Paper short abstract:

This paper aims at elucidating why Japan's foreign policy elite has been so eager to become an active part in the negotiations concerning the Iranian nuclear crisis and the coordination of JCPOA, despite the repeated denial by the other participants and how Japan plans to overcome this deadlock.

Paper long abstract:

On October 19, 2015, when the agreement between the so-called 5+1 countries (USA, Russia, China, France, UK and Germany) and Iran on the Iranian nuclear crisis was reached, Japan released a statement, in which Japan's motivation to actively coordinate the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is emphasized. This offer came as a surprise, given the fact that Japan is not even part of the agreement. Furthermore, Japan's foreign policy doctrine has been based on the norm of neutrality, thus on not being politically involved in conflicts in troubled regions, such as the Middle East. And yet, the Iran issue is significantly different. Although the importance of Japan's "special relationship" to Iran and Japan's involvement in the nuclear crisis is largely denied or overlooked in the literature so far, it very well exemplifies Japan's catch-22 in shifting its foreign policy preferences and doctrines. Since the early 2000s, Japan has repeatedly attempted to act as a mediator between Iran and the Western powers, particularly the US. There are, next to Japan's economic interests in Iran, two hitherto neglected factors that drive Japan's interest in the Iranian nuclear crisis: First, Japan's notion of a relative decline of US power; second, Japan's changing foreign policy doctrine, which aims at being recognized as a global great power. However, Japan is so far not taken seriously as a political actor, and the other involved powers do not see what Japan can offer to solve the problems in the negotiation between Iran and the international community. Thus, Japan aims at a deeper involvement to increase its recognition as an important global player, but because Japan so far lacks this exact recognition other actors in the region deny Japan a larger role. Based on interviews and the analysis of official documents the paper therefore aims at elucidating why Japan's foreign policy elite has been so eager to become an active part in the negotiations concerning the Iranian nuclear crisis and the coordination of JCPOA, despite the repeated denial by the other participants and how Japan's foreign policy elite creates strategies to overcome this deadlock.

Paper short abstract:

This paper sheds new light on the significance of Japan's indefinitely stationed JSDF facility in Djibouti in the context of institutional change and how this de facto overseas base is increasingly being primed to allow the potential use of enhanced military capabilities developed by Tokyo

Paper long abstract:

Substantial changes to Japan's contemporary foreign policy have arguably been most evident in the sphere of international security. Having passed successive legislation in the past two decades to expand its use of the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF), Japan has emerged from its post-war 'pacifist' shackles to assume a range of security roles that are typically associated with so-called 'normal nations'. This paper addresses how these have been crystallised in the form of an indefinitely-termed overseas base on the Horn of Africa, in Djibouti, which has now become a military hub amid shifting regional rivalries around the Indian Ocean Rim.

Specifically, the paper sheds new light on how the base is increasingly being primed, as part of competing Sino-Japanese interests in Africa, facilitating the potential use of enhanced military capabilities in the context of Japan's institutional changes. Careful examination of pertaining Diet minutes, media discourse and government ministry papers suggests that the risks identified with this facility's realization and status have been fundamentally recalibrated, allowing its presence and operational diversification to go largely unnoticed and unopposed - both domestically and overseas - despite representing a seemingly radical departure from common sense interpretations of Japan's antimilitarist constitution.

Paper short abstract:

The presentation aims to understand the practical relevance of Shinzo Abe's recent security changes and their role in Abe's general security strategy.

Paper long abstract:

The presentation aims to understand the practical relevance of Shinzo Abe's recent security changes and their role in Abe's general security strategy. It argues that although Shinzo Abe's ultimate goal is a revision of Japan's post-war security posture, there is still a plethora of legal, normative (popular) and even practical constraints that prevent him from doing so. In order to illustrate these constraints, the presentation analyzes the first practical implementation of the new security legislature: Japanese peacepeeking operation in South Sudan from September 2016 to May 2017.