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- Convenors:
-
Ivica Petrikova
(Royal Holloway, University of London)
Melita Lazell (University of Portsmouth)
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- Formats:
- Papers
- Stream:
- Challenging Authoritarianism
- Location:
- Jenny Lee, Meeting Room 1
- Sessions:
- Wednesday 19 June, -, -
Time zone: Europe/London
Short Abstract:
This panel explores the relationship between the recent increases in political populism in the world and development in the Global South - ranging from the depiction of developing countries through attitude towards development cooperation to actual provision of development aid.
Long Abstract:
The rise of populism, mostly of the right-leaning kind, has recently affected political scenes in the United States, United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland, and Italy amongst other countries and has been described as the most important political development in Europe and Northern America in the 21st century (Galston, 2018). Populism's rise has not been confined to the Global North either, with populist politicians wielding power in a wide range of non-Western countries, including Turkey, India, and most recently Brazil.
What does this political trend mean for international development cooperation? Populism has been defined as a 'thin ideology' (Friedman, 2017) in that it can attach itself to a spectrum of different political agendas but is distinguished by its division of society into an 'in-group', i.e. the people supporting the populist leader, and 'out-group', essentially everyone else but primarily immigrants, refugees, and minorities. The provision of development aid is in theory guided by the belief that every life has equal value (Gauri, 2017) and thus is in its essence incongruous with populism. However, given that aid has in reality often been deployed to promote national interests, the relationships between populist politics and development aid are likely more complex.
This panel seeks contributions that explore links between populist politics and the provision of development assistance/foreign aid. We also welcome papers that investigate the perception of development cooperation by populist parties and the attitude of populist governments towards poorer countries.
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Wednesday 19 June, 2019, -Yoshiharu Kobayashi (University of Leeds) Edward Lawson (University of South Carolina)
Paper short abstract:
This article examines the link between populism and foreign aid by unpacking populism into its core ideas and examining how populism and nativism interact and combine to influence aid attitudes and spending. Our arguments are supported by quantitative analyses of attitudes and aid spending.
Paper long abstract:
Populism is an ideology consisting of multiple core ideas but also maintaining a symbiotic relationship with other distinct beliefs like nativism. This article introduces a useful way to think about populism to the foreign policy literature by unpacking these "thin" components of populism and examining each in relation to one category of policy, foreign aid. We argue that one component of populism---anti-elitism---and nativist sentiments have strong negative effects on individual attitudes toward foreign aid. Evidence from an original survey supports this argument, while the effects of other components are weaker. Analysis of donors' aid spending also indicates greater anti-elitism and nativism in the population reduce the level of aid. These findings confirm that our decomposition approach is useful to understanding populism and foreign policy and that nativist anti-elitism influences aid attitudes and spending, rather than populism per se.
Ivica Petrikova (Royal Holloway, University of London)
Paper short abstract:
This paper uses quantitative analysis to examine if there is a relationship between populist parties in power in Western countries and the countries' provision of development aid - in amount, in the type of recipient, and in preferred aid sectors.
Paper long abstract:
Over the past two decades, populist parties, some on the left but mostly on the right, have increasingly gained power in parliaments and/or governments of most Western countries. One of the key distinguishing characteristics of populism is its perceived division of society into 'us' (populist leader and her/his supporters) and 'them' (everyone else). Because the provision of development aid is in theory driven by the belief in the equal value of life everywhere, populism and the provision of development assistance are inimical - at least in theory. The reality, in which development aid was always provided at least partially out of donors' national interest, is likely more complex.
This article tests the relationship between populist power and the provision of development aid through a quantitative examination of OECD donors' aid flows between 2000 and 2018, drawing on data sets of populism by Eiermann et al. (2017) and Kyle and Gultchin (2018) and aid data from Development Assistance Committee's QWIDS database. The initial hypothesis to be tested is whether a higher proportion of power held by populist parties translates into a reduction in the provision of development assistance. Further, I will examine if populist parties in power have an effect on which developing countries and which aid sectors receive most development assistance.
Paul Marschall (German Development Institute (DIE))
Paper short abstract:
People use heuristics and shortcuts for managing complexity. Globalization has transformed individual perceptions: they are prone to simple solutions, offered by politicians in their aim for getting support. For dealing with populism in development cooperation an adequate framing of issues is needed
Paper long abstract:
Populism is not a new phenomenon. It can be linked with diverse sets of left- and right-wing approaches. Countries in the global north and south are affected differently. There is evidence that a country's type of integration into globalization has consequences for concrete populism patterns. Alternative facts are used by politicians as narrative for justifying their arguments. This paper analyses populism from the perspective of behavioural political economy, provides an understanding why people can be vulnerable to populistic arguments, and gives suggestions for dealing with it related to development cooperation.
People are not fully rational. Therefore, heuristics and shortcuts are used for managing real world complexities, e.g. in terms of risk perception, adaptive expectations or wishful thinking. Belief distortions are relevant at the level of voters and politicians. The complexity of globalization and the corresponding individual perceptions has transformed voters' expectations, including fears, frustration, or hopelessness, which are dependent on individual values and morals. Thus, people are prone for simple solutions. The field of development cooperation is particularly vulnerable for this. For politicians, populistic wording is a strategy with costs (hostilities) and benefits (support by citizens).
Development cooperation must face the challenges which arise by populism. Think tanks providing policy advice must address them in their pathways to impact. Behavioural insights must be covered in communication strategies to citizens. There is evidence that electoral success is highly sensitive in terms of the corresponding wording. In addition, existing reporting of development cooperation activities must be supplemented by a targeted framing.
Ken Mitchell (Monmouth University)
Paper short abstract:
Do international providers of development aid treat progressive and conservative populist governments the same? Argentina is a constructive case due to its controversial track record with development actors and its experience with progressive (2003-2015) and conservative (2015-2018) populists.
Paper long abstract:
Political populism in South America goes way back. Iconic figures both past (Getúlio Vargas, Juan Perón, Jorge Gaitán) and recent (Carlos Menem, Fernando Collor de Mello, Hugo Chavez, Rafael Correa, Evo Morales, Álvaro Uribe, Néstor and Cristina Kirchner, Mauricio Macri, Alberto Fujimori) fall into the nebulous populist classification. Populism depicts a leadership style rather than a firm policy orientation; indeed, progressive and conservative populism co-exist in countries. Populists appeal to the street in binary us versus them code (we are honest, they are corrupt; we are patriotic, they are terrorists) around highly unrealistic campaign promises (zero poverty, zero debt, end corruption, end crime) while bypassing or devaluing traditional institutions (parties, congress, judiciaries). Election victories in 2018 by Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Iván Duque in Colombia, plus Alfredo Olmedo's potential 2019 run in Argentina, for some, point to a conservative populist wave reversing South America's recent progressive or "pink" populist wave - Evo Morales and Nicolas Maduro still represent the latter. Decaying party systems, unstable economies, rising USA protectionism and slower Chinese economic growth all but assure that South America's drift into rival populisms will continue. Do sources of international development aid distinguish between conservative and progressive populists? Or, does the "populist era" continue the "neoliberal/statist" fault-line of the 1980s and 1990s? Argentina's recent experience with progressive (2003-2015) and conservative (2015-present) populist presidents make it a useful case study, and the paper will examine (1) Inter-American Development Bank aid, (2) Chinese government aid, and (3) global microcredit actors.
Ana Paula Borges Pinho (University of São Paulo King's College London) Adriana Schor (University of São Paulo) Daniela Schettini (University of São Paulo)
Paper short abstract:
This study uses UN data to overcome the lack of official comparative data on non-DAC foreign aid donors to analyze whether they behave differently from DAC donors. The results show authoritarian governments working through the UN system and a concentration of disbursements on few agencies.
Paper long abstract:
In the last two decades, the foreign aid landscape, once monopolized by the traditional OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors, has been changing. The most visible actor is China, but other non-DAC donors are increasingly participating in international cooperation activities. Several studies (Dreher et al 2011, Zimmermann and Smith 2011) investigated whether non-DAC donors act similarly to traditional western donors. However, a lack of official data, and comparable definitions and accounting practices on the aid efforts of non-DAC donors stymies comparisons. This study bypasses such limitations by using data from UN agencies, which report all donations the same way. It represents a part of all foreign aid disbursed by both DAC and non-DAC donors, but offers a sound way to compare the behavior of the two groups.
The results show that non-DAC donors play a relative small role in the UN system (20% in 2016), but it is increasing. More importantly, several authoritarian and populist states, some of which systematically contest UN actions and decisions, are among the top non-DAC regular donors to its agencies. However, non-DAC donors (unlike traditional DAC donors) tend to concentrate their contributions on fewer agencies, some very specific to their national interests. While DAC donors fund the most important UN agencies (UNDP, WFP, UNHCR), non-DAC ones tend to concentrate their resources - Brazil on PAHO; China on DPKO and UN; Russia on DPKO, UN and WFP; and Saudi Arabia on UNRWA and WFP.
Pedriye Mutlu (Istanbul University)
Paper short abstract:
This article aims to explore the implications of AKP's and President Erdoğan's populist discourse and politics in domestic and foreign policy on development cooperation and aid. It looks at Turkey's evolving relations with Sub-Saharan Africa in terms of development cooperation.
Paper long abstract:
There is a proliferating literature on the global rise of populism, populist movements and leaders. However, populism is still highly controversial concept in terms of its usefulness as an analytical category. In the field of foreign policy and international development cooperation, limited attention has been paid to common features of populist politics. Having said that, this paper concerns itself with a single case on Turkey. Under the rule of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi- AKP) and President Erdoğan, Turkey has been one of the non-Western examples of the discussions on populism. On the form of populism, scholars suggested different conceptualisations such as "neoliberal populism", and "authoritarian populism". These conceptualisations have been propounded as an effort to contextualize populism in Turkey, in a wider political and economic transformation. This article aims to explore the implications of AKP's and President Erdoğan's populist discourse and politics in domestic and foreign policy on development cooperation and aid. It confines itself with Turkey's evolving relations with Sub-Saharan Africa and the activities of the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA, Türk İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Ajansı). TIKA was founded after the collapse of USSR, as a new instrument for Turkish foreign policy in 1992 and it has undergone an institutional and functional transformation. The article seeks to answer the following questions: How does Turkey position itself in global politics, through development cooperation and aid? What is the relationship between TIKA's activities in Sub-Saharan Africa and the needs of Turkey's economy?
Krzysztof Krzystek (University of Lodz)
Paper short abstract:
Populism is spreading across Europe. But is populism in Central and Western Europe the same? Does it perceive development cooperation the same way? The author argues that this is not the case and that different past will lead to different results for Western and Central European populist movements.
Paper long abstract:
In 2004 Central Europe united with Western Europe becoming one European family. However, the recent surge in populism originating in CE showed a lack of understanding between the two groups.
The speech aims to present the differences in world-view, which often get lost in translation, due to both sides using the same terminology, but ignoring the different past and experiences of the two groups. This may lead to mistakes in judgment of the political scene or confusion about the reasons behind certain choices. For example, why is Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, considered a progressive left-wing politician in the West, while in Poland he is considered right wing? Consequently - how far right is the current right wing government of Poland? How populist is it really? A genuine understanding is crucial if Europe is to progress and work together for international development.
In the first part of the speech, the author presents the impact that the communist past of CE has on the general world-view and sentiment among the people. Following that, the author explains what impact the lack of colonial past by the CE States has on the depiction of developing countries, the attitude towards the refugee crisis, refugees, minorities and foreign aid.
The author argues that "populist movements" in CE and West are different and what was labeled as "populism" by the West isn't seen as "populist uprising" in CE. Consequently, the knee-jerk reaction against CE may have given unreasonable fuel to populists in the West.