Click the star to add/remove an item to/from your individual schedule.
You need to be logged in to avail of this functionality,
and to see the links to virtual rooms.
Log in
- Convenors:
-
Elmurod Sobirov
(Lund University)
Rustamjon Urinboyev (Lund University)
Send message to Convenors
- Chair:
-
Elmurod Sobirov
(Lund University)
- Discussant:
-
Erhan Dogan
(Marmara University)
- Format:
- Panel
- Theme:
- Sociology & Social Issues
- Location:
- William Pitt Union (WPU): room 538
- Sessions:
- Friday 20 October, -
Time zone: America/New_York
Abstract:
The proposed panel aims to examine the interplay between informality and everyday business life in the Central Asian context. Central Asia’s business and economic context represents intriguing, given the fact that Central Asian countries are considered some of the most corrupt countries in the world according to Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index. At the same time, the Central Asian region is one of the key prospective markets for foreign investors due to its rich natural resources, growing middle-class population and progressive opening up to the outside world. However, the Central Asian region is a challenging environment to navigate and understand its legal culture. This is due to authoritarian tendencies, uncertain legal environment and the peculiar way in which the rule of law is interpreted and applied in the region, which leads to a conflict between (a) what is considered moral, socially acceptable or even legal in the region, and (b) what is considered good practice, in line with international law and standards. This is further exacerbated by the recalcitrant social norms and practices that promote alternative (to the state law) versions of social behaviour. The proposed panel aims to explore and illustrate these processes by analysing the social context of business in Uzbekistan, the nexus between local government and local business elites in rural Uzbekistan, formal and informal institutions of land allocation in rural Central Asia, and business associations in Kyrgyzstan.
Accepted papers:
Session 1 Friday 20 October, 2023, -Paper abstract:
Recent increased interest in the economic institutions with which the economists and international organisations try to explain the differences in the economic growth levels of the developing countries stress on the security of property rights. The absence of the long-term and stable political structures in governments like Kyrgyzstan, which could not create the right economic environment for security of the property rights might have, on the other hand, created other market institutions, such as business associations. There is increasing evidence about the advantages of these institutions from collective bargaining power to information flow among the business networks, which can lead to higher entrepreneurship and innovation. In Kyrgyzstan, increasingly several laws and government programmes are being designed followed by the lobbying from the business associations or even being developed together with them. Based on the interviews with 22 representatives of public and private sector actors, this qualitative study analyses the business associations from the institutional perspective to identify their weight in decision-making process, and they are changing the environment the business operate in. This study will also attempt at addressing the question of why these institutions could emerge and develop in Kyrgyzstan more than in other Central Asian countries.
Paper abstract:
The collapse of the Soviet Union paved a way for many post-Soviet countries to liberalize their economies and to implement more laws on private ownership and market-oriented principles by introducing Western values into the business climate. Many scholars argue that the oligarchic capitalism of the early 1990s and current monopoly-based business structures rose as a result of the weak presence of states which were forced to seek financial capital in exchange for questionable legitimate political and economic rights in the post-Soviet area. Under the slogans of legalizing the economy by defeating the shadow economy and corruption, many post-communist countries, including Uzbekistan, created new informal ways to control and manage the big businesses and create favourable conditions for their future progression, while at the same time pursuing both legal and economic oppression to the medium and small-scale businesses which led to the natural emergence of business networks. Institutionalization of business networks is consigned by some researchers to the periphery of economic studies, but in the case of postcolonial countries, we can observe that socio-legal motives of such an institutionalization are serving as a primary engine not only of economic development, but also of the democratization of laws shaping the business climate, eradicating corruption in the private sector, and involving new ethical standards in economic interactions within their business networks and beyond it. As in the case of Uzbekistan, business networks are considered by local politicians as important actors to support the government to better the legal conditions for the operating businesses and to enhance the taxation and financial systems in a way to empower the shift of small and medium companies to the larger scale with the sake of targeting bigger markets within the state and in the region. Hence, by engaging with widespread academic debates, this article provides analyses of both the ‘dark’ and positive sides of the institutionalization of business networks from the socio-legal perspective through the case of Uzbekistan.
Keywords: business networks, corruption, business law, social norms, Uzbekistan.
Paper abstract:
Shavkat Mirziyoyev, following his election as the president of Uzbekistan in December 2016, emerged as a reform-oriented leader, openly acknowledging the failure of the Karimov-era governance practices. He presented himself to both the local population and international community as a reformer, expressing eagerness to open the heavily closed country, modernize the system of governance and curb systemic corruption. The pace of changes was particularly felt in the local governance agenda. Perhaps, the most noteworthy feature of these changes was the introduction of the system of sectoral management of regions and districts which resulted in the new local governance system in entire Uzbekistan – each district is being divided into four geographic sectors led by hokim (the governor), public prosecutor, chief of police and head of tax department.
Heads of sectors—hokim, prosecutor, police chief, head of the tax department—require one to fulfil many functions outside of his/her qualifications and skills. Each sector leader is responsible for addressing and solving all issues of local importance, essentially assuming the broad list of local government functions. For example, public prosecutors, whose professional task is to ensure the rule of law, crime prevention, and human rights, are now also tasked with implementing state social welfare policies. However, assigning social welfare and job creation functions to sector leaders raises numerous questions about capacity and leads to informality and frustration. In the absence of favourable results in resolving issues of the local population, sector leaders are removed from office, even if the heads of the other three sectors (prosecutor, head of the tax service and head of police) do not have direct access to local budget and are dependent on hokim’s discretion. As a result, this “authority” of sector leaders without resources can lead to illegal activity, making sector leaders dependent on local business elites who have the resources to meet the needs of sectors. Accordingly, corruption, informal/semi-legal practices, and conflicts of interest are endemic to local governance in Uzbekistan. The way the local governance system is organized is prone to corruption and informality. Based on these considerations, this chapter aims to examine the sectoral management in Uzbekistan’s local governance system and its impact on the business environment and legal system. The chapter relies on the authors’ ethnographic fieldwork conducted between June 2021- November 2022 in Tashkent city, Bukhara and Fergana regions of Uzbekistan.
Paper abstract:
Institutions, defined as “rules of the game” by North (1990) and others are crucial ingrediencies of economic and social life. They come in different variants, but most important is the distinction, and often parallel existence, of formal and informal institutions, which differ also by the type of enforcement they entail. This way, they provide people guidelines how to act towards others and, vice versa, what kind of action to expect in specific circumstances. Institutions thus can create trust, which is at the core of any mutual exchange situation. This paper looks at one key economic institution, namely property rights and allocation rules to land, comparing cases from different parts of Central Asia as empirical material. While the role as a means of production may differ, depending on the economic activity, secure and reliable access to land is of eminent importance in any rural setting and defines also the distribution of material wealth and the gains from trade.