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Paper short abstract

We draw on survey data to assess public evaluations of the current electoral system and potential alternatives. It examines which features are considered effective or problematic, which reforms they support, and how these preferences relate to broader concerns about democratic representation.

Paper long abstract

Electoral systems shape how voters engage with representatives and how responsive governments are to public preferences. Japan adopted a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) rule for lower house elections in 1994, aiming to promote policy-based competition and a stable two-bloc party system. These goals have not been fully realized. The Liberal Democratic Party remains dominant, opposition parties are fragmented, and political scandals continue to undermine public trust. These outcomes have renewed calls for reform, including proposals to return to the previous multi-member district single non-transferable vote rule. However, it is unclear whether dissatisfaction reflects flaws in the MMM rule itself or other electoral system features such as malapportionment, restrictive campaign rules, and opaque political finance. This paper draws on original survey data to assess how the Japanese public evaluates the current electoral system and potential alternatives. It examines which features voters see as effective or problematic, what types of reform they support, and how these preferences relate to broader concerns about representation, party competition, and democratic legitimacy. By anchoring debates about electoral reform in public opinion, the paper sheds light on the conditions under which citizens support changes to the electoral rules that structure democratic governance.

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Paper short abstract

Japan’s early experiments with voting machines around 1900 were not mere imitations of Western models but attempts to apply science and technology to the reform and design of electoral system. Led by legislative bureaucrats, they show a deliberate use of technology in shaping political institutions.

Paper long abstract

This article examines the historical relationship between voting technology and electoral systems by focusing on the fact that, at the relatively early stage of the 1910s, a highly innovative voting machine was conceived in modern Japan. In Europe and the United States, voting machines were generally employed as supplementary devices within existing electoral systems, primarily to ensure ballot secrecy and prevent electoral fraud. In Japan, by contrast, parliamentary legal bureaucrats seeking to establish a proportional electoral system, particularly STV, played a leading role in conceiving the voting machine as a means of realizing institutional reform. This article identifies three conditions that made such an approach possible: (1) the rise of a community of engineering experts and the formation of connections between them and parliamentary legal bureaucrats; (2) the “Western” orientation inherited by the Legislation Bureau from the Ministry of Public Works and the emergence of generalist legal bureaucrats; and (3) the influence of contemporary developments in electoral reform in Britain. It further argues that this attempt to integrate institutional design with technological development offers important insights for contemporary debates over electoral reform and the role of voting technology.

The full paper is available for download at the following URL.

https://researchmap.jp/jeyongsohn/presentations/52957160

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Paper short abstract

This paper examines why the SNTV system survived in postwar Japan (1947–1950). While the core system remained fixed, campaign regulations were actively revised. These adjustments fostered consensus and consolidated the framework despite frequent government changes.

Paper long abstract

The reintroduction and consolidation of the multi-member district system in early postwar Japan pose a significant puzzle for research on electoral reform. Although the system was reintroduced in 1947, it was not overturned despite frequent changes in government—from the Katayama and Ashida cabinets to the Yoshida cabinet—and instead remained a core framework of postwar Japanese politics. This paper examines the period from 1947 to 1950 not as a one-time settlement, but as a process in which consensus was built through repeated adjustments.

The key to this process lies in the layered nature of electoral rules. Macro-level rules such as the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) directly shape seat allocation and thus have a largely zero-sum character, making fundamental reform difficult as conflicts of interest sharpen. By contrast, micro-level rules such as campaign regulations are often justified in terms of corruption prevention and administrative feasibility. This character allows for gradual adjustments and compromise. The repeated legal revisions between 1948 and 1950 reflect this asymmetry in consensus formation.

The analysis focuses on the 1948 Temporary Act on Election Campaigns, deliberations of the Electoral System Advisory Council in 1949, and the enactment of the Public Offices Election Act in 1950. It pays particular attention to how the SNTV system was treated as a fixed premise while campaign regulations were actively redesigned. Tracing this sequence shows that institutional reconsideration did not lead to radical system change. Instead, it reaffirmed the existing framework by narrowing the scope of reform.

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Paper short abstract

This presentation analyzes the relationship between electoral system reform and bureaucracy in Japan around the 1960s, focusing on the Electoral System Council. It examines the Ministry of Home Affairs’ involvement in the Council’s establishment and operation and its evaluation of the Council.

Paper long abstract

In Japan in the early 1960s, the need to revise the "process" of electoral system reform itself came to be emphasized, leading to the establishment of the Electoral System Council as a public advisory body. From the 1960s through the early 1970s, the Council was convened intermittently in seven successive rounds and continued deliberations on electoral reform. Thereafter, however, it entered a period of dormancy, and the eighth Council was not convened until the late 1980s.

Although the Electoral System Council was formally established within the Prime Minister’s Office, it was closely connected to the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Ministry drafted the legislation that provided the legal basis for the Council and also served as its secretariat, assuming responsibility for its administrative operations. As with other advisory councils, the Ministry was involved in key aspects of the Council’s activities, including the selection of members, the provision of materials for deliberation, and the preparation of specific proposals to be examined by the Council.

Initially, Home Affairs bureaucrats placed considerable expectations on the Electoral System Council. In the late 1950s, electoral system reform had become dysfunctional amid the institutionalization of prior screening procedures and intensified inter-party conflict, leading bureaucrats to regard the Council as a new avenue for reform. Over time, however, these expectations gradually gave way to disappointment. As the Council itself began to fall into dysfunction—stemming from structural problems such as the participation of incumbent legislators and conflicts between academic experts and sitting politicians—Home Affairs bureaucrats became openly critical of the Council and eventually adopted a reluctant stance even toward convening it.

The experience of the Councils convened between the 1960s and the early 1970s was reflected in the eighth Electoral System Council, established in the late 1980s. In this instance, incumbent legislators were excluded from the outset, and deliberations were conducted exclusively by academic experts. As a result, the Council succeeded in producing recommendations that later helped shape the direction of electoral system reform.