Paper short abstract:

The idea of a French pré carré in Africa has been shattered by neoliberal rivalries between the United States and China. This paper examines the implications of Sino-American rivalries on French monetary controls in West Africa and the socio-cultural import of this reconfiguration for Africa and France.

Paper long abstract:

Between 1945 and 1990, France effectively constructed the idea of pré carré, a neocolonial community of former colonies in Africa. The guiding principle of French involvement in Africa was the preservation of economic and strategic interests.

However, the end of the Cold War, and the emergence of the neoliberal order was to reconfigure France-Africa relations. The United States, the champion of the new order, was no longer satisfied with the neo-colonial permutations of spheres of interests and began to pressure the beneficiaries of the old order to adjust to the new realities or be elbowed out. The first sign of a new beginning was the Franco-Africa summit in La Baule, in 1990. President Mitterand made it clear to African leaders that a new world had overtaken the old. In 1993, Prime Minister Balladur announced that budgetary aid to franc zone countries would be conditional upon their having previously signed an agreement with the Bretton Woods Institutions. In 1994 France unilaterally devalued the CFA by 50 percent. With this devaluation, French grasp on her pré carré could no longer be guaranteed. This opened up interesting opportunities for American and Chinese businesses in Africa. Relying on the historiography of subaltern history, this study examine collates and analyzes the implications of Sino-American rivalries on French monetary controls in West Africa as well as the socio-cultural import of this reconfiguration for Africa and France – one of which has been a emigrational shift – from France to North America.

Paper short abstract:

Cette communication scrute l’horizon diplomatique entre la France et l’Afrique à l’aune du Sommet de Montpellier et de la pratique diplomatique ambiante.

Paper long abstract:

Le 8 octobre 2021, Emmanuel Macron a ouvert à Montpellier, le 28ème sommet Afrique-France. Alors que pour nombre d’observateurs ce sommet s’inscrivait dans la routine diplomatique habituelle entre la France et son pré-carré africain, le président français a prévu que ce sommet « marque une rupture radicale par rapport aux 27 Sommets précédents ».

Pour préciser sa pensée, le président français souhaite que Montpellier serve de plateforme d’écoute non seulement de la jeunesse africaine, de « ses perceptions, ses compréhensions éventuelles » mais aussi de la diaspora. Macron compte également écouter l'opinion locale, notamment la « jeunesse française qui manifeste le désire de s’impliquer dans la redéfinition des liens qui [unissent la France] avec le continent africain ».

Dès l'ouverture du sommet, la déclinaison des objectifs se perçoit.

Autour de Macron, aucun Chef d’Etat africain n’est présent ! Des jeunes africains choisis et invités in facultatem sont les interlocuteurs du président français.

Dans le fond, Emmanuel Macron qui a donné la parole à ses hôtes, se dispose à discuter avec eux, à bâtons rompus. A partir de ces éléments et eu égard à la pratique antérieure, l’on serait tenté d’affirmer que Macron est l'homme de la rupture dans les relations franco-africaines.

Cependant, instruit des annonces et velléités inabouties en la matière, il ne serait pas de mauvais aloi de prendre quelques distances. Alors faut-il croire Emmanuel Macron ? Cette communication scrute l’horizon diplomatique entre la France et l’Afrique à l’aune du Sommet de Montpellier et de la question du CFA .

Paper short abstract:

Counterfeit was a solution for some and a problem for others. Economic historians of West Africa insisted on the importance of counterfeit schemes during the interwar period. Analyzing counterfeit practices reveals nuances of the institution of the French colonial currency in West Africa.

Paper long abstract:

The interwar period in West Africa was a time of massive currency instability. Drawing on cases in Togo and Cameroun this paper focuses on counterfeiting of French colonial currency. In contrast to the image of all-powerful colonial banks and administrations, this paper suggests to look at monetary politics from the marginal perspective of currency reproduction. Archival sources from the Ministère des colonies (ANOM, Aix-en-Provence) reveal the French administration’s incapacity of responding to demands of money users for a stable and trustworthy currency. However, taxpayers, shop owners as well as workers were often confronted to situations with a lack of money (“manque d’argent”).

Counterfeit was a solution for some and a problem for others. Economic historians of West Africa insisted on the importance of counterfeit schemes during the 1920 and 1930s global financial crisis . Since most transactions on West African markets involved alloy coins, produced out of cheap metals and no longer gold and silver, it became easier to produce counterfeit coins. The production varied from local blacksmiths using molds to press money to internationally connected entrepreneurs reaching out to the imperial metropoles.

The economic relevance of counterfeit was limited, because it did not harm the colonial economy. However, the political and symbolic role should not be underestimated. Colonial administrations feared the loss of control over the already very limited circulation of their currencies. Counterfeiters perceived their work not as criminal, but rather as a pragmatic act of money making or even as resistance. Analyzing counterfeit practices makes the moral dimension of money making visible and reveals nuances of the institution of the French colonial currency in West Africa.