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Paper short abstract

This paper argues the U.S. accepted constraints in the 1960 treaty because Dulles saw an Australian fallback as needed to reduce reliance on an unstable Japan. Yet he failed to implement the Nash Report’s limited storage plan, leaving no viable backup and leading Washington to concede to Japan.

Paper long abstract

The revision of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty provoked backlash in Japan in 1960 and reshaped Japanese politics. Yet compared with the previous treaty, the revised agreement placed greater constraints on the United States; accordingly, one of the main puzzles in diplomatic-historical scholarship is why the United States accepted these constraints in 1958, later embodied in 1960. Existing studies emphasize U.S. anxieties about Japan’s possible neutralization, the favorable assessment of Kishi Nobusuke as a reliable pro-American partner, or military perspectives.

In this paper, I add a further perspective: the failure of John Foster Dulles—a key figure in Eisenhower-era diplomacy—to advance the idea of Australia as an alternative base to Japan. In spring 1957, as treaty revision emerged as a major issue in U.S.–Japan relations, Dulles proposed the long-term development of Australia as a defense production base, fearing excessive U.S. dependence on Japan in the Far East. Within the U.S. government, opposition was strong; officials objected to Australia’s distance from conflict zones, warned that the move could signal a retreat from forward deployment and unsettle allies, and pointed to the economic and fiscal costs. Even so, Dulles pressed on and an NSC policy paper on Australia stipulated that Australia could serve as a fall-back position.

However, Dulles could not carry his proposal into concrete policy. In late 1957, a global basing policy paper known as the Nash Report was submitted. The Nash Report raised concerns about the political stability of Japan and other allied states in the Far East and identified Australia as an alternative. Yet mindful of the problems noted above, it did not advocate a withdrawal from the Far East. Instead, it proposed Australia only as a supplementary base, kept primarily to store mothballed merchant ships and surplus grain. Even so, Dulles failed to win support within the U.S. government for this limited approach.

　Without a viable fall-back position, the United States had little choice but to compromise with Japan. This, in turn, encouraged Washington to relinquish certain established prerogatives and to enter into a new treaty relationship with Japan.