Paper short abstract:

Despite having ratified the Paris Agreement in 2015, Japan continued to be one of the most active promoters of coal-fired power plants (CFPP). This paper aims to explore why the Abe Government initiated the process of gradually distancing itself from exporting coal infrastructure in 2020.

Paper long abstract:

Despite having ratified the Paris Agreement in 2015, an internationally binding treaty addressing climate change, Japan continued to be one of the most active promoters of coal-fired power plants (CFPP), particularly in Asia. However, the Abe Government surprised the international community first in July 2020 by announcing the introduction of stricter criteria to promote coal power plants, and the succeeding Suga Governments again a year later at the G7 Summit in the UK by pledging to entirely stop the export of “unabated” CFPPs by the end of 2021. Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework this paper explores the political deliberations led by the Ministry of Environment that led the Government to gradually distance itself from exporting CFPPs.

Paper short abstract:

Contributing to studies on policy expertise, I employ the concept of “knowledge regime” to the case of Japan as developmental state. I focus on the role of policy experts and think tanks as “mobile carriers” in formulating Abe’s post-2012 “Abenomics” and Kishida’s 2021 “new form of capitalism”.

Paper long abstract:

To explain variations in policy outcomes, scholarship in comparative political economics has focused on the institutional composition within Anglo-American and Western European liberal, statist, and neocorporatist regimes. In a recent addition to this body of literature, new analyses focused on “knowledge regimes” as mechanisms by which ideas are being produced and transmitted within political regimes. In particular, the role of think tanks and policy experts as “mobile carriers” of ideas has gained attention. However, this literature has not taken into account the specific institutional arrangement of the (post-)developmental states with its governments playing a dominant role in policymaking. Therefore, in this paper I attempt to contribute to the literature exploring variation in policy outcome and the role of political expertise by adding the development state to the set of political regime types. I will do this by focusing on Japan as a classic representation of the developmental state.

Governments in Japan have become increasingly interested in policy-relevant ideas on how to revitalize the national economy. This focus has provided policy entrepreneurs in academia and beyond with new opportunities to promote new economic policy programs. In this paper, I focus on two programs, Abe Shinzo’s post-2012 “Abenomics” and Kishida Fumio’s “new form of capitalism” introduced in 2021. Specifically, I ask whether advisors outside the formal government and/or ruling party apparatus helped to provide the policy ideas that informed Japanese economic policy. I argue that a change in government has created a window of opportunity in Japan for policy entrepreneurs, including think tankers, to impact in ideational terms the development of a new signature economic policy in Japan. Moreover, I illustrate that think tanks in particular now play a more prominent role in Japanese economic policymaking. I argue that this is the result of institutional changes in Japan, especially since the collapse of the 2009 DPJ government which illustrated the need for alternative sources of policy ideas in addition to a dominant bureaucracy catering expertise to LDP governments. This being the case, I suggest that Japan’s marketplace for ideas has become more competitive.

Paper short abstract:

This paper will analyse the role of the Abe administration’s proactivism in establishing policies aimed at nurturing a “smart” urban technology industry domestically and carve a leadership role for Japan in Asia in this sector.

Paper long abstract:

Since the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident of March 2011, Japanese authorities have pushed ahead with the materialization of community-based power networks and enhanced energy self-sufficiency and security. Under late Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, the government of Japan has launched initiatives in the energy sector aimed at renovating the nation’s energy mix including renewable energies along with fossil fuels. More relevantly, technological solutions to urban issues (such as green house gas emissions, traffic congestions, energy consumption) have been sponsored and encouraged by ministries and governmental agencies in association with tech industry giants with the aim to nurture the “smart city” technology sector. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has played a key role in promoting “Japanese” solutions to global issues abroad. India-Japan cooperation in this sector initiated by a 2014 memorandum of understanding to turn Varanasi into a Kyoto-style “smart city” is a relevant example of this effort. This paper will outline the historical genesis and development of Japan’s “smart city” concept and of its use as a diplomatic tool in the light of Japan’s role in the “imaginative geography” of the Indo-Pacific. Particularly, it will stress the importance of subsequent energy and growth strategies in identifying policy priorities and potential model areas where to showcase Japan’s advance in next-generation urban technologies. The current Kishida administration-sponsored “Digital Garden City Nation Strategy” is a natural continuation of his predecessor’s proactivism aimed at carving a new global role for Japan.

Paper short abstract:

This paper examines Japan's response to Chinese seaports and maritime activities in SE Asia. Japan shifted its foreign policy on seaports from a strictly developmental, non-confrontational approach to a hybrid of economic and strategic approach, while mostly using existing financing schemes.

Paper long abstract:

Since the Chinese government adopted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, Japan has closely studied it with a mixed view - a potential opportunity and with a degree of scepticism. While a small number of academics and experts tried to advocate for the BRI as ‘a third wave of globalization after the end of Pax Americana’ and urged Japan to participate and cooperate with the BRI, they remain a minority. On the contrary, the discourse that the BRI leads to ‘debt traps’ by creating debt burdens for developing countries has become more prominent. For Japan, development assistance for the construction of seaports is a thing of the past. In the late 1980s when Japan became the world’s largest donor of the Official Development Assistance (ODA), most aid went to Asian projects to build infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports and power plants. It is not surprising, therefore, that the most recent seaport project in Asia to receive ODA from Japan – The Project for Urgent Relocation of Ferry Terminal in Dili Port in East Timor – was concluded in 2016 and received a reasonably small project grant of 2 billion JPY (approx. 16 million USD). Conversely, China’s seaport and maritime activities in Southeast and South Asia are viewed as a matter of geostrategic and security concern by Japan. Defense of Japan 2022 – an annual White Paper – allocated 33 pages to China’s defense policy and infrastructure development, including references to Chinese-supported seaports as having civil-military dual purposes. It remains to be seen whether/how Japan will try to compete against or influence such Chinese activities. The recent case of Japan’s assistance to the Philippines Republic and its Coast Guard may give clues as to how Japan should operate in such a competitive environment. Based on a historical perspective, the paper shows that, during PM Abe Shinzō’s administration, Japan has gradually shifted its foreign policy on (sea)ports from a strictly developmental, non-confrontational approach to a hybrid of economic and strategic approach, while mostly using existing financing schemes.