Paper short abstract:

By analysing and comparing the process behind the new petroleum legislation and the VAT Act in Tanzania, our study suggests that lobbyism in poorly regulated natural resource rich countries may be much more important than previously assumed in both the academic and policy-oriented literature.

Paper long abstract:

Petroleum sector institutions in Tanzania are in their formative stages. Intra-governmental coordination is challenging and policy objectives are at times conflicting. A largely unregulated booming new sector provides incentives for rent-seeking and lobbyism. Existing research argues that the lower probability of being sanctioned for a corrupt act in poor countries, means that bribery is the preferred way to influence policy decisions, whereas lobbyism is more common in rich countries. By analysing and comparing the process behind the new petroleum legislation and the VAT Act in Tanzania, our study suggests that lobbyism in poor countries may be much more important than previously assumed in both the academic and policy-oriented literature. We argue that it is too simplistic to expect that businesses will prefer to bribe than lobby if both strategies can achieve the same goal. Larger, organized associations are able to mobilize more powerfully for their demands, partly by engaging professional tax consultants and lobbyists to promote their position to Parliamentarians and senior government officials. The enhanced role of the Big Four international accounting and consultancy firms in tax lobbying in Tanzania, is a reflection of the importance of lobbying and the substantial resources spent on influencing policymakers and legislators. When domestic and foreign companies have the same interests they may pool their resources to influence policy decisions. In contrast, when domestic businesses and petroleum companies have divergent views, a rational strategy for foreign companies would be to lobby on other arenas where their technical know-how could be applied.

Paper short abstract:

This paper reports results from a randomized survey experiment of 3004 household members in Tanzania that sheds light on some possible micro-level mechanisms underlying the resource curse in contexts of weak institutions.

Paper long abstract:

Resource rich countries with weak institutions face the danger of a "resource curse", but few studies have empirically investigated the micro-level mechanisms that explain how resource wealth may hamper development. This paper reports results from a randomized survey experiment of 3004 household members in Tanzania that sheds light on some possible micro-level mechanisms underlying the resource curse in contexts of weak institutions. We use informational videos to generate exogenous variation in citizens' expectations about future gas revenues. Our preliminary analysis indicates that expectations about future gas revenues causally increase expected corruption, which in turn is likely to increase individual propensity to engage in corruption. Furthermore, we find the effect of increased expectations to be driven by older respondents. From the 1990s, the Tanzanian economy experienced a mineral resource boom, but the general public benefited little and corruption increased. Thus, a possible interpretation of this finding is that older respondents are affected by their previous experiences with natural resource revenues. Initiatives to strengthen trust among older Tanzanians in the could therefore be important part of the Government's petroleum policy in managing the resource curse. We find no effect of expectations about future gas revenues on attitudes toward paying taxes.

Paper short abstract:

Results from a randomized field experiment we conducted among eligible voters in Tanzania show that providing morally charged information on self-serving elite behaviour reduces electoral participation.

Paper long abstract:

Does self-serving elite behaviour make citizens more politically active? This paper presents the results from a randomized field experiment where voters in Tanzania were given information about self-serving elite behaviour in two forms, a neutral form and a morally charged one. The results show that voting was significantly reduced in the treatment group that received the morally charged information, compared to the group that received the neutral treatment. We provide evidence suggesting that in captured democracies, morally charged messages of self-serving elite behaviour tend to activate or reinforce sentiments of the futility of democratic action. The analysis suggests that rational choice voting models may have to be extended to include voter sentiment, indicates that effects of information on political action is substantially different in imperfect democracies, provides a potential explanation of why elections in these types of democracies tend to be person- rather than issue focused, and indicates that increased transparency in the absence of perceived agency may not improve democratic accountability.

Paper short abstract:

Ever since the UN intervened in the conflcit in DR Congo the international community has tried to break the accliamed bonds between the warring parties and the mineral economy. This paper analyse these initiatives and the conseqeunces they have created on the ground

Paper long abstract:

Ever since the UN intervened in the conflcit in DR Congo the international community has tried to break the accliamed bonds between the warring parties and the mineral economy. Currently, a new process sponsored by international actors has been implemented in North Kivu. The approach is to reformlaise mines and the mining sector through a bureaucratic-administrative design of tracking minerals from source to plant. This may seem like a most needed initiative, but a closer examiniation of the approach taken and how well it fits with realities on the ground leads to a number of questions. This paper analyse these initiatives and the intended adn unintended results they have created on the ground.

Paper short abstract:

This paper explains how activists get traction on complex policy issues combining professional expertise and moral authority to push economic justice. The unfolding of country by country reporting in the EU and OECD moves in this direction. However, for now, developing countries are not set to gain.

Paper long abstract:

Global Wealth Chains denote transacted forms of capital operating multi-jurisdictionally for the purposes of wealth creation and protection. Those seeking to protect wealth often conflict with governments seeking revenue and activists seeking economic justice. This paper examines one such conflict over company reporting highlighting how activists can combine expertise with moral authority to trump formal authority and rule-making, changing issue content and shifting the location of issue control. The rapid adoption of country by country reporting for multinational companies in the EU and at the OECD testifies to a shift away from market actor control to a situation where the issue of how multinational corporations report performance and for what purposes is heavily contested. However, at this point new rules that require multinationals to provide financial performance metrics for each jurisdiction of operation are unlikely to account for the interests of developing countries. While activists have gained traction on the issue and some states stand to gain greater traction on international capital, country by country reporting at present will not remedy either the resource curse or the finance curse in Africa.

Paper short abstract:

This paper studies the relation between self-serving elite behaviour and citizen political participation. We use a fixed effects approach to analyze the association between portfolio investment in tax havens and voter turnout

Paper long abstract:

Abstract

This paper studies the relation between self-serving elite behaviour and citizen

political participation. We use a fixed effects approach to analyze the association

between portfolio investment in tax havens and voter turnout, using data from

213 parliamentary elections in 65 countries for the period 1998-2014. For

well-functioning democracies, we find a positive relation between the use of

tax havens and voter turnout, suggesting that self-serving elite behaviour is

associated with citizen political mobilization rather than voter apathy.

The estimated relationship is stronger in the period after the 2008 economic crisis,

when elite behaviour was a particularly salient issue.

Paper short abstract:

Somaliland is a a nation that is developing its fiscal social contract and legitimacy. The state and its people, engage in domestic, regional and international fiscal relations using global wealth chains sometimes in innovative ways in order to maintain peace and develop.

Paper long abstract:

Somaliland is a separatist state seeking recognition and already has in place an elected government, a fixed population, a clearly demarcated territory and the capacity to enter into legal relations. The result is a nation that is developing its fiscal social contract and legitimacy with its people. The state and its people, all of whom belong to a certain group of clans within the Somali community, engage in domestic, regional and international fiscal relations using global wealth chains sometimes in innovative ways. This not only allowed them to create, build and develop the state but also potentially add justifiable arguments for the future recognition of the state of Somaliland.