Paper short abstract:

This article investigates the behavior of prefectural governors in Japan since the 1990s, who have become less dependent on the ruling party for their re-election or policy implementation at local level, thus leading them to challenge major national policy intiatives in defense of local interests.

Paper long abstract:

Decentralization trends, electoral system reforms, and reduced fiscal support/clientelism since the 1990s have led to a decoupling of national and local governments as well as party systems in Japan. These trends have generated greater partisan incongruence between levels of government and expanded local autonomy, which in turn is leading to more conflictual intergovernmental relations. Multilevel conflicts have emerged within parties (particularly between the LDP executive and its rural branches), between national and local legislatures controlled by different parties, and between governors/mayors and the central government. This article, then, focuses on the behavior of an increasing number of directly-elected local executives who are less dependent on the ruling party at national level for their re-election or policy implementation at local level. These governors are expected to be more involved in multilevel conflicts challenging national policy to defend local interests. We provide evidence for these hypotheses in three areas. First we look at the changing overall dynamic between individual governors and the central government, specifically using data of governor meetings with the prime minister over time since the 1990s. Second we look at the evolving role and behavior of the National Governors' Association, a key actor representing the collective interests of the regions, as well as the use of more institutionalized frameworks for intergovernmental interaction. Third, we investigate recent cases of major policy conflicts (over TPP, nuclear power, and Okinawa base policy, et alia) led by individual governors against the national government to better assess the origins, processes and outcomes of these multilevel conflicts. The evidence suggests interactions between governors and central government have become less stable and less cooperative, with local governments acting as a restraint on important national policy goals. Local politics and elections are thus shown to limit majoritarian, top-down decision making in Japan.

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