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- Convenors:
-
Paul O'Shea
(Lund University)
Karl Gustafsson (Stockholm University)
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- Stream:
- Politics and International Relations
- Location:
- Torre A, Piso 0, Sala 05
- Sessions:
- Saturday 2 September, -
Time zone: Europe/Lisbon
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Saturday 2 September, 2017, -Paper short abstract:
Former Osaka Governor Hashimoto Tōru's rise to fame has shaken up Japanese politics since 2008. This study analyzes this phenomenon through the lens of populism theory, looking at Hashimoto's discursive strengths, his opponent's weaknesses and discussing implications for current Japanese politics.
Paper long abstract:
Former Osaka Mayor, Governor and Osaka Ishin no Kai co-leader Hashimoto Tōru's fame and success has shaken up Japanese politics since 2008. His brash and combative style has sparked fear of hashizumu (a combination of Hashimoto and fascism) and the reasons for his success have been discussed manifold. This study contributes to the understanding of his success and its implications for Japanese democracy, by taking a close look at one specific policy discourse through the lens of populism theory, namely the so-called 'Kimigayo ordinance' (Kimigayo kiritsu seishō gimuzuke jōrei). This policy concerns the stricter enforcement of teachers' 'correct' conduct towards Japan's national symbols at school ceremonies and has sparked considerable contention in 2011. It exemplifies how Hashimoto's brand of 'regional populism' discursively constructs homogenized collective popular identities for 'the people' and 'the elite'. It further shows, how he does so by binding together various demands (from more patriotism to business-like structures in state-run schools) as 'the popular will' and portrays himself as a mere executor of this homogenized group's will. In this study's mixed-method approach, the qualitative post-structuralist discourse analysis, which finds the pro-ordinance discourse to be populist, is expanded by a comparison of narrative structure with the opposing anti-policy advocacy coalition's discourse. A quantitative content analysis following the Narrative Policy Framework finds that the coalitions show statistically significant variations in narrative character usage (heroes, villains and victims), narrative strategies and plots. Building on existing NPF research, the analysis shows that Hashimoto's populist mode of articulation in fact correlates with high effectiveness in narrative persuasion and highlights the fact that Hashimoto's opponents stay confined within ineffective attacks on his person. It is argued, that on a larger scope, effective populist right-wing discourses, like the one by Hashimoto, can be seen as contributing to the conservative hegemony and therefore, cementing a continuity of rule by the political right of Japan. As regional populism(s) could be able to challenge national LDP leadership, though, the nature of the right could shift. As the quantitative data also indicates, the pro-ordinance coalition's propagation of democracy as majority rule could lead towards authoritarian tendencies if continued.
Local Politics and National Policy in Japan: Mulitlevel Policy Conflicts between Governors and Governments, 1990-2015
Ken Hijino
(Kyoto University)
Paper short abstract:
This article investigates the behavior of prefectural governors in Japan since the 1990s, who have become less dependent on the ruling party for their re-election or policy implementation at local level, thus leading them to challenge major national policy intiatives in defense of local interests.
Paper long abstract:
Decentralization trends, electoral system reforms, and reduced fiscal support/clientelism since the 1990s have led to a decoupling of national and local governments as well as party systems in Japan. These trends have generated greater partisan incongruence between levels of government and expanded local autonomy, which in turn is leading to more conflictual intergovernmental relations. Multilevel conflicts have emerged within parties (particularly between the LDP executive and its rural branches), between national and local legislatures controlled by different parties, and between governors/mayors and the central government. This article, then, focuses on the behavior of an increasing number of directly-elected local executives who are less dependent on the ruling party at national level for their re-election or policy implementation at local level. These governors are expected to be more involved in multilevel conflicts challenging national policy to defend local interests. We provide evidence for these hypotheses in three areas. First we look at the changing overall dynamic between individual governors and the central government, specifically using data of governor meetings with the prime minister over time since the 1990s. Second we look at the evolving role and behavior of the National Governors' Association, a key actor representing the collective interests of the regions, as well as the use of more institutionalized frameworks for intergovernmental interaction. Third, we investigate recent cases of major policy conflicts (over TPP, nuclear power, and Okinawa base policy, et alia) led by individual governors against the national government to better assess the origins, processes and outcomes of these multilevel conflicts. The evidence suggests interactions between governors and central government have become less stable and less cooperative, with local governments acting as a restraint on important national policy goals. Local politics and elections are thus shown to limit majoritarian, top-down decision making in Japan.
The Reform Plan for the Japanese Agricultural Co-op by the Abe Administration
Hironori Sasada
(Hokkaido University)
Paper short abstract:
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe has proposed a drastic reform plan for the Japanese Agricultural Co-operatives, the party's longtime and loyal supporter. What encouraged Abe to carry out the reform plan? This article analyzes the reform plan from the viewpoint of constructivist institutionalism.
Paper long abstract:
One of the main components of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe's new economic policies, the so-called Abenomics was a drastic reform plan for the Japanese Agricultural Co-operatives (JA) The JA has been a faithful supporter of the LDP for the last sixty years or so, and the party relied heavily on the JA particularly in the rural districts, which are more important than the urban ones, given the fact that more districts are allocated to rural areas than urban areas in the Japanese Diet. As expected, the JA reform plan invited fierce opposition from the JA, which threatened to end its support of the party in future elections. Why is the Abe administration trying to reform the JA, even though it could result in a substantial decline in the party's share of votes? What is Abe trying to achieve by implementing such a policy that is highly unpopular among his party's longtime supporters? Why did the reform policy turn out in the way it did? Is Abe serious about carrying out the proposed reform plan, or is it just for show? This article analyzes the context behind the JA reform plan from the viewpoint of constructivist institutionalism focusing on policymakers' ideas regarding party management. It argues that the Abe administration's JA reform is not a product of the 1994 electoral reform but a part of an incremental change from a clientelistic party to a centralized party, which was rooted in LDP history since the time of its foundation. This study shows that ideational contention between two of the major LDP factions became the foundation for the JA reform today.