Paper abstract:

The main focus of the study is the use of religion as an informal regulator of social relations* by the official legal institution – the Court of Aksakals (court of elders)**.

The data of the field study conducted by the authors during 2022 in all the regions of Kyrgyzstan show a clear trend toward increasing Islamisation of the population and dispute resolution mechanisms, especially in the southern regions of the republic.

Various channels are used for this purpose:

- religious leaders are elected as members of the Courts of Aksakals;

- the Courts of Aksakals invite religious leaders to court sessions for consultation if a dispute involves religious issues (religious divorce (uch talaq), polygamy, dowry, etc.);

- Aksakal Courts use an oath on a holy book (Koran) as evidence in resolving a dispute;

- Aksakal Courts use the authority of religious leaders to reconcile parties;

- Aksakal courts refer disputes to religious leaders, and conversely, religious leaders refer disputes to the Courts of Aksakals.

Our hypothesis is that the process of Islamization in the Aksakal Courts practice can develop in two directions:

1. Controlled Islamisation: when the norms of religion will be applied in a way that does not contradict the law. Shariah norms will not be used directly, but as part of the cultural code of the Kyrgyz: through the norms of ethics, morality, traditions, and customs.

2. Out-of-control Islamisation. This will lead to the fact that the Shariah norms will be opposed to the law. In particular, it will be legalized to decrease the marriage age to 16, polygamy, and home education for children. Sharia courts will be set up in some localities as a parallel justice system.

Obviously, the first scenario is preponderant in the political-legal sense. In this respect, the Courts of Aksakals, which have not only a dispute resolution function but also an educational and legal propaganda function, are a deterrent to the uncontrolled spread of religion and therefore need the support of the state.

* Religious norms are not part of Kyrgyzstan's formal legal system

** Aksakal courts (courts of elders) are constitutionally recognised as a non-state body for conflict resolution and prevention at the local level

Paper abstract:

What is the nature of Soviet secularism? How does its conceptual and affective legacy impact the lives of post-Soviet Muslims today? Engaging with the burgeoning literature on secularism, my paper tackles these questions by focusing on the rise of Islamic piety movements in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan. Scholars specializing in Central Asia have been increasingly interested in these movements, inquiring into their genealogies and speculating about structural reasons for their spread. But I have been drawn to something else. I have been trying to understand how non-observant Kyrgyzstani Muslims grapple with the growing presence of pietistic Islam in their country. Although the piety movements are different from each other, all of them challenge Soviet ways of being Muslim by stressing the importance of regular rituals (e.g., the five daily prayers), Islamic ethics of dressing (i.e., covering certain parts of the body), and certain lifestyle choices (e.g., avoiding alcohol, gambling, and premarital sex). Precisely because of this, they ignite interest and curiosity, but also trigger enduring ambivalence, skepticism, anxiety, and even hostility among the non-observant majority of Kyrgyzstani Muslims. Drawing on two years of fieldwork in Bishkek, my paper shows how this range of affective reactions towards pietistic Islam reveals some of the key concepts through which the Soviet state enacted its sovereignty in Central Asia. Seen from this perspective, the post-Soviet Islamic revival acts as a sort of contrasting background that throws the conceptual and affective legacy of Soviet secularism into relief. Accounting for this legacy, I argue, is key to understanding the contemporary religious landscapes of Central Asia.