Abstract:

In 1991, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan inherited the same higher education system from the Soviet Union. In 2024, their systems differ substantially, in four inter-related categories: internationalization, massification, privatization, and quality assurance. For example, Kyrgyzstan quickly established two jointly-governed universities, the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University and the Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University; agreed to the headquarters and then an undergraduate campus of the Aga Khan-funded University of Central Asia; actively participated in Erasmus and other international grant programs, hosted Fulbrights, and permitted the establishment of foreign-influenced universities such as the American University in Central Asia and the [then named] International Ataturk Ala-Too University. Private universities were allowed almost immediately, leading to a substantial increase in the proportion of secondary school students continuing on the higher education and, at one point, more than 20 private medical schools teaching in English, aimed at the South Asian international student market. Uzbekistan, on the other hand, with, by design, the lowest percentage of secondary school students continuing to higher education of any of the former Soviet republics, warily accepted a small number of international branch campuses, and did not allow domestic private institutions until after Karimov died. Quality assurance still is handled by the government, whereas in Kyrgyzstan, six private accreditation agencies actively evaluate both programs and institutions.

Based on participant observation, interviews, campus visits, and document analysis during ten weeks in the summer of 2023 and seven months in the first half of 2024, supplemented by long-standing observations of both systems, I argue that the differences in the higher education systems in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are based more on divergences in political leadership, economic realities, legal structures, and demographics than on differences in visions among educators.

Abstract:

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine set in motion unprecedented processes in societies with a history of Russian rule. In Qazaqstan, the brazenly imperial character of Russia’s aggression fueled the rise of previously marginalized decolonial perspectives critical of the USSR and modern-day Russia. Previous analysis of public opinion data demonstrated that ethnic Qazaqs are far more supportive of Ukraine and critical of Russia’s aggression than their ethnic Russian compatriots. However, it is important to delve deeper into the factors associated with perspectives on the war

among ethnic Qazaqs, especially given Qazaqstan’s dramatic demographic transformation since independence.

Importantly, ethnic Qazaqs are far from homogenous. One of the most consequential divides has to do with language. Since independence, Qazaq language, once relegated to rural areas and certain regions of the country (e.g., West Qazaqstan), has made a comeback. Following the abolition of the Soviet-era residential restrictions, massive numbers of Qazaq-speakers migrated from rural to urban areas in search of educational and economic opportunities. The city of Almaty, currently at 2.2 million residents, is by far the largest destination of such migration. As a result, Qazaq language, once largely absent from the former capital, can now be heard in public spaces throughout the city. Nonetheless, there remains a sizable community of Russified urban Qazaqs for whom Russian serves as the first language. Among members of this group, knowledge of Qazaq can range from fluent to non-existent. The division between Qazaq- and Russian-speakers among ethnic Qazaqs is often fraught because thoroughly Russified Qazaqs usually come from more privileged urban backgrounds.

Another important demographic factor to be taken into account is age cohort membership. The population of Qazaqstan is young, with about half of the country’s inhabitants under the age of30. Members of this group were born after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and grew up in independent Qazaqstan. Naturally, their socialization differed markedly from those who came of age during the Soviet era. How, if at all, this has translated into distinct attitudes toward Russia and Ukraine is something we need to learn more about.

I use data from 40 in-depth, face-to-face interviews conducted in Almaty in the summer of 2023 to shed light on the role of age and language in perceptions of war among ethnic Qazaqs.

Abstract:

Uzbekistan pursues a proactive foreign policy, fostering close cooperation with neighboring countries and regions. Particularly dynamic are the relations with the People's Republic of China, which has firmly established itself as the main trade, economic, investment partner, and external creditor of Uzbekistan in recent years. The share of Chinese investments in the country's economy continues to grow. Concurrently, China recognizes the importance of shaping a positive image and expands its presence in the media sphere.

Contemporary research indicates the strengthening of China's informational influence on developing countries. The Chinese government and pro-government structures actively engage with foreign mass media outlets, utilizing various forms of interaction such as content exchange, paid material placements, sponsorship of editorial teams, financial incentives for loyal journalists, organizing press tours, educational trips to China, and more. All of these approaches are applicable in the context of Uzbekistan. In this study, the author will analyze the extent of China's presence in Uzbekistan's media space, identify the specificities and tools employed by the Chinese side in their interactions with local journalists, and overall assess the level of China's informational influence on the Uzbek audience.