Paper short abstract:

The Abe administration’s failure to respond to humanitarian crises in Myanmar signals the demise of Japan’s claim to be ‘Asia’s liberal leader’. The discourse of Abe’s ‘value-based diplomacy’ requires critical review if Japan is to resurrect the ambitions of an adaptive state.

Paper long abstract:

Returning as Prime Minister in December 2012, Abe Shinzō declared that Japan was back. Complimenting his Abenomics policy and proactive foreign affairs agenda, Abe’s ‘value-based diplomacy’ promised to place democratization, peace-building, and human security at the forefront of Japan’s foreign policy. The fortuitous circumstances surrounding Abe’s return to power, including weakened opposition and factions as well as the absence of a major international crisis, all signaled that Japan was well-placed to play a greater role in international affairs. Rather than a state that pursued its mercantilist interests as a free-rider, Japan had become an adaptive state, willing to act as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’.

This paper draws on my forthcoming book: Disciplined Democracies: Human Insecurity in Japan-Myanmar relations, to examine how, as Myanmar transitioned to a ‘disciplined democracy’ following general elections in 2010, so the Abe administration emphasized Japan’s role as a bridge between Myanmar and international society. The Abe administration sought to support Myanmar’s fledgling democracy through aid and investment. Abe also appointed Sasakawa Yohei to mediate in Myanmar’s long-standing ethnic conflicts as a means of demonstrating Japan’s contribution to the liberal international order.

The ‘value-based rhetoric’ underpinning Japan’s peace-building approach masked a broader economic rationale. Pacifying Myanmar’s turbulent border regions was key to the Japanese government’s regional ambitions, notably building key infrastructure to connect Myanmar’s neighboring Mekong states with the Indian Ocean. When violence broke out in Rakhine state, leading to the exodus of the Rohingya to refugee camps in Bangladesh, the Abe administration opted to support rather than pressure the Myanmar government. Despite the February 2021 coup, the connections between the Japanese government and business elites with Myanmar’s junta remain strong. As Myanmar descends into civil war, claims that Japan can act as ‘Asia’s liberal leader’ should be reassessed. For Japan to act as a adaptive state requires more than simply aligning the rhetoric of a ‘value-based diplomacy’ with its foreign policy, but to confront the inherent contradictions within the rhetoric itself. Interrogating the discursive foundations of Japan’s foreign policy reveals how Japan’s foreign policy elites perceive Japan’s role in the liberal international order.

Paper short abstract:

The WHO has played a significant role in Japan’s response to international health crises, but the Abe administration adopted a pragmatic approach to engaging with the WHO. As a result, Japan adopted the WHO’s advice only when it did not conflict with Abe’s domestic agendas.

Paper long abstract:

Over the past three decades Japan has faced multiple public health crises. This paper builds upon my recently published edited volume, Public Health in Asia during the COVID-19 Pandemic, and examines the role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the formulation of Japan’s responses to the SARS, MERS, and COVID-19 public health crises. The paper shows the limitations of the WHO in the international coordination of public health crises by taking Japan as a case study, showing how the country has increasingly engaged with the organization in pragmatic terms, especially under the Abe administration.

During the SARS health crisis (2003-), the WHO was seen as a neutral source of scientific information, and the organization managed to influence Japan’s responses in terms of national policy and international diplomacy. Over the course of the MERS crises, Japan became a strong proponent of international information exchange, especially due to the geographic proximity of the virus-origins. During the 2014-2015 MERS crises, under the Abe administration, Japan attempted to establish a transparent system of information exchange through the WHO, although this proved ineffective due to the organization’s limited enforcement mechanisms. As a result, Japan cicrumvented the WHO, and engaged bilaterally with South Korea and Taiwan (which was excluded from the WHO), in order to gain access to infection data. Despite the WHO’s limitations internationally, Japan advocated the WHO’s guidelines domestically to establish public trust.

However, public and political trust in the WHO has faltered due to a perceived intimate connection with China. Despite the government’s continued reliance on the WHO’s scientific expertise, it has balanced a declining trust in the organization with domestic policy aims in a utilitarian fashion. One dominant factor in this strategic disengagement is the legacy of the Abe-administration’s pragmatic diplomacy in public health, where domestic policy aims have taken precedence over public health concerns. This paper shows that the importance of the WHO in Japanese policymaking has declined significantly, and will continue to do so as long as the organization’s neutrality is doubted, and as long as its advice and guidelines conflict with Japan’s domestic agenda.

Paper short abstract:

In the runup to the 2020 Olympic Games, Abe Shinzo was at the helm of new surveillance policies that were meant to ensure “The safest Japan in the world”. This paper evaluates the long term effects of these and other surveillance policies and their implications for the Kishida-government.

Paper long abstract:

In 2012 Japan received the opportunity to host the 2020 Olympic Games, causing the Abe administration to draft a string of surveillance legislation and policies intended to keep all involved in these events safe, creating the “safest Japan in the world”. Grassroots movements, activists and legal experts however expressed concerns that these surveillance measures were not proportionate to the threats an international event faces, claiming the Abe government had ulterior motives for implementing these regulations.

For the 2021 Olympic Games, the surveillance legislation remained in place and was even supplemented with new health surveillance measures in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In the end, the Olympic Games took place without any international spectators, save for international media representation. This means that the severity of measures and legislation intended for short-term foreign interference has mostly been implemented long-term on the domestic population, creating a massive discrepancy that the Japanese government has refused to alter or even address.

During the Abe administration, the Japanese government has shifted away from liberal democratic norms, pushing surveillance legislation through parliament without adequate debate or oversight. Prime Minister Kishida inherited these policies and legislation, and has seemingly subsumed them in his “Vision for Peace”. While one of the main components of this vision is strengthening Japan’s security, the haphazard way in which these measures have been implemented will not have the desired effect. The new regulations implemented because of the Olympic Games are the newest in a line of increasingly invasive measures focussed especially on minority citizens and foreigners. In fact, because of the stance of the Japanese government on these kinds of surveillance, their impact is more likely to be felt in the diminishing of human rights, than in security.

This paper shows that the Japanese government’s struggle to implement proportionate surveillance measures betrays its reluctance to commit to security for its citizens, displaying a wish for social control. In addition, the aim to increase surveillance even in domestic context should be seen as an indication of the government’s shifting ideals regarding state surveillance, which has consequences that reach far wider than just one event.