Paper short abstract:

This paper aims at elucidating why Japan's foreign policy elite has been so eager to become an active part in the negotiations concerning the Iranian nuclear crisis and the coordination of JCPOA, despite the repeated denial by the other participants and how Japan plans to overcome this deadlock.

Paper long abstract:

On October 19, 2015, when the agreement between the so-called 5+1 countries (USA, Russia, China, France, UK and Germany) and Iran on the Iranian nuclear crisis was reached, Japan released a statement, in which Japan's motivation to actively coordinate the implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is emphasized. This offer came as a surprise, given the fact that Japan is not even part of the agreement. Furthermore, Japan's foreign policy doctrine has been based on the norm of neutrality, thus on not being politically involved in conflicts in troubled regions, such as the Middle East. And yet, the Iran issue is significantly different. Although the importance of Japan's "special relationship" to Iran and Japan's involvement in the nuclear crisis is largely denied or overlooked in the literature so far, it very well exemplifies Japan's catch-22 in shifting its foreign policy preferences and doctrines. Since the early 2000s, Japan has repeatedly attempted to act as a mediator between Iran and the Western powers, particularly the US. There are, next to Japan's economic interests in Iran, two hitherto neglected factors that drive Japan's interest in the Iranian nuclear crisis: First, Japan's notion of a relative decline of US power; second, Japan's changing foreign policy doctrine, which aims at being recognized as a global great power. However, Japan is so far not taken seriously as a political actor, and the other involved powers do not see what Japan can offer to solve the problems in the negotiation between Iran and the international community. Thus, Japan aims at a deeper involvement to increase its recognition as an important global player, but because Japan so far lacks this exact recognition other actors in the region deny Japan a larger role. Based on interviews and the analysis of official documents the paper therefore aims at elucidating why Japan's foreign policy elite has been so eager to become an active part in the negotiations concerning the Iranian nuclear crisis and the coordination of JCPOA, despite the repeated denial by the other participants and how Japan's foreign policy elite creates strategies to overcome this deadlock.