Paper short abstract:

This paper will analyze the LDP's newest constitutional amendment proposals. It will examine 1) how they compare to previous proposals, especially recent wholesale amendment drafts, and trends in constitutional redesign, and 2) analyze the odds of PM Abe succeeding in realizing revision.

Paper long abstract:

In 2017, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō announced his newest proposals to amend the thus far unamended Constitution of Japan. The Constitution, drafted more than seven decades ago with considerable influence from the US Occupation authorities, and its revision has remained a key item on Abe's agenda and a major battleground in the ideological struggle for postwar Japanese political identity. Based on Abe's ideas, his party, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) announced four amendment proposals in 2018: These include adding the SDF to Article 9, state of emergency stipulations, new rules for Upper House election districts and financial support for needy students. This paper examines how these four proposals fit into the long history of amendment proposals in Japan and how they measure up to international trends in constitutional (re)design. The proposals are particularly noteworthy, because they represent a clear break from the LDP's own 2005 and 2012 amendment drafts. Pundits have explained these proposals as simply representing Abe's attempt at winning over the Clean Government Party (Kōmeitō) and the Japan Innovation Party (Nihon Ishin no Kai). The LDP will need the support of both parties (and members of the opposition) to secure the necessary two-thirds majorities in both houses of the National Diet. This explanation does not grasp the background and scope of the 2018 proposals, though: Adding a third paragraph to Article 9, for instance, has traditionally been a rarity among amendment proposals. The same is true for stipulations pertaining to free education. Taken together all four proposals represent a significant break from recent wholesale amendment drafts such as the LDP's own 2012 proposal. This paper will take a look at how these changes can be interpreted as well as the odds of Abe succeeding to amend the COJ within his remaining term in office.

Paper short abstract:

The periodic election of the long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party’s leader is a significant ritual in Japanese politics. From a historical perspective, I reexamine the nature of these leadership contests, investigating the notion that they are largely devoid of policy or ideological substance.

Paper long abstract:

The election of the Liberal Democratic Party’s top leader, its president (sōsai), is one of the most important rituals in Japanese politics. Since its founding in 1955, the LDP has been Japan’s dominant political party and under the country’s parliamentary system, the head of the majority party in the National Diet almost inevitably doubles as the prime minister. In characterizing LDP leadership elections, analysts have often focused on the role of money, factions, and backroom deals in what are essentially elite intraparty contests. Policy goals or ideological affirmations expressed during these events tend to be seen as lip service done to give candidacies a veneer of higher public purpose.

To what extent is this conventional wisdom true? In this paper, I reassess LDP leadership elections from a historical perspective. In particular, I will focus on the election of 1964. This case involved the standard machinations by party bosses and their factions but was also heralded by some as centered on policies and programs to an unprecedented level. After analyzing how this contest was evaluated by prominent political participants and observers, I will examine the media coverage at the time and available information about public opinion. This study will carefully consider the conventions and rituals of such party leadership elections, also aiming to draw connections to contemporary Japanese politics, in which the LDP remains very much in charge.

Paper short abstract:

In this paper I explore how the progressive opposition consolidated itself after its fall from power in 2012 through a melodramatic narrative.

Paper long abstract:

The failure of the Democratic Party of Japan to perform competently during its brief time in government between 2009 and 2012 has had a persistent effect in keeping the public away from the opposition throughout the rest of the decade and has led to an understanding within the parties that projecting competence and a positive vision is of prime importance to restore credibility. The opposition has, despite this, leaned towards attacks on PM Abe Shinzo's administration during the remainder of the decade, which has been met by a lukewarm response from voters at best and a negative appraisal at worst. This article draws from literary theories of emotion and narrative to analyze this reliance by the opposition on a story of itself as standing together with the good citizens of Japan against the authoritarian and illiberal goals of the LDP. It argues that this form of discourse served to give meaning to the opposition's efforts under difficult electoral circumstances in large part by relying on a melodramatic narrative that turned the PM into a symbol against which divergent opposition parties could rally. The paper concludes that the opposition's style of discourse allowed for a more simplified representation of the otherwise complex structural obstacles that impeded the rise of a two-party system, while also allowing it to construct a coherent identity distinct from the LDP. It also shows how even as opposition parties should reliably lean towards vote-maximization, its understandings of itself as a valuable democratic institution may limit the kinds of stories it can actually tell to its constituents.

Paper Download (166 KB)

Paper short abstract:

This paper seeks to understand the failure of the Japanese new parties to create a credible alternative to the LDP. Using comparative case studies, it explains why most new actors are short lived, while the strategies of lasting challengers also cannot translate survival into thriving.

Paper long abstract:

The Japanese party system has been undergoing continuous change over the last two decades due to the successful challenge of new parties at every national election. Yet, none of them managed to establish themselves as a credible alternative to the major actors and most perished or re-organised shortly after their formation. Volatility among these challengers undermined the competitiveness of the political system and facilitated the return to one-party dominance of the LDP. This paper seeks to understand the reasons behind new actors' failure to sustain themselves beyond the initial electoral breakthrough and transform into a formidable opposition force. This paper argues that the survival of new parties hinges on their ability to develop a strong organisation and a differentiated policy profile, so as to generate material and immaterial benefits that can serve the vote-seeking interests of their members and keep them attached in the long run. In order to substantiate this argument, the paper uses an original dataset that covers all competitive parties over the period of 2005-2016 and develops a typology of new challengers based on their position-taking and organisational strategies. It then examines the cases representative of each type contrasting those that dissolved completely to those that survived. The analysis demonstrates that the Japanese challengers faced a trade-off between organisational expansion and positional differentiation, which resulted in their chronic inability to produce sufficient benefits for their members and precipitated their demise. On the one hand, those parties that targeted floating voters with decisively oppositional appeals built sizeable organisations at the expense of programmatic differentiation from other competitors, which undermined their willingness to go it alone. On the other hand, those that relied on their core electorate preserved a distinctive conservative character but failed to expand and withered. Only those actors that compensated for the lacking benefits with appropriate functional equivalents avoided dissolution over a prolonged period of time. However, the strategies they used—boosting differentiation through the local executive office or mending organisational weakness by co-opting other parties' organisations—also precluded their pursuit of the national ambitions for being a viable force against the major parties.