Paper abstract:

Preferences in Presidential Appointees in Authoritarian Regimes: Loyalty vs. Competence

Competence and/or loyalty are two most important factors during an appointment in high-ranking governmental positions in both democracies and authoritarian regimes. Many of the existing studies suggest that dictators often prefer loyalty over competence when appointing subordinates, although competent subordinates are more likely to contribute to effective repression and economic performance. This project seeks to contribute to the growing theoretical and empirical debate on presidential appointments in authoritarian regimes by examining an unexplored case of Azerbaijan. It investigates why two authoritarian leaders within the same regime have different preferences regarding presidential appointments. I argue that international factors contributed to the variation between Aliyev Sr. and Aliyev Jr.'s appointment strategies, and that Aliyev Jr. appoints loyal and competent cadres, unlike Aliyev Sr. who prioritized only loyalty. Specifically, while both leaders had the same domestic concerns: stability, managing elections and distributing rents, Aliyev Jr. also has international concerns. Growing pressure from the EU for reforms as part of its aid policy, and dependency on international financial institutions put the government under pressure to introduce reforms. To address this external challenge, Aliyev Jr. had to introduce some cosmetic changes, requiring him to not only rely on loyal cadres, but also find those who are loyal and competent. While loyal cadres are key to the regime’s stability and longevity, they might not be capable of managing reforms, especially to make sure that a reform does not get out of control as with glasnost or perestroika. For this reason, I argue that Aliyev Jr. appoints competent cadres. However, this does not mean that he prefers competence over loyalty, but rather it means that for some positions he needs officials who are both loyal and competent.