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Accepted Paper:
Formal and informal institutions of land allocation in rural Central Asia: Theoretical considerations and empirical examples from Uzbekistan, Qazaqstan and Mongolia
Peter Finke
(University of Zurich)
Paper abstract:
Institutions, defined as “rules of the game” by North (1990) and others are crucial ingrediencies of economic and social life. They come in different variants, but most important is the distinction, and often parallel existence, of formal and informal institutions, which differ also by the type of enforcement they entail. This way, they provide people guidelines how to act towards others and, vice versa, what kind of action to expect in specific circumstances. Institutions thus can create trust, which is at the core of any mutual exchange situation. This paper looks at one key economic institution, namely property rights and allocation rules to land, comparing cases from different parts of Central Asia as empirical material. While the role as a means of production may differ, depending on the economic activity, secure and reliable access to land is of eminent importance in any rural setting and defines also the distribution of material wealth and the gains from trade.