Paper short abstract:

This paper considers the political effects of Japanese infrastructure development, focusing on the Thilawa Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Myanmar. As Thilawa’s development has coincided with competing projects and the 2021 military coup, how does SEZ development come to bear on bilateral relations?

Paper long abstract:

Over the past decade, Southeast Asia—the hub and geographic heart of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP)—has witnessed increased engagement from Tokyo, including diplomatic visits, port calls, capacity building and, especially, infrastructure development projects. A major component of FOIP is fostering “connectivity”, evidenced by commitments to build transportation infrastructure as well as Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Focusing on the emergence SEZs across time and how ruling elites have used them as nodes to both foster connectivity, politically legitimate their regimes and to press for change, this paper considers the Japan-backed Thilawa SEZ, Myanmar’s first and largest that is often deemed “special” for Japanese investors. How does SEZ development come to bear on bilateral relations in this context? SEZs in the region can be usefully read as Sino-Japanese power struggle arenas as well as tools to diversify supply chains and circumvent trade wars. As Thilawa’s development has coincided with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects and the 2021 military coup, Tokyo has adapted its practices and policies in terms of magnitude, temporality, span and content to navigate the contentious and cooperative aspects of connectivity. What does this entail? Analysis draws on ethnographic fieldwork, stakeholder interviews and public documents.