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Abstract

This paper attempts to analyse the complex interplay of geopolitics within Eurasian connectivity. Focusing on key themes such as India's role in contesting the idea of BRI, China's expanding influence, and the evolution of a new Eurasian connectivity paradigm. It investigates the dynamics of infrastructural aid and alliances, China's emerging role in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and the potential establishment of a Sino-centric order in the region. Additionally, it explores cross-border infrastructure projects in the Eurasian neighbourhood and evaluates logistical alternatives amid changing connectivity dynamics.

Focusing on an alternative and a “New Eurasian Connectivity” based on the natural demands of the market, people-to-people connections, digital connectivity, and connectivity of the service sectors. I attempt to understand the rising concern over the debt trap that China has led to many beneficiaries of the BRI and also concern over the rise of the Sino-Centric Eurasian Order, as is visible in Pakistan and parts of Central Asia. It investigates the formation of infrastructural alliances and their role in shaping connectivity initiatives, both regionally and in a larger Eurasian landscape.

This paper relies on secondary literature and has taken insights from work by Bhumitra Chakma and Xiudian Di (eds.), “Belt and Road Initiative and the Politics of Connectivity”. My study goes beyond the book’s central idea. It emphasises that China’s connectivity projects must be based on universally recognised international norms, good governance, the rule of law, openness, transparency and equality and must be pursued to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states in Eurasia. It tries to supplement and provide an alternative to the studies done by Western scholars and institutions, which try to project China’s BRI as a strategic overreach enabled by deep pockets through which they exploit Eurasian states’ natural requirements of the emerging markets.

By delving into these key themes, this conference paper aims to provide a nuanced understanding of the geopolitics surrounding Eurasian connectivity. The study will contribute to the academic knowledge of the complex interactions between geopolitics and connectivity in Eurasia, bridging gaps in the existing literature. It contributes to ongoing academic discussions, informs policy debates, and offers insights into the strategic decisions of nations navigating the complexities of this dynamic and evolving region.

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Transportation cooperation has emerged as a central pillar of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), framed by member governments as essential for strengthening Turkic connectivity and operationalizing the ‘Middle Corridor’ as an alternative East-West route. Yet despite increasing political attention and frequent summit declarations, the depth and coherence of OTS transport cooperation remain limited. This article argues that these outcomes are best understood through the lens of regime complexity, which highlights how states operate within a crowded institutional environment composed of overlapping and competing connectivity frameworks, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the EU’s Global Gateway programs, and various bilateral agreements. Drawing on documentary analysis and elite interviews with diplomats, public officials, and experts across the region, the study shows that OTS members selectively engage with OTS initiatives while simultaneously pursuing national transport priorities through more resource-rich or strategically advantageous regimes. Rather than representing institutional weakness, this selective engagement reflects deliberate strategies of hedging, forum shopping, and layering. The article further demonstrates that transport cooperation within OTS serves not only instrumental goals, such as diversifying transit routes and improving resilience, but also important symbolic and narrative functions, reinforcing discourses of Turkic solidarity and regional identity. By situating OTS transport cooperation within broader Eurasian regime complexity, the study offers a new explanation for the uneven institutionalization of OTS connectivity initiatives and provides a nuanced account of how middle and small states navigate competing transport regimes in a rapidly shifting geopolitical landscape.

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The fragmentation of global supply chains, which has been intensified by great-power rivalry and sanctions, has elevated the strategic importance of transport corridors of intermediary states. In this global political economy, Kazakhstan has actively sought to position itself as a key connectivity hub that links Europe and Asia via investments in transport infrastructure and participation in trans-Eurasian corridors. While existing analyses often explain this strategy in terms of geography and logistical necessity, this paper argues that such accounts can be supplemented by the following idea. Kazakhstan’s connectivity strategy is also shaped by deliberate status-seeking behavior.

The article addresses the research question: What role does status-seeking behavior play in Kazakhstan’s efforts to position itself as a connectivity hub in emerging global supply chains? The paper conceptualizes connectivity as both a material and symbolic foreign policy instrument by building on status-seeking theory and the literature on emerging middle powers. As an aspiring middle power that is operating under material constraints, Kazakhstan uses connectivity initiatives to signal responsibility, thereby seeking international recognition as a constructive intermediary.

Methodologically, the study employs qualitative content analysis of strategic policy documents and connectivity-related initiatives. It examines how connectivity is framed in official discourse through responsibility narratives and multilateral signaling. The analysis demonstrates that material infrastructure development is consistently accompanied by symbolic and diplomatic efforts to reinforce Kazakhstan’s international standing. The paper contributes to debates on middle-power agency by showing how connectivity initiatives function as status-enhancing strategies in a fragmented global order, while remaining constrained by structural and geopolitical limitations.

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This study questions the regionness of the ‘Turkic World’ and examines its construction as a region within the framework of multilateral cooperation and integration efforts among Turkic states from the early 1990s to the present. The ‘Turkic World’, conceptualized here as a space comprised of independent Turkic states, lacks geographical contiguity. While traditional International Relations theories consider geographical contiguity a constitutive feature of an international region, this study utilizes constructivist, cognitive, and functional regionalism theories. These frameworks suggest that regions can be constructed through shared identities, networks, and functional integration rather than strictly through physical proximity. Within this theoretical context, the study traces the shared region-building process among Turkic states by specifically examining the joint declarations of summits of the heads of Turkic states held since1992, which were institutionalized as the Turkic Council in 2010 and later as the Organization of Turkic States. The research observes the frequency of specific spatial and regional terms to map conceptual changes over time. The findings demonstrate a distinct conceptual shift in official discourse. A shared regional vision was largely absent in the declarations until 2015; however, the data reveals a striking increase in the use of the concept ‘Turkic World’ starting from the 2015 Astana Summit. We associate this rise with growing functional regionalism resulting from the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as the same declarations began to emphasize the Middle Corridor more frequently around 2014. We argue that the development of the Middle Corridor has enhanced the functional integration of Turkic states, thereby accelerating the need for, and the discourse surrounding, the construction of a shared region. Furthermore, Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the subsequent economic sanctions since 2014 have increased the geopolitical significance of the Middle Corridor, acting as a critical alternative to the BRI’s Northern Route, and of the Turkic states along this transit corridor as a regional bloc. Ultimately, as reflected in the examined declaration texts, these logistical networks have the potential to transform the ‘Turkic World’ from a purely cultural and cognitive construct into a dynamic and functional region rooted in mutual economic interdependence.