Paper short abstract:

The WHO has played a significant role in Japan’s response to international health crises, but the Abe administration adopted a pragmatic approach to engaging with the WHO. As a result, Japan adopted the WHO’s advice only when it did not conflict with Abe’s domestic agendas.

Paper long abstract:

Over the past three decades Japan has faced multiple public health crises. This paper builds upon my recently published edited volume, Public Health in Asia during the COVID-19 Pandemic, and examines the role of the World Health Organization (WHO) in the formulation of Japan’s responses to the SARS, MERS, and COVID-19 public health crises. The paper shows the limitations of the WHO in the international coordination of public health crises by taking Japan as a case study, showing how the country has increasingly engaged with the organization in pragmatic terms, especially under the Abe administration.

During the SARS health crisis (2003-), the WHO was seen as a neutral source of scientific information, and the organization managed to influence Japan’s responses in terms of national policy and international diplomacy. Over the course of the MERS crises, Japan became a strong proponent of international information exchange, especially due to the geographic proximity of the virus-origins. During the 2014-2015 MERS crises, under the Abe administration, Japan attempted to establish a transparent system of information exchange through the WHO, although this proved ineffective due to the organization’s limited enforcement mechanisms. As a result, Japan cicrumvented the WHO, and engaged bilaterally with South Korea and Taiwan (which was excluded from the WHO), in order to gain access to infection data. Despite the WHO’s limitations internationally, Japan advocated the WHO’s guidelines domestically to establish public trust.

However, public and political trust in the WHO has faltered due to a perceived intimate connection with China. Despite the government’s continued reliance on the WHO’s scientific expertise, it has balanced a declining trust in the organization with domestic policy aims in a utilitarian fashion. One dominant factor in this strategic disengagement is the legacy of the Abe-administration’s pragmatic diplomacy in public health, where domestic policy aims have taken precedence over public health concerns. This paper shows that the importance of the WHO in Japanese policymaking has declined significantly, and will continue to do so as long as the organization’s neutrality is doubted, and as long as its advice and guidelines conflict with Japan’s domestic agenda.