Paper short abstract:

Results from a randomized field experiment we conducted among eligible voters in Tanzania show that providing morally charged information on self-serving elite behaviour reduces electoral participation.

Paper long abstract:

Does self-serving elite behaviour make citizens more politically active? This paper presents the results from a randomized field experiment where voters in Tanzania were given information about self-serving elite behaviour in two forms, a neutral form and a morally charged one. The results show that voting was significantly reduced in the treatment group that received the morally charged information, compared to the group that received the neutral treatment. We provide evidence suggesting that in captured democracies, morally charged messages of self-serving elite behaviour tend to activate or reinforce sentiments of the futility of democratic action. The analysis suggests that rational choice voting models may have to be extended to include voter sentiment, indicates that effects of information on political action is substantially different in imperfect democracies, provides a potential explanation of why elections in these types of democracies tend to be person- rather than issue focused, and indicates that increased transparency in the absence of perceived agency may not improve democratic accountability.