Click the star to add/remove an item to/from your individual schedule.
You need to be logged in to avail of this functionality.
Log in
- Chair:
-
Diana Kopbayeva
(Nazarbayev University)
- Discussant:
-
Diana Kopbayeva
(Nazarbayev University)
- Format:
- Panel
- Theme:
- Political Science, International Relations, and Law
- Location:
- Debate club (Floor 7)
- Sessions:
- Thursday 6 June, -
Time zone: Asia/Almaty
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Thursday 6 June, 2024, -Abstract:
According to J. Gerschewski (2013, p. 29), legitimacy, along with co-optation and repression, constitute the three essential pillars of autocratic regime stability, and explaining the mechanisms of sustainability should take into account the complex relationship between the mentioned variables. As he points out, legitimacy significantly reduces the costs of persuasion undertaken by elites against the apparatus and the public, and reduces the likelihood of the emergence of personal alternatives to those in power.
The concept of legitimacy is particularly useful for explaining the sources of political stability of Central Asian regimes, both those that have never embarked on the path of democratization and those that remain in a hybrid space, where formal democratic institutions (e.g., competitive elections) (Diamond, 2002; Levitsky, Way, 2010), are modified to a greater or lesser extent by informal practices designed to secure the power of those in power (e.g., by restricting voting rights, media freedom, or persecuting the opposition). Mechanisms of repression, or co-optation, are insufficient to explain the phenomenon of the persistence of Central Asian authoritarianisms, and they fail to account for a range of legitimizing activities of non-democratic elites aimed at justifying the existing order. Focusing on repressive mechanisms also makes it difficult to understand why authoritarian rulers choose to bear the costs associated with institutionalizing persuasion.
The task of this text is to analyze selected conditions of effectiveness and mechanisms of legitimacy in authoritarian states, based on examples from Central Asian countries. Focusing attention on the legitimacy claims formulated by the political elites of non-democratic states does not mean assuming that their actions are always effective. It is about the weaker claim that they are relevant to the reproduction of non-democratic regime stability, so they are not just propaganda messages. The speech will point to several dimensions of the effectiveness of the legitimization of power and its mechanisms: control of those who formulate claims that undermine the official legitimacy formula, basing legitimacy on dichotomous divisions, shaping perceptions of legitimacy, authoritarian establishment and limitation of the agenda, the interactive nature of legitimacy, controlling the definition of the situation, stable support of a relatively narrow circle of supporters.
Abstract:
Scholarly research on the role of digital activism in authoritarian settings has largely centred around debates on ‘liberation technology’ versus ‘networked authoritarianism’. This article aims to extend existing research by linking authoritarian legitimation theories with emerging scholarship on digital activism. The study examines Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, two autocracies in post-Soviet Central Asia, to demonstrate how non-democratic regimes use digital activism for legitimation purposes. This research is based on 33 qualitative in-depth interviews with digital activists and state officials in both countries and generates critical comparative insights into how modern autocracies function in the digital age. The article suggests autocracies use four mutually inclusive and escalating legitimation mechanisms (limited participation, outputs legitimation, regime discourse, and targeted repression) to become more resilient through their interactions with digital activists.
Abstract:
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine put Kazakhstan in a very difficult situation. On one hand, it had to show allegiance to its strategic neighbor by showing diplomatic support; on the other, it risks facing Western sanctions for helping Russia evade anti-Russian sanctions. One area where Kazakhstan and its Central Asian neighbors could benefit from the war is increased collaboration with the West in the spheres of renewable energy, trade and logistics. What is the effect of abovementioned risks and opportunities for Kazakhstan’s democratization record?
Has the Ukrainian war made Kazakhstan more or less democratic? Will the rejuvenation of relations with the West translate into political openings at home? As this paper will illustrate, the Ukrainian conflict has not caused any positive effect on democratization. On the contrary, it consolidated public opinion around the leadership of President Tokayev contributing to his regime legitimation efforts after a violent suppression of January protests. Moreover, Tokayev’s numerous meetings with global leaders reinforced his popular legitimacy at home. In addition, growing ties with the West around energy, logistics and trade deals eased Western pressure on Kazakhstan’s poor human rights record. Finally, contrary to most commentators’ views, Russia continues to yield political influence in Kazakhstan domestic affairs via its regional organizations and hybrid warfare tactics.
Abstract:
This paper explores the key drivers of recent institutional changes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. I explain why in spite of substantial differences in their political systems, economic development, legislative processes, and civil society, both countries recently experienced the same outcome, i.e. institutional change, ranging from formal legislative amendments and structural reforms to changes in the electoral system and institutional composition. In contrast to conventional theories of incremental (evolutionary) institutional change, I argue that the endogenous elite conflict stemming from struggle for power and attempts to ensure regime survival in response to the perceived crisis have served as catalysts of major institutional reforms in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. I posit that institutional change in both soft-autocratic regimes is the ruling elite’s direct reaction to the threats from rising rivals within the current political order and domestic mass movements that seek to revolutionize the extant political system. In testing this proposition, this study utilized a multifaceted qualitative approach, including in-depth case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, content and discourse analysis of government white papers, legal texts/amendments, Presidential addresses, and media reports, as well as process tracing to unravel the history and narratives surrounding institutional change in the two countries.