Paper short abstract:

This paper argues that ‘anti-French’ popular (re)actions should be read as initiatives that reformulate African liberation ideologies from the 1950s-1960s. These mobilizations, which sometimes promote authoritarian powers, have consequences on the French Development-Security nexus in West Africa.

Paper long abstract:

This paper argues that the effervescence of ‘anti-French’ mobilizations in the 2010s is not only the result of the various political and security crises faced by France-Africa relations in the context of the growing influence of non-French actors (Russia, Turkey, and China), but also of the long history of anti-imperialist movements located in the ‘Black Atlantic’ (Gilroy 1993) between Europe, Africa, and the Americas. It asserts that these mobilizations should be read as initiatives that reformulate African liberation ideologies from the 1950s-1960s. It posits that these movements, which sometimes rehabilitate ‘revolutionary’ authoritarian powers, have implications for the evolution of the French Development-Security nexus in West Africa.

This paper relies on empirical research conducted during 12 months on Pan-Africanist organizations based in France, consisting of 30 interviews, a study of numerical social networks, and an ethnography of these movements. It focuses on two associations called 'la Ligue de Défense Noire Africaine' (LDNA) and 'Unité, Dignité, Courage' (UDC), and shows how they renegotiate Pan-Africanism and Third-Worldism by advocating for a radical separation from France: they not only wish to end all French military interventions in West Africa, but also to depart from ‘democracy’ and ‘development’, considered to be exogenous and ill-suited models to African realities. It examines how their reformulation of anti-imperialist ideologies manifests through discourses that interpret the recent coups d’état in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso as progress towards regaining African sovereignty, as well as through concrete relationships with West African ‘patriots’ that support geopolitical reconfigurations in favor of Russia.

Paper short abstract:

This article explores the historical link between the new anti-French movements and the anti-imperialist leaders of the 1950s and 1960s as well as the underlying ideology to depict the will of the youth in the quest for their countries' liberation from neocolonialism.

Paper long abstract:

Most of Francophone West African countries achieved independence in 1960. The independence acquired was more theoretical than practical. The political leaders are practically the sentries for the French leaders who hold them in power. Some become the sponsors of the "Françafrique" network which maintains and perpetuates the structural dependence in all areas of the states with the metropolis. Natural resources, national wealth are plundered with the blessing of those political leaders and to the detriment of populations.

However, some African leaders opposed this African policy of France. Anti-imperialist leaders of the 1950s and 1960s were already denouncing French imperialism. In 1980s, Thomas Sankara fought neocolonialism. These leaders are later assassinated or driven out of power by rebellions.

In recent times, due to economic and security matters in African countries, we are witnessing the rise of an anti-French feeling in West Africa. The youth now open to the world, is taking up the fight of pan-Africanist leaders. During protests, French symbols and businesses are destroyed. The recent blockade of the French military convoy by Burkinabe and Nigerien demonstrators hostile to the presence of the French soldiers in the Sahel "suspected" of colluding with the terrorists is an illustration of this situation. The youth aims to triumph where politicians were unable to revisit the relationship between France and Africa. They aim to free their countries from France's yoke.

The question is: what are the foundations of this anti-french resurgence feelings currently prevailing in West Africa's Francophone countries?

Paper short abstract:

The French-led intervention in Mali was initially welcomed by many. Subsequent events led to suspicion about France’s role, concerning conflict actors or Malian resources. The changing attitude reflects the varying success of the intervention and conflicting views of how to deal with the conflict.

Paper long abstract:

Observations made in Northern Mali initially suggested enthusiasm for France and the French intervention in Mali in 2013. More recent visits to Mali revealed growing scepticism regarding France’s role in Mali. Speculations regarding the ‘real’ intentions of France could be heard among ordinary people and government agents. France was accused of siding with some actors in the conflict, the Tuareg rebels in particular. Speculations verging on conspiracy theories claimed that the French supported not just the rebels but also indirectly the Islamists and also failed to apprehend wanted rebel or Islamist leaders. The French supposedly had a hidden agenda and were pursuing their own objectives. More specific reasons were invoked, listing the attempts of the French to take control of the assumed vast mineral wealth of Northern Mali, oil and uranium in particular. The relationship between France and Mali is not determined from the outset, but shaped by unfolding developments. Oscillating over the years, it is neither one of one-sided French dominance nor necessarily harmonious. Rather, the tensions between the French and Malian governments, as the changing, and progressively negative, perceptions of the French presence in Mali, have emerged as different approaches to the conflict have been attempted with varying success. These include differences of opinion as to certain options, including the choice to negotiate with the Islamists. The mitigated success of the long-lasting French-led intervention is also what has prompted consideration of recourse to other external forces including the Russians.

Paper short abstract:

Faced with the Anglophone crisis, members of the Fulani communities entrapped by the war hysteria, developed flexible containment mechanisms. Irrespective of the options, the war presaged impressive displacements among the Fulani contributing to issues of adjustments in their new environments.

Paper long abstract:

The Fulani of the North West Region of Cameroon are mainly cattle nomads with inaudible lifestyles. They mostly live on grassy hilltops overlooking pasture-laden valleys for herding. Recently they are gently gaining sedentary habitations and are often visibly indifferent to political issues that do not directly impinge on their immediate socio-economic setting. The historic routine of living, especially, in their natural eco-structure was greatly affected by the general anxiety, insecurity and uncertainty engendered by the belligerency accompanying the Anglophone crisis that radicalized roughly around 2017. It is in this context that following a qualitative (historical) method-approach supported by primary and secondary evidences, the study argues that the extension of the armed phase of the Anglophone crisis to the Fulani social and geographical reserves exposed them to conditions of the war scenario. Faced with the entanglement and hysteria, members of the Fulani communities developed alternating containment mechanisms that saw them collaborating with or resisting the guerilla set up of the separatists-led ambazonian-fighters. The study interrogates the extent to which the Fulani in the war circumstance contended with the decision to synchronize positions of either appropriating the propaganda of the separatists’ forces or aligning with the ideology of the state to neutralize the ambazonian-fighters. It argues that as a survival strategy within the war situation, some Fulani populations were constrained to flee from their natural abodes to new locations where they submitted to the impulses of local and international support agencies to adjust to their host communities.