Paper short abstract:

This paper examines Japan's response to Chinese seaports and maritime activities in SE Asia. Japan shifted its foreign policy on seaports from a strictly developmental, non-confrontational approach to a hybrid of economic and strategic approach, while mostly using existing financing schemes.

Paper long abstract:

Since the Chinese government adopted the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, Japan has closely studied it with a mixed view - a potential opportunity and with a degree of scepticism. While a small number of academics and experts tried to advocate for the BRI as ‘a third wave of globalization after the end of Pax Americana’ and urged Japan to participate and cooperate with the BRI, they remain a minority. On the contrary, the discourse that the BRI leads to ‘debt traps’ by creating debt burdens for developing countries has become more prominent. For Japan, development assistance for the construction of seaports is a thing of the past. In the late 1980s when Japan became the world’s largest donor of the Official Development Assistance (ODA), most aid went to Asian projects to build infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports and power plants. It is not surprising, therefore, that the most recent seaport project in Asia to receive ODA from Japan – The Project for Urgent Relocation of Ferry Terminal in Dili Port in East Timor – was concluded in 2016 and received a reasonably small project grant of 2 billion JPY (approx. 16 million USD). Conversely, China’s seaport and maritime activities in Southeast and South Asia are viewed as a matter of geostrategic and security concern by Japan. Defense of Japan 2022 – an annual White Paper – allocated 33 pages to China’s defense policy and infrastructure development, including references to Chinese-supported seaports as having civil-military dual purposes. It remains to be seen whether/how Japan will try to compete against or influence such Chinese activities. The recent case of Japan’s assistance to the Philippines Republic and its Coast Guard may give clues as to how Japan should operate in such a competitive environment. Based on a historical perspective, the paper shows that, during PM Abe Shinzō’s administration, Japan has gradually shifted its foreign policy on (sea)ports from a strictly developmental, non-confrontational approach to a hybrid of economic and strategic approach, while mostly using existing financing schemes.