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Paper short abstract:

This paper examines the Nanjing Incident in 1913 from its outbreak to its conclusion, particularly focusing on the influence of public opinion on Japan’s foreign policy. Through the analysis, the structural problems of Japan’s foreign policy-making process towards China will be highlighted.

Paper long abstract:

There were three incidents known as the Nanjing Incident. This paper focuses on the first of these, the Nanjing Incident in 1913. This incident occurred amid the chaos in China after the Second Revolution (an armed uprising by Sun Yat-sen and others to overthrow the Yuan Shikai administration), in which three Japanese were murdered, Japanese shops were looted and the Japanese flag was desecrated.

Japanese newspapers sensationalized the incident whipping up a crowd of 30,000 demonstrators Hibiya Park, next to the imperial palace in Tokyo. They demanded that China apologize and pay compensation, and even argued that the Japanese government should intervene by force. Criticism of the Japanese government was so fierce that it resulted in the assassination of Abe Moritaro, head of the Political department of the Foreign Ministry. Abe’s crime was that he was seen as a promoter of 'soft diplomacy'. This incident can be regarded as an early example of the growing influence of a public opinion that advocated hard-line diplomacy towards China. In the years leading to the Second Sino-Japanese War, public opinion in Japan repeatedly insisted on a hard-line response to Japan’s ‘China problem’ and forced the Japanese government to execute hawkish policies.

In response to the 1913 Nanjing Incident, Foreign Minister Makino Nobuaki adopted a policy of non-interference in China, while at the same time, under pressure from domestic opinion, he demanded an apology and payment of compensation from the Chinese side. This inevitably suggested the potential use of force. The Yuan Shikai administration, wishing to avoid confrontation, accepted the Japanese demands. Although the incident was brought to a peaceful conclusion, it could have escalated had the governments of Japan and China not adopted a restrained attitude. This paper clarifies the process from the outbreak to the end of the incident and examines the basic structure of the diplomatic relationship between the two countries over the following thirty years, paying particular attention to the influence of public opinion. Through the analysis of this incident, the structural problems of Japan’s foreign policy-making process towards China will be highlighted.