Paper short abstract:

Focusing on Ashida Hitoshi, Hatoyama Ichiro, and Ishibashi Tanzan, I argue that behind their rearmament arguments, there were considerations to encourage Japanese nationalism and prevent the infiltration of communism while avoiding the suppression of communism and the revival of the Police State.

Paper long abstract:

Focusing on Ashida Hitoshi, Hatoyama Ichiro, and Ishibashi Tanzan, I explore the relations between Japan's rearmament and internal security in the early 1950s. During the Yoshida Shigeru's premiership (1948-1954), rearmament was a central issue in the U.S.-Japan security relations and Japan's internal politics. It is well known that Yoshida resisted the rapid and large-scale reinforcement of Japan's security forces (the National Police Reserve) and the re-creation of an army, and instead decided to depend on U.S. military forces for Japan's security. To explain the rationale behind his decision, existing studies have emphasized Yoshida's internal security calculations. They have argued that Yoshida was concerned that rearmament would exacerbate Japan's living standards and facilitate the spread of communism into Japanese society.

However, conservative political elites who criticized Yoshida's security policy and argued rearmament, such as Ashida Hitoshi, Hatoyama Ichiro, and Ishibashi Tanzan, also emphasized Japan's internal security. Although some previous studies have pointed out that spiritual mobilization of Japanese society to fight communism was an important rationale behind their rearmament arguments, analysis of the relations between their internal security conceptions and rearmament arguments is still not sufficient. Therefore, using their articles, diaries, and private papers, I explore the domestic rationale behind their rearmament arguments in the early 1950s. I argue that for them, rearmament was a tool for encouraging Japanese nationalism and prevent the infiltration of communism into the society while avoiding direct suppression of communists and the revival of the Police State. They considered that to prevent the infiltration of communism, fighting the ideological war and encouraging Japanese nationalism were essential. Meanwhile, unlike Yoshida who sought to re-establish a centralized and suppressive internal security system, they took negative stances on the suppression of communists and the revival of the Police State in postwar Japan. Therefore, by re-creating military force and encouraging Japanese nationalism, these figures sought to balance Japan's internal security and the prevention of the large-scale revision of postwar Japan's democratic political system. Shedding a new light on the interaction between Japan's security policy and internal politics, I maintain that rearmament was a tool for postwar Japan's nation-building.