Paper short abstract:

The war between the Soviet Union and Japan ended in 1945 with a very controversial victory over a country that had suffered already the attack of the atomic bombs and had surrendered to the United States. The Soviet media coverage was in the same way a vexed depiction of a victim and an enemy.

Paper long abstract:

The Second World War between the Soviet Union and Japan ended in September of 1945 with a very controversial victory over a country that had suffered already the attack of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and had earlier surrendered to the United States. The coverage of this military conflict in the Soviet media was in the same way a vexed depiction of Japan as a victim and an enemy at the same time.

The current paper is based on the textual analysis of the Soviet Estonian newspapers “Rahva Hääl” (“Voice of Nation) and “Noorte Hääl” (“Voice of Youth) from 1945-1955 by the research of the content of the editorials, feature and opinion stories (n=53) how the perception of Japan was on the one had as a sufferer of the atomic attacks and on the other hand that of the defeat over aggressive and militaristic samurai nation. The examples are drawn from the phrases and metaphors used in the war narratives. In addition an overview is given how the historical revanchism derived from the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905) was depicted in the printed word.

Paper short abstract:

During the Manchurian Crisis, the French ambassador to Japan Damien de Martel consistently supported Japan’s assertive diplomacy. After tracing his diplomacy as High Commissioner in Siberia and Minister to China from 1926 until 1929, I will analyze de Martel’s diplomacy during the Manchurian Crisis.

Paper long abstract:

During the Manchurian Crisis, Japanese foreign minister Shidehara Kijuro led a highly assertive form of diplomacy to minimize the involvement of the League of Nations in autumn 1931 as has been demonstrated by Japanese historians in recent years. Accepting recommendations of Asianist diplomats in Gaimusho, Shidehara tried to utilize Kwantung Army’s occupation of southern Manchuria to force China to conclude a serious new treaty while also reserving Japan’s right to use its military forces in the neutral zone. Amid such developments, French ambassador Damien de Martel consistently expressed his most assuring support for Shidehara; but the background and process of de Martel’s diplomacy during the crisis remains understudied.

This paper investigates the origin and process of de Martel’s diplomacy during the Manchurian Crisis drawing on both Japanese and French records. It traces first the origin of de Martel’s beliefs about the imperial order in Asia since he worked as the French high commissioner in Siberia in 1919. It particularly examines the sympathy he had developed towards Japan while coping with Chinese Nationalists’ challenges to French imperial interests as the French minister to China from 1926 until 1929. Then the paper scrutinizes de Martel’s diplomacy as French ambassador to Japan during the Manchurian Crisis and examines the continuity of his imperialistic outlook after he became French high commissioner in Syria in 1933.

The French government eventually chose to limit its support for Japan and prioritized collective security during 1932 and 1933 when the leftist coalition cabinet ruled France. Still, de Martel’s view received support from the Asia-Oceanic bureau of the French foreign ministry during the early stage of the Manchurian Crisis and revealed one undercurrent of French Far Eastern policy during the interwar era. In fact, de Martel’s recommendations were largely in line with those made by his predecessor Ambassador Paul Claudel, whose pro-Japanese recommendations from Tokyo during the 1920s have been well documented by Japanese historians. By revealing the understudied strand of French Far Eastern policy during the late 1920s and early 1930s, this paper will contribute to enhancing our knowledge about the French-Japanese relations before the Second World War.

Paper short abstract:

The paper examines the Soviet view on Japan during World War II, based on recently declassified archival documents. It focuses on the Soviet diplomats, working in war-time Japan, analyzing their contacts and talks with the Japanese elite, political assessments and estimates of war perspectives.

Paper long abstract:

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, most of the world's nations became involved in the global war between the two military alliances: the Allies and the Axis powers. However, the Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations during World War II were fundamentally different from those between any other of "great powers". Being in opposite camps, only Moscow and Tokyo were not at war with each other. The USSR remained to be one of the few and most important diplomatic channels for Japan until the Soviet offensive in Manchuria in August 1945. Therefore, the state and dynamics of Soviet-Japanese relations in 1941-1945 are of particular interest for understanding many aspects of Japan's history in war times, as well as for the history of the World War II in general.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the position of the USSR toward Japan in 1941-1945 from the point of view of Soviet diplomats, working mostly in Japan and partly in China/Manchuria. The paper is based on recently declassified documents from the Foreign Ministry archives. Namely, the notes of Soviet representatives regarding the meetings and talks with Japanese politicians, diplomats, economic circles etc.; the diaries of Soviet diplomats; analytical notes on Japan’s domestic political, economic and other issues; reviews of the Japanese press, and other documents of profound importance and value. A special attention deserves the materials regarding the position of Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke on the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 1941; the Soviet diplomats' assessments of Japan's entry into the war with the United States (late 1941/beginning of 1942); the attempts of Japanese elite to obtain Soviet mediation at the final stage of the war (the summer of 1945) and so on.

The comprehensive analysis of these materials allows us to take a new look at the internal political situation and foreign policy of Japan during World War II.