Paper abstract

During the 1990’s, a school of thought emerged which emphasised on political decentralisation as the major an effective means to achieve democratisation. In a diverse nation every individual, community, ethnic group requires a political identity along with participation in the decision-making process. Central Asian states have rich ethnic diversity. Diversity and democratic decentralisation are intrinsically related to one another. In decentralised political system, every individual shares the power in political decision-making process. Political participation is a means through which the individual can fulfils his/her socio-political and economic needs. Active political participation promotes political stability and economic development. Kyrgyzstan became an independent country in 1991. As one of the poorest soviet republics, it totally depended of Moscow and faced an economic crisis after the collapse of USSR. As a result, Kyrgyzstan took financial support from the international institutions upon a condition to liberalise, privatise and to adopt democratic decentralisation. After the disintegration of the soviet, it was seen that democracy could not flourish in the Central Asian states due to the lack of democratic decentralisation. Kyrgyzstan is one of the Central Asian States that took steps to establish a democratic system and decentralise its political and administrative authority.

After 1992, Kyrgyzstan adopted a democratic political system, President Aksar Akaev took various steps that promoted political decentralisation at the lowest levels. These local self-governments were given financial autonomy. Under the regime of Akaev free media, political parties and liberal economy was promoted in Kyrgyzstan. The western NGO’s provide aid to several self-local government for basic infrastructure developmental activities. Due to lack of resources and political socialisation the actual meaning of democratic decentralisations could not be achieved. The approach of political elites of Kyrgyzstan towards democratic decentralisation is a full of contradictions.

The paper will look into the role played by democratic decentralisation in the promotion of democracy in Kyrgyzstan. It will critically analyse the role of aid provided by the western countries and several international institutions in deepening the idea of decentralisation. This paper will also analyse the stand-point of Russia and China towards democratic decentralisation and political stability in Kyrgyzstan. This study is based on the rational choice theory. It is based on certain assumptions about actors' motives and their choices. The theory is based on methodological individualism and the assumption of rationality.

Key words: Decentralisation, Democratisation, Kyrgyzstan, Political Socialisation, Political Stability.

Paper abstract

This study examines the non-violent revolutionary regime transition that occurred in Armenia. This transition is analyzed in the context of the post-Soviet regime transformations, whereby the ruling elites succeeded in regaining political office right after revolutionary social movements in all circumstances, except the Armenian case. The main research objective of this study is to explain why the social movement in Armenia resulted in the breakdown of the authoritarian regime despite its well-established ruling party, stable political party system, a strong state, cohesive elite, coercive apparatuses, unity in national identity, clerical backing, and external support. The project underlines the importance of the authority gap and political actors' expectations regarding the authoritarian breakdown.

Paper abstract

Preferences in Presidential Appointees in Authoritarian Regimes: Loyalty vs. Competence

Competence and/or loyalty are two most important factors during an appointment in high-ranking governmental positions in both democracies and authoritarian regimes. Many of the existing studies suggest that dictators often prefer loyalty over competence when appointing subordinates, although competent subordinates are more likely to contribute to effective repression and economic performance. This project seeks to contribute to the growing theoretical and empirical debate on presidential appointments in authoritarian regimes by examining an unexplored case of Azerbaijan. It investigates why two authoritarian leaders within the same regime have different preferences regarding presidential appointments. I argue that international factors contributed to the variation between Aliyev Sr. and Aliyev Jr.'s appointment strategies, and that Aliyev Jr. appoints loyal and competent cadres, unlike Aliyev Sr. who prioritized only loyalty. Specifically, while both leaders had the same domestic concerns: stability, managing elections and distributing rents, Aliyev Jr. also has international concerns. Growing pressure from the EU for reforms as part of its aid policy, and dependency on international financial institutions put the government under pressure to introduce reforms. To address this external challenge, Aliyev Jr. had to introduce some cosmetic changes, requiring him to not only rely on loyal cadres, but also find those who are loyal and competent. While loyal cadres are key to the regime’s stability and longevity, they might not be capable of managing reforms, especially to make sure that a reform does not get out of control as with glasnost or perestroika. For this reason, I argue that Aliyev Jr. appoints competent cadres. However, this does not mean that he prefers competence over loyalty, but rather it means that for some positions he needs officials who are both loyal and competent.

Paper abstract

The traditional narrative on state-civil society relations in the consolidated authoritarian regimes of Central Asia is one of coercion with little room for independent NGOs which challenge the states' discourse. There is however emerging evidence of a gradual shift in relationships. First, the distinction between independent organisations (NGOs) and government owned bodies (GONGOs) is becoming blurred as the former struggle to remain financially buoyant and the latter find (limited) opportunities to influence the state. Second, the role played by international donors in authoritarian regimes is fraught with obstacles/resistance making internal civil society organisations more self-reliant and the state grants' application process more competitive. Third, the context is changing with a younger more assertive generation willing to challenge the vestiges of the Soviet era. Using Kazakhstan as a Central Asian case study, this paper finds there is an increasing role for civil society along a NGO-GONGO continuum aimed at 'challenging existing realities' even within the parameters of authoritarian states.

CO-AUTHOR DR COLIN KNOX