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- Convenor:
-
Andrea Revelant
(Ca' Foscari University of Venice)
Send message to Convenor
- Discussant:
-
Yufei Zhou
(Teikyo University)
- Format:
- Panel
- Section:
- History
- Location:
- Lokaal 1.11
- Sessions:
- Saturday 19 August, -
Time zone: Europe/Brussels
Short Abstract:
The three Nanjing incidents of 1913, 1927 and 1937-38 are emblematic of successive stages in the history of conflict between Republican China and Imperial Japan. Through different sources, we discuss how mutual perceptions affected public opinion and policymaking at the time, and still shape memory.
Long Abstract:
The Nanjing incident of 1937-38, or Nanjing Massacre, has been extensively studied owing to its exceptional gravity and later prominence in the politics of war memory. It is less known, however, that in 1913 and 1927 the same city was the site of two other incidents of a different kind, which involved looting and assaults on Japanese residents by Chinese soldiers. Although the sheer scale of the atrocities that hit the city years later dwarfs these two episodes, they both occurred at pivotal times in the modern history of Sino-Japanese relations, and both reflected tensions stemming from opposed national goals. Taken together, the “three Nanjing incidents” mark a trajectory in the history of conflict between Republican China and Imperial Japan. A comparative analysis, aside from pointing out differences between each stage, can highlight aspects of continuity which are essential for the understanding of bilateral relations over the whole period from the Xinhai Revolution to the Second World War.
This panel examines in succession the three incidents, as cases representative of structural problems in Sino-Japanese interactions through three decades. We consider a broad range of primary sources, that is official documents, press articles and private accounts. The first two papers focus on Japanese public opinion and its influence on foreign policy. Reports and comments published in the printed media in 1913 and 1927 as an immediate response to either incident constituted part of a larger narrative on the Chinese Revolution and its consequences for Japan. Arguments disseminated through the press informed the perception of China among the public and exerted pressure on policymakers, thereby constraining their options. The third presentation shifts the main viewpoint to a third party witness of the Nanjing Massacre, John Rabe. By comparing two successive versions of his diaries, we get insight into the process of construction of historical memory. The analysis then elaborates further on this theme, reviewing the controversy that has grown over the Rabe Diaries in relation to war commemoration. Finally, the fourth paper reconsiders all the three incidents from the perspective of Chinese sources, showing the gap in perception between the two countries.
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Saturday 19 August, 2023, -Andrea Revelant (Ca' Foscari University of Venice)
Paper short abstract:
In 1927, the Japanese press reported and commented intensively on the Nanjing incident. Textual analysis shows that the incident, rather than changing media narratives, was used by writers in support of their already formed views on China and Japan’s China policy.
Paper long abstract:
So far, research on the Nanjing incident of March 1927 has assessed its impact on Sino-Japanese relations by stressing two kinds of effects. The first one is the diplomatic pressure Japan and other foreign powers exerted on Chiang Kai-shek’s faction in the Nationalist Party to have it break off its already shaky alliance with the communists. Such international pressure was an external factor contributing to Chiang’s decision to strike the communists on 12 April. The second effect attributed to the incident is a surge of public criticism within Japan against Foreign Minister Shidehara, who was accused of negligence in the protection of nationals abroad. Dissatisfaction for the outcome of Shidehara’s policy of “nonresistance” raised expectations for a more assertive China policy under the Tanaka cabinet, which took office less than a month after the incident.
This paper reconsiders the significance of the incident by investigating how the Japanese printed media reported the news and commented on it. The analysis covers a range of newspapers and magazines, selected as representative of different political positions and target readerships. In order to put the findings in the wider context of press reports on the Northern Expedition, the survey extends over a period of several months. This method allows to appreciate the salience of the Nanjing incident in a continuous flow of news on China and China policy, as well as its influence on the framing of news into media narratives. The findings indicate that the incident was not a game changer in the latter process, despite the attention it commanded. Rather, writers used it to feed the narrative they had been weaving over the previous months, emphasizing those aspects that could support their own established views on the Nationalist Party, its leaders, their relations with the Chinese Communist Party, Japan’s foreign policy and other related topics. In conclusion, this study highlights how media writers defended their biases when confronted with a critical event.
Torsten Weber (DIJ Tokyo)
Paper short abstract:
My paper approaches the controversies about the historicity of the Nanjing Incident (Nanjing Massacre) of 1937/38 through John Rabe's wartime diaries. I compare the reception of the diaries in Japan & China and analyze how they contribute to understanding the multi-perspectivity of experiencing war.
Paper long abstract:
In the debate about the historicity and significance of the ‘third Nanjing incident’ (or Nanjing Massacre) of 1937/38, documents and oral histories produced by witnesses and survivors play a crucial role. From non-government perspectives, they not only provide important insights into the victimization of the Chinese, the actions of the Japanese, and relief activities. They also offer personal perspectives into how witnesses, bystanders, victims, and perpetrators experience and testify war. But scholarship has also raised doubts about the reliability and impartiality of these accounts. Which biases and changes of memory may have influenced their production? This paper focuses on the example of the wartime diaries written by John Rabe (1882-1950), a German businessman and witness of the atrocities committed in Nanjing during the Japanese attack and occupation of the Chinese capital in 1937/38. As chairman of the Nanjing Safety Zone and a long-term resident in China, he was well connected and informed, including contacts to the Chinese and Japanese authorities. From September 1937 to February 1938, Rabe kept a detailed, daily account of the events, including personal notes, letters, photos, official documents, and newspaper clippings. After the re-discovery of the Rabe Diaries in 1996, they were partly published in their original German version as well as in English, Chinese, and Japanese translations. However, instead of contributing to a convergence of historical narratives of the Nanjing Massacre they have further fueled antagonistic interpretations of the event between China and Japan, as well as within Japan. Why did this occur? The first part of this paper discusses the production of the Rabe Diaries by a comparative reading of its 1937 and 1942 versions. This includes a critical assessment of the contribution this source may make to understanding the multi-perspectivity of witnessing and experiencing war. In its second part, my paper will analyze and compare the reception of Rabe’s diaries in Japan and China. It situates the controversy surrounding them in the wider context of the role the Nanjing Massacre plays in the commemoration of World War Two in both countries.
SHIN Kawashima (the Graduate School of Arts Sciences, the University of Tokyo)
Paper short abstract:
This presentation considers the public and governmental perceptions and responses of China on three Nanjing incidents in 1913, 1927 and 1937. Previous studies scarcely argued them in 1913 and 1927. And this presentation explore differences of them between China and Japan.
Paper long abstract:
December 1937, Nanjing Incident (Nanjing Massacrer) happened, this incident is recognized as the symbol of Japanese aggression and Japanese military’s characteristics.
Before 1937, when Japanese and Chinese mentioned “Nanjing Incident,” they imagined other incidents happened in Nanjing. The first Nanjing incident was happened in 1913, Zhang Xun（張勳）murdered some Japanese, when he recovered Nanjing at the second revolution. The Document Files of Imperial Japanese Navy about this incident are named “Nanjing Incident”. Jiji Shimpo（時事新報） also reported an editorial article of this incident on January 9th, 1914. Zhangxun vindicated this incident was accidental that his troop misunderstood those Japanese were soldiers of the enemy. At last, this incident was solved diplomatically in 1914. The second Nanjing incident was happened in 1927, when the Nationalist Army entered Nanjing city in the operation of Northern Expeditions, foreigners including diplomats and his families were murdered and some foreign females were assaulted by the troop. Toward this incident, because Japanese consul, his wife and others of consul office staffs were also assaulted, Japanese public opinion was enthusiastic opposite and criticized Shidehara Diplomacy that adopted “soft” attitude to China. This incident stimulated Japanese public opinions strongly so that Shidehara Diplomacy was getting difficult to keep its policy.
About these two Nanjing incidents as well as the incident in 1937, we can find a series of previous studies, but those scarcely use materials both China and Japan. This presentation uses Chinese materials of Nanjing incidents to explore Chinese government and society’s perceptions and policies and makes them into comparison to Japan’s perceptions and policies. From Japanese point of view, Nanjing Incidents in 1913 and 1927, especially 1927’s incident, stimulated public opinion toward China. How about China? This presentation would show the perception gaps about these incidents to understand difficulties to share consensus of Sino-Japanese relations.
Sochi Naraoka (Kyoto University)
Paper short abstract:
This paper examines the Nanjing Incident in 1913 from its outbreak to its conclusion, particularly focusing on the influence of public opinion on Japan’s foreign policy. Through the analysis, the structural problems of Japan’s foreign policy-making process towards China will be highlighted.
Paper long abstract:
There were three incidents known as the Nanjing Incident. This paper focuses on the first of these, the Nanjing Incident in 1913. This incident occurred amid the chaos in China after the Second Revolution (an armed uprising by Sun Yat-sen and others to overthrow the Yuan Shikai administration), in which three Japanese were murdered, Japanese shops were looted and the Japanese flag was desecrated.
Japanese newspapers sensationalized the incident whipping up a crowd of 30,000 demonstrators Hibiya Park, next to the imperial palace in Tokyo. They demanded that China apologize and pay compensation, and even argued that the Japanese government should intervene by force. Criticism of the Japanese government was so fierce that it resulted in the assassination of Abe Moritaro, head of the Political department of the Foreign Ministry. Abe’s crime was that he was seen as a promoter of 'soft diplomacy'. This incident can be regarded as an early example of the growing influence of a public opinion that advocated hard-line diplomacy towards China. In the years leading to the Second Sino-Japanese War, public opinion in Japan repeatedly insisted on a hard-line response to Japan’s ‘China problem’ and forced the Japanese government to execute hawkish policies.
In response to the 1913 Nanjing Incident, Foreign Minister Makino Nobuaki adopted a policy of non-interference in China, while at the same time, under pressure from domestic opinion, he demanded an apology and payment of compensation from the Chinese side. This inevitably suggested the potential use of force. The Yuan Shikai administration, wishing to avoid confrontation, accepted the Japanese demands. Although the incident was brought to a peaceful conclusion, it could have escalated had the governments of Japan and China not adopted a restrained attitude. This paper clarifies the process from the outbreak to the end of the incident and examines the basic structure of the diplomatic relationship between the two countries over the following thirty years, paying particular attention to the influence of public opinion. Through the analysis of this incident, the structural problems of Japan’s foreign policy-making process towards China will be highlighted.