Paper short abstract:

This presentation aims at analyzing Japanese foreign policy and ‘diaspora diplomacy’ toward Latin America in the context of Shinzo Abe government, and to provide some reflections of the challenges that PM Kishida might face with the region.

Paper long abstract:

Latin America represents two main things for Japan: a region of natural resources and market for Japanese companies, and the home for the thousands of descendants of Japanese migrants living there, the so-called Nikkeijin. These two principles have guided Japanese diplomatic actions and strategies towards the region, especially since the 1990s, when both Japan and Latin America began a process of internationalization and economic opening. However, in the decade of 2010 the landscape for Japan in Latin America changed drastically, primarily due to the growing economic and diplomatic presence of China, which prompted the government of Shinzo Abe to display a more active foreign policy toward the region to balance China, reflected, among other actions, in the emphasis put on the Nikkeijin communities as ‘diplomatic assets’ and contributors to the pro-Japanese sentiment in the region. With the advent of Kishida’s government and the later assassination of Shinzo Abe, some things have changed for Latin America in Japanese foreign policy, which can arguably be expressed as if Latin America has lost its momentum for Japan.

By looking at the relationship between China and Japan, and the impact of their presence in the region of Latin America, this work aims at analyzing Japanese foreign policy and ‘diaspora diplomacy’ toward Latin America in the context of Shinzo Abe government, and to provide some reflections of the challenges that PM Kishida might face with the region. For this purpose, I am going to review the yearly Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)’s Diplomatic Bluebooks and other documents, as well as Japanese government officials’ speeches regarding Latin America.

Paper short abstract:

This paper considers the political effects of Japanese infrastructure development, focusing on the Thilawa Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Myanmar. As Thilawa’s development has coincided with competing projects and the 2021 military coup, how does SEZ development come to bear on bilateral relations?

Paper long abstract:

Over the past decade, Southeast Asia—the hub and geographic heart of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP)—has witnessed increased engagement from Tokyo, including diplomatic visits, port calls, capacity building and, especially, infrastructure development projects. A major component of FOIP is fostering “connectivity”, evidenced by commitments to build transportation infrastructure as well as Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Focusing on the emergence SEZs across time and how ruling elites have used them as nodes to both foster connectivity, politically legitimate their regimes and to press for change, this paper considers the Japan-backed Thilawa SEZ, Myanmar’s first and largest that is often deemed “special” for Japanese investors. How does SEZ development come to bear on bilateral relations in this context? SEZs in the region can be usefully read as Sino-Japanese power struggle arenas as well as tools to diversify supply chains and circumvent trade wars. As Thilawa’s development has coincided with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects and the 2021 military coup, Tokyo has adapted its practices and policies in terms of magnitude, temporality, span and content to navigate the contentious and cooperative aspects of connectivity. What does this entail? Analysis draws on ethnographic fieldwork, stakeholder interviews and public documents.