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Paper short abstract

This paper examines why the SNTV system survived in postwar Japan (1947–1950). While the core system remained fixed, campaign regulations were actively revised. These adjustments fostered consensus and consolidated the framework despite frequent government changes.

Paper long abstract

The reintroduction and consolidation of the multi-member district system in early postwar Japan pose a significant puzzle for research on electoral reform. Although the system was reintroduced in 1947, it was not overturned despite frequent changes in government—from the Katayama and Ashida cabinets to the Yoshida cabinet—and instead remained a core framework of postwar Japanese politics. This paper examines the period from 1947 to 1950 not as a one-time settlement, but as a process in which consensus was built through repeated adjustments.

The key to this process lies in the layered nature of electoral rules. Macro-level rules such as the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) directly shape seat allocation and thus have a largely zero-sum character, making fundamental reform difficult as conflicts of interest sharpen. By contrast, micro-level rules such as campaign regulations are often justified in terms of corruption prevention and administrative feasibility. This character allows for gradual adjustments and compromise. The repeated legal revisions between 1948 and 1950 reflect this asymmetry in consensus formation.

The analysis focuses on the 1948 Temporary Act on Election Campaigns, deliberations of the Electoral System Advisory Council in 1949, and the enactment of the Public Offices Election Act in 1950. It pays particular attention to how the SNTV system was treated as a fixed premise while campaign regulations were actively redesigned. Tracing this sequence shows that institutional reconsideration did not lead to radical system change. Instead, it reaffirmed the existing framework by narrowing the scope of reform.