Paper short abstract:

During the Manchurian Crisis, the French ambassador to Japan Damien de Martel consistently supported Japan’s assertive diplomacy. After tracing his diplomacy as High Commissioner in Siberia and Minister to China from 1926 until 1929, I will analyze de Martel’s diplomacy during the Manchurian Crisis.

Paper long abstract:

During the Manchurian Crisis, Japanese foreign minister Shidehara Kijuro led a highly assertive form of diplomacy to minimize the involvement of the League of Nations in autumn 1931 as has been demonstrated by Japanese historians in recent years. Accepting recommendations of Asianist diplomats in Gaimusho, Shidehara tried to utilize Kwantung Army’s occupation of southern Manchuria to force China to conclude a serious new treaty while also reserving Japan’s right to use its military forces in the neutral zone. Amid such developments, French ambassador Damien de Martel consistently expressed his most assuring support for Shidehara; but the background and process of de Martel’s diplomacy during the crisis remains understudied.

This paper investigates the origin and process of de Martel’s diplomacy during the Manchurian Crisis drawing on both Japanese and French records. It traces first the origin of de Martel’s beliefs about the imperial order in Asia since he worked as the French high commissioner in Siberia in 1919. It particularly examines the sympathy he had developed towards Japan while coping with Chinese Nationalists’ challenges to French imperial interests as the French minister to China from 1926 until 1929. Then the paper scrutinizes de Martel’s diplomacy as French ambassador to Japan during the Manchurian Crisis and examines the continuity of his imperialistic outlook after he became French high commissioner in Syria in 1933.

The French government eventually chose to limit its support for Japan and prioritized collective security during 1932 and 1933 when the leftist coalition cabinet ruled France. Still, de Martel’s view received support from the Asia-Oceanic bureau of the French foreign ministry during the early stage of the Manchurian Crisis and revealed one undercurrent of French Far Eastern policy during the interwar era. In fact, de Martel’s recommendations were largely in line with those made by his predecessor Ambassador Paul Claudel, whose pro-Japanese recommendations from Tokyo during the 1920s have been well documented by Japanese historians. By revealing the understudied strand of French Far Eastern policy during the late 1920s and early 1930s, this paper will contribute to enhancing our knowledge about the French-Japanese relations before the Second World War.