wider strategies of state-building and regime survival, and also to transnational influences.
Long Abstract:
High levels of state capacity have played a critical role in enabling developing countries to achieve progress, as recognized in the emphasis in SDG16 on building institutions that are 'effective' as well as 'inclusive'. However, history suggests that 'developmental states' were not characterized by Weberian civil services and high levels of state capacity across the board, but rather that progress is often driven by small bureaucratic enclaves performing specific functions. Often referred to as 'pockets of bureaucratic effectiveness', PoEs, defined as public organizations that are reasonably effective in carrying out their functions in otherwise dysfunctional governance contexts. PoEs have played essential roles in establishing the conditions for economic growth, avoiding problems associated with the resource curse, delivering services and performing a range of regulatory functions. However, current research into PoEs tends to lack a comparative focus and underplay the centrality of politics in shaping how they emerge and can be sustained, in part by referring to such organisations as 'islands' that are somehow divorced from their wider context. We particularly welcome papers that seek to locate PoEs in their political and political economy context, including with reference to wider strategies of state-building and regime survival, and also to transnational influences.
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Friday 21 June, 2019, -Paper short abstract:
This paper interrogates the role of bureaucratic "pockets of effectiveness" (PoEs) in the state-building trajectory of Rwanda since the genocide and its attempt to become an African developmental state. It reflects on whether PoEs in Rwanda can play a similar role as in Asian developmental states.
Paper long abstract:
This paper interrogates the role of bureaucratic "pockets of effectiveness" (PoEs) in the state-building trajectory of Rwanda since the genocide and its attempt to become an African developmental state. The Rwandan case does not seem to clearly follow the patterns of other African countries whereby few effective public organizations exist in an otherwise relatively dysfunctional governance context. Under the Rwandan dominant political settlement, while some organisations clearly over-perform, performance is relatively well distributed in the state apparatus. In addition, performance differentials between "pockets of effectiveness" and the rest of the state might be smaller than observed elsewhere. By taking the cases of a PoE -the Ministry of Finance- and of organisations performing less well such as the Rwandan Revenue Authority and the Ministry of Infrastructure, the paper aims at understanding this phenomenon and reflecting on whether PoEs in Rwanda can play a similar role as in Asian developmental states. The paper also aims at analysing the conditions under which pockets of effectiveness can spread and constitute a feasible basis for broader state building.
Paper short abstract:
This paper analyses the Ministry of Finance, Bank of Zambia and Zambia Revenue Authority throughout an era of high copper prices and strong bureaucratic performance. It will highlight determinants for the functioning of these economic institutions.
Paper long abstract:
Zambia's exponential growth in the 2000s was not only buttressed by the rise of copper prices, but was also propped up by a bureaucracy that sustained conditions for economic growth and increased state revenue by amending fiscal policies, informed by (moderate) resource nationalism. This era also saw an expansion of state functions/bureaucracy following the Structural Adjustment Program in the 1990s which led to a reduced civil service. This paper will situate these developments in the political context of President Mwanawasa era (2001-2008) and will highlight some of the determining factors of the functioning of Minister of Finance, Bank of Zambia and Zambia Revenue Authority like leadership, relations with State House and regional/international organisations.
Paper short abstract:
Is the commitment and capacity of elites to promote government performance shaped by different types of political settlement?. This paper advances the current literature on PoEs by reframing them as windows onto deeper processes of state-building and regime survival in Africa.
Paper long abstract:
It remains a puzzle that certain parts of the state function remarkably effectively in developing countries, despite being located in governance contexts that many characterize as dysfunctional. Known as 'pockets of effectiveness' (PoEs), such high-performing agencies are increasingly seen as critical to development prospects in developing countries. This comparative paper shows that investigating the pattern of public sector performance over time through PoEs can offer an important window onto how deeper processes of state-building are playing out within Africa, particularly in relation to the politics of regime survival. It draws on case-studies in five countries (Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia) to show how public sector performance is directly shaped by the ideas and incentives that characterize different types of political settlement. We also draw attention to the transnational and ideational aspects of state-building in the global south, including the role of international development agencies in determining the shape of the state and what form of development it has the capacity to promote.
Paper short abstract:
Through the case of Ghana, this paper argues that public sector agencies can enhance their effectiveness not by isolating themselves from politics, but by cultivating 'strong political relations' and engaging in 'political bargaining' with powerful political and bureaucratic elites.
Paper long abstract:
Although Ghana has been widely hailed as a democratic success story, there is broad-based consensus that state capacity in Ghana is weak, as a vast majority of public organizations are unable to effectively perform their mandated functions. However, evidence from several datasets as well as our own expert survey show that organisations such as the Bank of Ghana (BoG) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) have maintained a relatively high degree of performance during the past three decades, although this has been varied over time. In this paper, we explore the role of leadership, organizational culture and external support in accounting for this pattern, before arguing that the clearest explanation can be found through reference to the changing nature of Ghana's political settlement over time. In particular, we find strong support for the theoretical proposition that PoEs are more likely to emerge and endure under dominant political settlements than in countries characterized by competitive clientelism due to the varied degrees of elite vulnerability under these settlement types and the extent to which this shapes elite incentives in investing in bureaucratic capacities in the long-term. These findings support recent observations that in contexts of personalized forms of governance, public sector agencies can enhance their effectiveness not by isolating themselves from politics, but instead by cultivating 'strong political relations' and engaging in various forms of 'political bargaining' with powerful political and bureaucratic elites. The paper draws on official government reports, various international datasets, and over 50 key informant interviews.
Paper short abstract:
Within Uganda's weakening dominant political settlement, NWSC offers a cheap mechanism for dispensing patronage. NWSC delivers water management services in ways that enables the ruling elite to take the credit in return for being able to operate with minimal political interferences.
Paper long abstract:
Uganda's National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) turned around its reputation as a moribund public water utility during the 1970s and 80s to become one of Africa's best utilities of the last two decades. Previous studies into this Pocket of Effectiveness (PoE) have employed a business management perspective that has emphasised the role of managers introducing innovative New Public Management (NPM) principles, and also the technical and financial support that NWSC has received from international development agencies. The role of politics has been ignored. Here we reveal how a symbiotic relationship between NWSC and Uganda's ruling elite has not only been central to sustaining its good performance over time but also enabled it to expand its sphere of influence from under 20 towns to over 250 towns in the last 10 years. Within Uganda's weakening dominant political settlement, NWSC is deployed as a cheap mechanism for dispensing patronage. This signals the ruling party's commitment to service delivery especially to its critical upcountry support-base. In return NWSC obtains a growing business portfolio and is protected from the political interference that most public sector agencies in Uganda are exposed to.
Paper short abstract:
Using Kenya's Central Bank as a case study, this paper argues that pockets of effectiveness are not divorced from the clientelistic and patrimonial nature of a country's political settlement, but instead represent hybrid modes of governance that fuse legal-rational and patrimonial logics
Paper long abstract:
There is an increasing appreciation that political dynamics play a critical role in determining the prospects for "pockets of effectiveness" (POEs) to emerge and be sustained, specifically through the nature of a country's political settlement. However, there remains an assumption that POEs, whenever they do emerge, are somehow divorced from the patrimonial nature of the political settlement, operating according to a formal and rules-based rationale. This paper challenges such assumptions, arguing that POEs often represent hybrid modes of governance that fuse legal-rational and patrimonial logics. To do so, the paper uses the example of Kenya's Central Bank, specifically its contrasting fortunes under its two most recent governors. During the tenure of Njuguna Ndung'u (2007-2015), indicators of Kenya's financial sector development surged rapidly, overtaking those of many middle-income countries. This, the paper argues, was enabled by Ndung'u's deals-based approach to the sector. Ndung'u understood the clientelist nature of Kenyan banking as well as its role in preserving the political settlement by enabling vital patronage networks. He therefore gave banks leeway in meeting their financial and regulatory obligations, favouring an incremental approach to improved corporate governance, particularly with politically-influential banks. Ndung'u's successor, by contrast, has opted for "big bang" reforms, demanding total compliance with international best-practice regulations. This rules-based approach has been met with fierce resistance by Kenya's banks as well as their political patrons, resulting in a concerted effort to force Patrick Njoroge from office, while also causing instability within the banking sector and undermining the autonomy of the Central Bank.
Paper short abstract:
This paper will discuss how politicization of national planning through executive interference can strengthen or weaken the sustainability of development interventions introduced by trilateral partnerships and civil service organisations often deemed as 'effective'
Paper long abstract:
The Triangle of Hope project (2006-12) is a large-scale trilateral capacity building initiative in Zambia that has aimed to improve the efficiency of the civil service in managing national development and stimulating economic growth, implemented with the support of Japanese and Malaysian partners. Through a discussion of how political changes affected the outcomes of the ToH project, this paper will argue that politicization of national planning through executive interference can strengthen or weaken the sustainability of interventions introduced by trilateral development partnerships and civil service organisations often deemed as 'effective'. Drawing on key stakeholder interviews and archival research, it will discuss the impacts of: the increasing use of political patronage rather than merit as the basis of civil service appointments; the absence of protection mechanisms to support officials who speak out against negative policy changes made by the President; and the loss of institutional memory through staff turnover. Overall, the findings of this paper will highlight the limits to which bureaucratic 'pockets of effectiveness' can function in states in which decision-making power is highly centralised.