Paper short abstract:

This paper examines the applicability of a 'Normative Power Japan' argument and the function of Japanese foreign aid within such framework. A case study of Japan's aid to Vietnam suggests that the 'rise of China' limits Japanese normative power and the use of aid to such extent.

Paper long abstract:

The incumbent Abe administration in Tokyo has signaled a willingness to shoulder greater responsibilities in the international community—making 'proactive contributions to peace and security'—particularly in the Asia-Pacific. According to the new National Security Strategy (NSS), to protect the rule of law, democracy and human rights in the region should even be considered as falling within Japan's own national interest. To such extent, a more strategic use of Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) should be employed.

Following the (re)-ignition of the South China Sea (SCS) 'dispute', Tokyo has become a fierce advocated for the seas to be 'governed by rule and not might'. Coupled with ODA provisions directly geared towards upholding the rule of law at sea such advocacy has gained support among ASEAN claimants to the SCS dispute. The 'rule of law' (at sea) has become regarded as 'normal' and legitimate behavior among these nations. In that sense Japan has 'normative power'—the ability to set what is to be regarded as 'normal' behavior in international affairs.

This paper traces the applicability of said normative power and the function of ODA with regards to a non-traditional security related field identified in the NSS as a Japanese national interest—protecting democracy and human rights. It is proposed that Japan's recent attempts to frame democracy and human rights as 'normal' behavior among members of ASEAN is derived from the so-called 'rise of China'. However, a case study of Japanese ODA to Vietnam—the number one recipient of Japanese foreign aid in the 21st century—suggests that actual utilization of ODA, specifically addressing the protection of such values, is only feasible for Tokyo to the extent that it provides leverage in its relationship with Hanoi vis-á-vis Beijing.