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- Convenors:
-
Marie Söderberg
(Stockholm School of Economics)
Raymond Yamamoto (Aarhus University)
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- Stream:
- Politics and International Relations
- Location:
- Torre A, Piso 0, Sala 05
- Sessions:
- Friday 1 September, -
Time zone: Europe/Lisbon
Short Abstract:
The panel analyzes the Japanese post-Cold War ODA strategy towards Asia. The need to take greater accounts of Japan's national interest has become prominently advocated by Prime Minster Abe. Actual effects are revealed through examination of three case studies: Indonesia, Philippines and Vietnam.
Long Abstract:
In the past Japan utilized its Official Development Assistance (ODA) primarily to pursue its economic interests. In comparison to other OECD donors, Japan had the highest share of economic infrastructure within its ODA. Furthermore, a high proportion of loans and aid was tied to Japanese companies, a practice that was strongly condemned by other OECD donors. By leaving political and security matters almost completely to the USA, Japan was allowed to focus primarily on its own economic development.
However, the stable bipolar world order that ensured a strong US presence in Asia ceased to exist with the fall of the Berlin Wall. It would soon be clear that Japan had to become more proactive in forming the post-Cold War order, especially in Asia. Due to Article 9 of the Constitution, which limits Japan's military engagement, ODA remains one of the key instruments of Japanese foreign policy. Since 1990, various administrations have advocated for a change of Japan's ODA strategy in order to encounter new challenges facing the country. The consideration of politics and security has stood at the center of various debates, and with the Abe administration ODA was even included in Japan's National Security Strategy (NSS), adopted in December 2013. It highlighted that ODA should not be used only for the economic benefit of the country, but also to protect the rule of law, democracy and human rights.
To what extent has altering Japan's strategy affected ODA towards Asian countries, and what are the new driving forces behind Japan's foreign aid strategy? This panel aims to answer these complex questions through a longitudinal analysis of Japan's involvement.
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Friday 1 September, 2017, -Paper short abstract:
Being a great economic power, Japan is expected to use its ODA to alleviate global poverty and promote liberal principles. Despite human rights violations in Indonesia, Japan has maintained a neutral stance towards the country, and continues to do so as the strategic importance of Indonesia grows.
Paper long abstract:
For the energy-scarce Japan, Indonesia has traditionally been an economically and strategically important country. The need to secure an access to natural resources was the reason why Japan occupied Indonesia in the Pacific War (1942-1945). After the war, Indonesia remained important for Japan and consequently became the main target of Japanese ODA and investments in Asia. Moreover, in addition to its valuable natural resources, Indonesia was important for Japanese building companies as well, which were strongly profiting from the demands of the country's economic infrastructure.
Japan's strategic interests in Indonesia further grew after the Cold War and as new security challenges emerged, including piracy, terrorism and, recently, the territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea. At the same time, Japan's first ODA Charter in 1992 declared that the country is to be a more responsible ODA donor in the future. The Charter indicated a greater engagement in creating a UN-centric world order after the end of the East-West conflict, while committing the country to contributing to the eradication of poverty more actively and to promoting international liberal principles, including freedom, democracy and basic human rights. The position of the Charter was reaffirmed by Abe administration in its Factsheet on Japan-ASEAN relations—"Five Principles of Japan's ASEAN Diplomacy" in 2013.
However, the multifaceted national interest of Japan was at odds with its pledge to contribute to the promotion of liberal principles in Indonesia. Being a young democratic society, the country's political reality continued to include the problems of corruption and violations of human rights. According to the report of Amnesty International, the Indonesian government continues to use excessive force against the opposition and minorities.
This paper analyses Japan's ODA strategy towards Indonesia while arguing that Japan was never willing to publicly criticize Indonesia for its human-rights valuations despite its repeated promise to put more weight on liberal principles.
Paper short abstract:
A new Development Cooperation Charter has been adopted in Japan. Aid shall now ensure Japan's national interests, be more "strategic" and promote public-private cooperation. This paper researches aid implementation on the ground and the role it plays in the Japanese-Philippine relationship.
Paper long abstract:
2015 Japan adopted a new Development Cooperation Charter bearing in mind the National Security Strategy. In the Charter "development" is used in a broader sense and encompasses such activities as peacebuilding and governance, promotion of basic human rights and humanitarian assistance. It foresees a more "proactive" approach. Priority issues are 1. Economic growth of good quality 2. Sharing universal values and realizing a peaceful and secure society 3. Address global challenges to build a sustainable international society.
In Southeast Asia, Japan will support ASEAN connectivity and community building through physical and non-physical infrastructure building. Aid should be extended not only to the poor but also to countries that have already achieved a certain level of economic growth to keep them from being caught in the "middle income trap". The Philippines with a GNI of US$ 3 500 in 2015 and an economic growth forecasted to be 6.4 percent this year is today the third largest recipient of Japanese foreign aid.
According to the Charter implementation of aid should be more "strategic" and public-private cooperation should be promoted. This paper will research the role foreign aid plays in the Japanese-Philippine relationship and be a case study of how the charter is implemented on the ground.
Paper short abstract:
This paper examines the applicability of a 'Normative Power Japan' argument and the function of Japanese foreign aid within such framework. A case study of Japan's aid to Vietnam suggests that the 'rise of China' limits Japanese normative power and the use of aid to such extent.
Paper long abstract:
The incumbent Abe administration in Tokyo has signaled a willingness to shoulder greater responsibilities in the international community—making 'proactive contributions to peace and security'—particularly in the Asia-Pacific. According to the new National Security Strategy (NSS), to protect the rule of law, democracy and human rights in the region should even be considered as falling within Japan's own national interest. To such extent, a more strategic use of Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) should be employed.
Following the (re)-ignition of the South China Sea (SCS) 'dispute', Tokyo has become a fierce advocated for the seas to be 'governed by rule and not might'. Coupled with ODA provisions directly geared towards upholding the rule of law at sea such advocacy has gained support among ASEAN claimants to the SCS dispute. The 'rule of law' (at sea) has become regarded as 'normal' and legitimate behavior among these nations. In that sense Japan has 'normative power'—the ability to set what is to be regarded as 'normal' behavior in international affairs.
This paper traces the applicability of said normative power and the function of ODA with regards to a non-traditional security related field identified in the NSS as a Japanese national interest—protecting democracy and human rights. It is proposed that Japan's recent attempts to frame democracy and human rights as 'normal' behavior among members of ASEAN is derived from the so-called 'rise of China'. However, a case study of Japanese ODA to Vietnam—the number one recipient of Japanese foreign aid in the 21st century—suggests that actual utilization of ODA, specifically addressing the protection of such values, is only feasible for Tokyo to the extent that it provides leverage in its relationship with Hanoi vis-á-vis Beijing.