Paper short abstract

This paper rethinks Japan's "unequal treaties" in the context of Tokugawa-Dutch relations. It argues that they aimed to dismantle an earlier unequal and humiliating relationship and to establish legally defined, reciprocal state relations.

Paper long abstract

This paper rethinks Japan's so-called "unequal treaties" of the late Tokugawa period by situating them in the longer context of Tokugawa-Dutch relations. Conventional narratives portray these treaties primarily as instruments of Western domination imposed on Japan. This paper instead argues that their original purpose was to clear away an earlier relationship that had long been regarded in Western eyes as unequal, humiliating, and legally insecure.

For more than two centuries, the Dutch had been confined to the small artificial island of Desima in Nagasaki and subjected to restrictive and often degrading regulations. From the Western perspective, this exclusive and asymmetrical arrangement came to be seen as incompatible with emerging norms of international law and sovereign equality. When Western powers sought to establish treaty relations with Japan in the mid-nineteenth century, their primary concern was therefore not to impose domination but to replace this earlier Tokugawa-Dutch relationship with a legally defined, reciprocal framework governing diplomacy and trade.

The paper examines how this objective shaped the negotiations conducted by Matthew Perry and Townsend Harris, as well as the abortive attempt by the Dutch commissioner Jan Donker Curtius to create a treaty "model" in 1856-57 for Japan's future treaty relations. It then analyzes the original draft of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Amity and Commerce, which emphasized reciprocal jurisdiction, mutual most-favored-nation treatment, and freedom of residence and trade, and notably did not include a tariff schedule.

By comparing this draft with the final treaty text, the paper shows that the features later condemned as the hallmarks of the "unequal treaties" emerged not as the primary goals of Western negotiators but as contingent outcomes shaped in part by Japanese requests and negotiating strategies. The paper concludes that, from a contemporaneous perspective, these treaties were conceived less as instruments of subjugation than as mechanisms to normalize Japan's external relations by dismantling the earlier, highly asymmetrical Tokugawa-Dutch order.

Paper short abstract

This paper focuses on the Municipal Council at Nagasaki foreign settlement through historical documents from foreign consulates and the Prefecture. To clarify the specific activities of this organization, this research demonstrates the meaning for both the foreign settlement and Japanese society.

Paper long abstract

Nagasaki had been a hub for foreign trade with China and the Netherlands since the Edo period. The signing of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Japan and western countries in 1850s led to the birth of a foreign community in the treaty ports. Its function as an international trading port continued to the Meiji era, with the Japanese government providing a foreign settlement as a place for business executives and diplomats to live.

More than 10 countries, including the United States, Britain, France, and Russia, opened consulates in Nagasaki. China was the largest foreign population in Nagasaki, but until the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Amity and Commerce established in 1871, the Chinese had a unique situation in which consular services were handled by hometown associations from Fujian and Canton.

Land regulations were drawn up to manage the Nagasaki settlement, and in 1861, Municipal Council as autonomous administration had launched. These regulations later served as a model for foreign settlements in open ports such as Yokohama, Kobe, and Osaka.

This paper focuses on the Municipal Council, which was responsible for the autonomy of Nagasaki foreign settlement. In particular, I would like to clarify the specific activities of this organization and examine its historical significance for both the foreign settlement and Japanese society. It is also important to consider how the Municipal Council maintained a balance with the consulars of each country and the Japanese administration. This research mainly analyzes historical documents from the British and American consulates, as well as those of Nagasaki Prefecture.

Paper short abstract

This paper argues the U.S. accepted constraints in the 1960 treaty because Dulles saw an Australian fallback as needed to reduce reliance on an unstable Japan. Yet he failed to implement the Nash Report’s limited storage plan, leaving no viable backup and leading Washington to concede to Japan.

Paper long abstract

The revision of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty provoked backlash in Japan in 1960 and reshaped Japanese politics. Yet compared with the previous treaty, the revised agreement placed greater constraints on the United States; accordingly, one of the main puzzles in diplomatic-historical scholarship is why the United States accepted these constraints in 1958, later embodied in 1960. Existing studies emphasize U.S. anxieties about Japan’s possible neutralization, the favorable assessment of Kishi Nobusuke as a reliable pro-American partner, or military perspectives.

In this paper, I add a further perspective: the failure of John Foster Dulles—a key figure in Eisenhower-era diplomacy—to advance the idea of Australia as an alternative base to Japan. In spring 1957, as treaty revision emerged as a major issue in U.S.–Japan relations, Dulles proposed the long-term development of Australia as a defense production base, fearing excessive U.S. dependence on Japan in the Far East. Within the U.S. government, opposition was strong; officials objected to Australia’s distance from conflict zones, warned that the move could signal a retreat from forward deployment and unsettle allies, and pointed to the economic and fiscal costs. Even so, Dulles pressed on and an NSC policy paper on Australia stipulated that Australia could serve as a fall-back position.

However, Dulles could not carry his proposal into concrete policy. In late 1957, a global basing policy paper known as the Nash Report was submitted. The Nash Report raised concerns about the political stability of Japan and other allied states in the Far East and identified Australia as an alternative. Yet mindful of the problems noted above, it did not advocate a withdrawal from the Far East. Instead, it proposed Australia only as a supplementary base, kept primarily to store mothballed merchant ships and surplus grain. Even so, Dulles failed to win support within the U.S. government for this limited approach.

　Without a viable fall-back position, the United States had little choice but to compromise with Japan. This, in turn, encouraged Washington to relinquish certain established prerogatives and to enter into a new treaty relationship with Japan.

Paper short abstract

This study compares the implementation of the so-called "unequal treaties" with that of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), based on domestic and foreign diplomatic archives and focusing techniques of consensus building and their consequences.

Paper long abstract

This study compares the implementation of the so-called "unequal treaties" with that of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The objective is to deepen our understanding of how treaties that constrain sovereignty—or the exercise thereof—have been managed in Japan. No nation exercises its sovereignty with 100% autonomy; indeed, the United States, in its current desire for such absolute control, has begun withdrawing from numerous international organizations and treaties. Such a trend likely does not contribute to global peace. Learning how to coexist with constraints on sovereignty may, perhaps, offer a way to help reconstruct the international order.

While research on the "unequal treaties" tends to focus on the history of treaty revision (explaining how they were eventually abolished), the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty has persisted to this day despite undergoing revisions, making a direct comparison difficult. However, the "unequal treaties" remained in effect for nearly forty years and thus possess a long history of practical implementation.

Therefore, this report utilizes domestic and foreign diplomatic archives to compare the styles of implementation between the two. A commonality is that in both cases, there are numerous instances where Japan successfully persuaded its counterparts to accept its positions. A point of divergence is that while disputes over the implementation of the "unequal treaties" resulted in relatively clear "wins" and "losses," the management of the Security Treaty involves a sophisticated layering of agreements at various levels to ensure that the interests of both Japan and the U.S. are reflected. While the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty system could be described as more refined than its Meiji-era predecessor, the accumulation of these agreements has become so complex that it is now nearly impossible to grasp the full picture, making its practical management increasingly difficult.