Abstract:

This paper explores the key drivers of recent institutional changes in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. I explain why in spite of substantial differences in their political systems, economic development, legislative processes, and civil society, both countries recently experienced the same outcome, i.e. institutional change, ranging from formal legislative amendments and structural reforms to changes in the electoral system and institutional composition. In contrast to conventional theories of incremental (evolutionary) institutional change, I argue that the endogenous elite conflict stemming from struggle for power and attempts to ensure regime survival in response to the perceived crisis have served as catalysts of major institutional reforms in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. I posit that institutional change in both soft-autocratic regimes is the ruling elite’s direct reaction to the threats from rising rivals within the current political order and domestic mass movements that seek to revolutionize the extant political system. In testing this proposition, this study utilized a multifaceted qualitative approach, including in-depth case studies of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, content and discourse analysis of government white papers, legal texts/amendments, Presidential addresses, and media reports, as well as process tracing to unravel the history and narratives surrounding institutional change in the two countries.