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- Convenor:
-
Ayako Kusunoki
(International Research Center for Japanese Studies (NICHIBUNKEN))
Send message to Convenor
- Format:
- Panel
- Section:
- History
- Location:
- Lokaal 1.10
- Sessions:
- Saturday 19 August, -
Time zone: Europe/Brussels
Short Abstract:
This panel will consider how historical studies can explain Japan’s nation-building process in the 1950s, focusing on the 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, Japanese rearmament and internal security, and the negotiations for normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea.
Long Abstract:
In recent years, the study of Japan’s modern history has seen a revitalization of research on Japan’s domestic politics and foreign policies in the 1950s. Several factors could be mentioned: the transformation of "postwar" Japanese foreign policy since the 2010s may have renewed interest in the starting point of "postwar" diplomacy. The discovery of private papers and the progress in the disclosure of diplomatic records has also facilitated the research. In addition, there have been active attempts to analyze patterns and characteristics of Japan’s foreign policy throughout the 150 years since the Meiji Restoration, which may be contributing to the increased attention paid to the process of nation-building in the 1950s.
The elements that featured Japan's domestic politics and foreign policy during the Cold War—the enhancement of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the gradual building of a self-defense force within the limits of the Peace Constitution, solid economic growth, and the stability of conservative rule—were not necessarily obvious in the 1950s. The U.S. government was seriously concerned the lack of the will and capability of the conservative government to lead the country. It is difficult to understand that the implementation of the Peace and Security Treaty and the addressing of the remaining issues were pursued with a coherent strategy. In this sense, the 1950s was a period in which a variety of options existed—in other words, there might have been a critical juncture in the 1950s—which seems to have been overlooked in the previous studies.
This panel will consider how historical studies can explain such Japanese politics and diplomatic relations in the 1950s through the cutting-edge research with the topics of the revision of the 1951 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the inseparable relations between Japanese rearmament and internal security, and the negotiations for normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea. All three papers are expected to examine the options that were available to Japan in the 1950s, what Japan decided to choose or did not, which would shed the new light on the process of nation-building and dissolution of the Japanese empire after the Asia-Pacific War.
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Saturday 19 August, 2023, -金 恩貞 (Hyogo Earthquake Memorial 21st Century Research Institute)
Paper short abstract:
This presentation will examine the Japan-Korea negotiations for establishing diplomatic relations in the 1950s by focusing on Japan's claims against Korea that the former Japanese property in prewar colonial Korea was to be reverted, and explain the U.S. commitment to the issue and its limits.
Paper long abstract:
The negotiations for the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea in 1965 were extremely a difficult process that took about 14 years from the preliminary talks that began in October 1951. Among the various issues discussed at the bilateral talks, the key to the final agreement was the resolution of claim rights. The ROK government insisted on the right to claim reparations from Japan on the grounds that it had been subjected to harsh colonial rule by prewar Japan for more than 30 years and suffered tremendous damage during the Asian-Pacific War. On the other hand, Japan demanded the return of former Japanese property that had been formed in prewar colonial Korea, and rather asserted its claim against Korea. These Japanese claims against Korea caused a heated dispute between the two countries and was a major cause of the stalled Japan-Korea talks throughout the 1950s. The U.S. government, maintaining close relationships with both countries and expecting the establishment of diplomatic relations between them as early as possible for the security of the West in the region, made a commitment to the bilateral talks in order to resolve disputes and conflicts. This presentation will examine the Japan-Korea negotiations in the 1950s by mainly focusing on Japan's claims against Korea, and explain the U.S. commitment to the issue and its limits. It is expected to suggest the reason why the normalization process was long-stymied and be better understood as a prototype of the ongoing historical disputes between both countries, as well as the "ambiguous commitment" that the U.S. is taking to avoid being embroiled in it.
Masahiko Nishimura (International Research Center for Japanese Studies)
Paper short abstract:
This paper examines the interaction of the US alliance policy in Asia with its decision to revise the US-Japan security treaty. It argues that the decision was influenced by the trend to maintain the hub-and-spokes system and reinforced the trend further.
Paper long abstract:
In the early 1950s, the US government formed a network of bilateral military alliances (the hub-and-spokes system) in Asia, and it adopted a policy goal toward creating a comprehensive regional alliance like NATO in Europe. Japan was expected to contribute to regional security as a key member of the regional alliance in the future. However, in 1958, the US decided to start revising the US-Japan security treaty of 1951 into an equal one, and thereby the hub-and-spokes system had been strengthened.
This paper argues that the decision was influenced by the trend to maintain the hub-and-spokes system and reinforced the trend further. The US initially considered it desirable to form a collective alliance in Asia because of burden-sharing with its Asian allies. Therefore, the US discussed the feasibility of specific proposals, such as the Organization of Pacific States (a regional alliance of Pacific countries), the Republic of China's army unit assigned to be dispatched to the Asian theater under the US's command ("Fire Brigade"), and the ROC-ROK(South Korea)-South Vietnam alliance. Although these proposals could have partially archived the goal, the US rejected them mainly because these proposals could have made it difficult to localize conflicts in Asia. In the late 1950s, there were doubts in the US government about the validity of the goal.
Their doubts facilitated the revision of the US-Japan security treaty. In 1958, the US was preparing to begin negotiations for the revision of the treaty. The State Department tried to leave room for a collective alliance in the future by including a provision for expanding membership in the new treaty. Nevertheless, the provision would never have been accepted by the Japanese public who feared being drawn into wars overseas. The US Embassy in Tokyo strongly opposed it, and the State Department dropped it because the collective alliance project was already in doubt. The new US-Japan security treaty stabilized relations with Japan and contributed to strengthening the hub-and-spokes system.
These considerations were a process of learning that collective alliance in Asia was neither desirable nor feasible. Finally, in 1959, the US officially abandoned the goal.
Goro Fujita (Waseda University)
Paper short abstract:
Focusing on Ashida Hitoshi, Hatoyama Ichiro, and Ishibashi Tanzan, I argue that behind their rearmament arguments, there were considerations to encourage Japanese nationalism and prevent the infiltration of communism while avoiding the suppression of communism and the revival of the Police State.
Paper long abstract:
Focusing on Ashida Hitoshi, Hatoyama Ichiro, and Ishibashi Tanzan, I explore the relations between Japan's rearmament and internal security in the early 1950s. During the Yoshida Shigeru's premiership (1948-1954), rearmament was a central issue in the U.S.-Japan security relations and Japan's internal politics. It is well known that Yoshida resisted the rapid and large-scale reinforcement of Japan's security forces (the National Police Reserve) and the re-creation of an army, and instead decided to depend on U.S. military forces for Japan's security. To explain the rationale behind his decision, existing studies have emphasized Yoshida's internal security calculations. They have argued that Yoshida was concerned that rearmament would exacerbate Japan's living standards and facilitate the spread of communism into Japanese society.
However, conservative political elites who criticized Yoshida's security policy and argued rearmament, such as Ashida Hitoshi, Hatoyama Ichiro, and Ishibashi Tanzan, also emphasized Japan's internal security. Although some previous studies have pointed out that spiritual mobilization of Japanese society to fight communism was an important rationale behind their rearmament arguments, analysis of the relations between their internal security conceptions and rearmament arguments is still not sufficient. Therefore, using their articles, diaries, and private papers, I explore the domestic rationale behind their rearmament arguments in the early 1950s. I argue that for them, rearmament was a tool for encouraging Japanese nationalism and prevent the infiltration of communism into the society while avoiding direct suppression of communists and the revival of the Police State. They considered that to prevent the infiltration of communism, fighting the ideological war and encouraging Japanese nationalism were essential. Meanwhile, unlike Yoshida who sought to re-establish a centralized and suppressive internal security system, they took negative stances on the suppression of communists and the revival of the Police State in postwar Japan. Therefore, by re-creating military force and encouraging Japanese nationalism, these figures sought to balance Japan's internal security and the prevention of the large-scale revision of postwar Japan's democratic political system. Shedding a new light on the interaction between Japan's security policy and internal politics, I maintain that rearmament was a tool for postwar Japan's nation-building.